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Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs), such as blockchains, are primarily tamper-resistant 
and time-stamped databases. They allow multiple parties to record, verify and share data 
on a peer-to-peer basis across a network, in decentralised, synchronised and transparent 
ways, with limited human intervention and reduced intermediate steps. These technologies 
are mostly known for business use cases, from cryptocurrencies to asset track and 
tracing. But there are numerous organisations nowadays searching for alternative ways to 
harness the potential of DLTs in the pursuit of public and social good, from local to global 
challenges, and towards more inclusive, cooperative, sustainable, ethical or accountable 
digital and physical worlds. This Science for Policy report explores the current status of 
this particular field both theoretically and empirically, in the framework of the project 
#DLT4Good: Co-creating a European Ecosystem of DLTs for Social and Public Good. Part 
One offers a conceptual overview of the connections between main features of DLTs and 
their potential for social and public good goals. Emphasis is placed on different approaches 
to decentralisation, and on core building blocks of DLTs linked with values such as trust, 
privacy, self-sovereignty, autonomy, inclusiveness, transparency, openness, or the commons. 
Part Two comprises a scanning of the current European ecosystem of DLT projects with 
activities in this field. It contains a summarized version of a database published online 
with 131 projects, and a quantitative review of main trends. It also includes a qualitative 
assessment of 10 projects selected from the larger sample to showcase this field and its 
diversity. Part Three concludes with six independent position papers and recommendations 
from experts and advisors of the #DLT4Good project. The main topics addressed range 
from decentralized governance to collaborative economies, with highlights on issues such 
as trust, verifiability, transparency, privacy or bottom-up coordination.
ABSTRACT
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Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs), such as blockchains, are primarily tamper-
resistant and time-stamped databases that allow multiple actors in a network to 
record, verify or share data on a peer-to-peer basis, in decentralised, synchronised and 
transparent ways. 
These technologies are often associated with commercial use cases, from cryptocurrencies 
to asset track and tracing. But a number of organisations are looking into alternative ways 
to harness the potential of DLTs to address social and public good challenges, from 
tackling specific local or global issues at digital and physical levels, to enabling more 
sustainable, ethical, inclusive, cooperative, transparent, or accountable worlds. 
This report explores this field in the framework of #DLT4Good: Co-creating a European 
Ecosystem of DLTs for Social and Public Good, an interdisciplinary project grounded on 
anticipatory innovation concepts and tools to envision and test use cases of DLTs in 
this context. #DLT4Good is coordinated by the European Commission’s Joint Research 
Centre (JRC), in collaboration with the Directorate-General for Communications Networks, 
Content and Technology (DG CONNECT). It is supported by the European Parliament (EP) 
as part of a Pilot Project.
The main objective of the report is to shed light on why this topic deserves attention 
from research to policy, which are its defining features and key principles, how is it 
developing through concrete initiatives, and last, but not least, what ideas can be be 
put forward for decision-makers to reflect about and act upon at this moment.
In an overview of DLTs in the field of social and public good, and how their current use 
can be further explored for positive impact, the following insights can be presented: 
• We should look into how DLT projects can strengthen civil society or the public
space in contexts as financial inclusion, fair supply chains, or sustainable
environment. But the general role of DLTs here must be assessed through more than
just the identity or purpose of specific applications. There is also need to understand
how DLT features such as decentralisation can be generally approached, and in
which ways this heightens the impact of these technologies.
• Main differences in uses of DLTs for social and public good often come attached
with drivers for decentralisation. Multiple motivations and approaches generate
impact, not tied to institutional layouts or market orientations. But broader effects
can be linked with investing in decentralisation beyond technical structures,
such as at governance and other levels, combined with principles as autonomy,
openness, privacy, or commons-based implementations.
• The expansion of decentralisation offers other possibilities when we observe
for instance current and upcoming financial or organisational territories of
experimentation. This is crucial as a testbed for wider and more inclusive innovations
necessary for larger DLT spaces, with examples such as new collaboration platforms
for resource distribution and management, which allow for alternative forms to
allocate value and decision-making powers.
EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY  
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Scanning through the current European ecosystem of DLT projects for public and social good, 
a qualitative sample of 131 projects was selected to showcase the field. This was based 
on predefined criteria and a collective stewardship process supported by external experts 
and DLT communities. No inferential reading should be made on these projects as statistical 
representatives of this ecosystem, as they are part of a diffuse and fast-changing context.   
Detailed information on the projects can be found online via the #DLT4Good Scanning 
tool of the Competence Centre on Foresight published on the Knowledge4Policy 
platform of the European Commission. Below are some of our main findings:
• 68% of the projects analysed emerged between 2016 and 2018, with a spike of
40% in 2017. 66% of projects have their operations in an EU-27 country.
(Fig. 01 – Main country of origin) 
• Seven sectors of activity are the most represented, with 69% of the projects.
(Fig. 05 – Relation between sectors of activity and region) 
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• Eleven types of applications are operated by 71% of our total sample of projects.
(Fig. 06 – Types of applications in all projects)
• 22% of all projects are in live mode, while 53% is now in a pilot stage. 10% claim
to have developed a new DLT. 73% are built on an existing public blockchain,
without significant differences between for-profit and non-profit projects.
(Fig. 13 – Relation between types of DLTs / Blockchains and profit orientation.)
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A deeper dive into ten of these projects was also produced. It is aimed at better 
exploring and showcasing the existing heterogeneity in approaches to decentralisation, 
impacts, geographies, sectors, applications, technical and governance structures, 
funding models, and more. In a combined reading of the projects two reflections emerge: 
• Looking to commonalities, it is perceivable that all projects share a criticism of
current network structures and the centralization they embody. DLTs emerge as
opportunity to counter it via experimentation, with changes in not only technical,
but also governance and economic models. There is an aspiration that vast adoption
of DLTs will lead to bottom-up empowerment, through more transparent and open
networks, better command over data, or transference of resources to communities.
• But looking into diversity, various stances exist between ambitions to achieve
radical complete transformations, and improvement or reform of the network
structures. This is observed from large scope projects, wanting to create a novel
decentralized internet with a wide set of applications, to more targeted projects,
aiming to boost social resilience by combining existing local operations with DLTs.
To conclude this report, seven high-level experts and advisors of the #DLT4Good 
project were invited to produce position papers. They reflected upon and offered 
their independent perspectives on multiple issues regarding the use of DLTs such as 
blockchains towards the pursuit of social and public good objectives.  
The topics addressed range from the prospects of DLTs for decentralised governance, 
to their role for alternative collaborative economies. Moreover, several discussions 
are also set in these papers regarding current and future intersections of DLTs with 
matters of trust, verifiability, transparency, privacy or bottom-up coordination. 
This exercise benefited from feedback loops to guarantee that the papers were 
complementary and also relevant for the intended audiences of the report. What follows 
are the main recommendations on DLTs for social and public good aimed at EU 
policy-makers and other relevant decision-makers, also produced by these experts and 
advisors: 
• Marcela Atzori focuses on a need to avoid fragmentation and to develop
convergent approaches to DLTs among EU Member States, to advance mutual
learning and achieving technical standardisation, and dissemination of good practices
and policies. She also recommends promoting social inclusion and user-centric
technological design to generate social value and increase autonomous digital
accessibility through these technologies.
•  Balász Bodó centres his advice on the idea of trust, exploring how traditional
institutions can help DLTs to overcome some issues related to trustworthiness.
He also states that trust-minimizing architectures such as those of DLTs should
not replace interpersonal trust, or prevent its emergence, and warns that these
architectures could crowd out and replace mechanisms that produced high levels of
trust in our institutions.
•  Sarah Meiklejohn suggests to consider all ledger technologies, not just distributed
ones, if the goal is to tackle social and public good problems in near-term futures,
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as some might be functional at a much faster pace. She also recommends to work 
backwards from these problems to produce contextualized solutions and avoid 
‘one-size-fits-all’ frameworks.
• Jaya Klara Brekke directs our attention to the idea that DLTs for social and 
public good should take a ‘minimum viable proof’ approach to traceability and 
transparency, meaning that only that which is relevant, adequate, and absolutely 
necessary should be in a DLT. As a follow-up, she suggests that privacy should 
be promoted as a main principle and use case in this field to increase future 
democratic control.
• Samer Hassan and David Rozas advocate for investments in research and 
development of free / open source decentralised technical infrastructures, where 
DLTs could be ground for customized organisational alternatives in current 
innovation ecosystems. They also argue for strengthening EU hubs on decentralised 
technologies with diverse and not-just-for-profit projects, and promoting platform 
co-ops as emerging governance and business models. 
• Primavera De Filippi discusses DLTs for bottom-up coordination in global governance. 
She encourages, on the short term, the adoption of DLTs as a means to provide 
technological guarantees, and for regulatory compliance to promote innovation, 
on the medium term. She also recommends fostering implementation and progressive 
adoption of shared DLT infrastructures for future services that extend beyond 
national boundaries.
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1.1 Perspectives on Distributed 
Ledger Technologies (DLTs)
Standard definitions of Distributed Ledger 
Technologies (DLTs), the most recognizable 
being blockchains, take us to their existence as 
tamper-resistant and time-stamped databases. 
With primary origins in cryptocurrencies such as 
Bitcoin, they now allow for an ample range of 
digital or digitized assets to be recorded, updated, 
validated or replicated, across one or more 
networks, in a decentralised, synchronised and, 
presumptively, transparent manner.
DLTs enable parties who are physically distant, or 
have no particular trust in each other, to record, 
verify or share data on a peer-to-peer basis with 
reduced need for intermediate steps or even 
the intervention of other actors. Moreover, when 
combined with specific automation attributes, 
such as smart contracts, some DLTs support the 
execution of complex procedures and agreements 
with limited to zero requirements of external or 
internal human participation.
Their development grows as a trend, something 
noticeable in international initiatives as the EU 
Blockchain Observatory and Forum1 (Courcelas, 
Lyons and Timsit 2020), the OECD Global 
Blockchain Policy Forum (OECD 2019)2 or the 
Strategic Intelligence Platform of the World 
Economic Forum (WEF 2020)3. Not only that, but 
functional use cases are largely more diverse 
now than we could observe a few years ago 
(Pólvora et al 2018)4. 
The hype around DLTs also continues. It has 
peaks and it has plunges. But these technologies 
still get most of the attention that made them 
visible in recent years, from media to policy. 
Perhaps most significantly, they still benefit from 
what are deemed as less publicly visible moves 
1 https://www.eublockchainforum.eu/initiative-map
2 https://www.oecd.org/finance/oecd-blockchain-policy-forum.
htm
3 https://intelligence.weforum.org/topics/
a1Gb00000038qmPEAQ?tab=publications
4 https://blogs.ec.europa.eu/eupolicylab/blockchain4eu/
from investors, developers, managers, researchers, 
and several other actors. They are searching 
for novel or alternative technological, economic, 
financial, social, and governance possibilities, 
to carry out their own agendas, or pursue wider 
collective goals (Nascimento et al 2019).
Nonetheless, after early promises of muscled 
revolutions in a multitude of sectors, DLTs 
have not fully delivered what was frequently 
forecasted and announced. In this, they are not 
as unique or disruptive, considering the pace 
and adoption of other emerging technologies, 
as some of its most devoted supporters 
preach. Criticisms emerge typically around DLTs 
such as blockchains for being slow (Mearian 
2018), wasteful (Truby 2018), expensive and 
inefficient (Odiljon and Gai 2019), unscalable 
(Bano, Al-Bassam, and Danezis 2017; Chu and 
Wang 2018), and possibly most strikingly, for 
supporting or allowing at times a centralization 
of power and resources, opposite effects of 
what this class of technologies was originally 
envisioned for (Torpey 2019).
All these criticisms are relevant and most DLTs 
have also to emerge as stable, appropriated 
and integrated solutions for the most part 
(Nascimento, Pólvora and Sousa Lourenço 
2018). But coupled with the last point above, 
we see more and more organisations searching 
for alternative ways to explore and harness 
the potential of DLTs, while having more 
intersections with the spaces of public and 
social good. There is now a growing interest 
in reflecting about and experimenting with 
DLTs beyond original financial or commercial 
use cases, towards different applications and 
operational models, and deeply connected 
with possibilities of more inclusive, convivial, 
cooperative, ethical, sustainable or accountable 
digital and physical frameworks. 
1.2 Searches and intersections in 
alternative spaces
Beyond the most expectable territories of 
non-profit, third-sector or governmental 
INTRODUCTION 
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organisations, a considerable and diverse set 
of DLT projects is drawing, for instance, on 
heterodox economic and governance models, 
and a vast history of open source technologies, 
peer-to-peer production or commons-based 
approaches, to develop alternative solutions 
for structures that are mainly centralized at 
its core, even if technically distributed (Ostrom 
1990; Oram 2001; Rozas et al 2018; De Filippi 
and Hassan 2015; Brekke forthcoming). By 
following these or similar routes, most DLTs can 
impact the social and public good with concrete 
technical applications that deliver specific 
results in more distributed ways to local or 
global challenges. 
Moreover, some DLTs might also have a 
different impact if opening up the larger field 
of possibilities for individual and collective 
action, crossing largely into wider movements 
as those of appropriate technologies, civic tech, 
digital social innovation, and akin. Some DLTs 
can help to decentralise and disintermediate 
decision-making in a system through enabling 
participants to better access, operate or build 
that system. Gains could be observed for 
instance in collective infrastructures not taken 
by centralizing actors that own, control, or 
enforce conditions of engagement. 
We are now in a crucial moment to understand 
what this space is, and why, where and how 
this type of alternative searches takes place. 
On top of that, we are in a moment where it is 
especially relevant for decision-makers first, to 
have an evidence-based perspective on which 
benefits DLTs can generate through projects 
targeting social and public good, and second, 
to start anticipating how far DLTs can move us, 
envisioning permanent changes from digital to 
physical structures.
Numerous explorations of this trend were 
carried out in recent years. They have 
been produced by consultancies such as 
Accenture to expand their services beyond 
traditional business use cases, and target 
non-governmental or social innovation 
organisations with strategic advice on adoption 
and implementation of DLTs for issues such as 
fighting human trafficking or transparency in 
land registration (Podder 2017)5. We observed 
them emerging from within big market players 
and technology providers such as IBM with 
ambition to position their own infrastructures 
as problem-solvers for societal problems, from 
sustainability on plastic waste to microfinancing 
in local food systems (Wieck and Cuomo 
2019)6. Most substantially perhaps, we saw 
such explorations drafted by international 
organisations looking to assess the potential 
of these same technologies for their own 
challenges on the ground, as in the recent brief 
by the UNHCR on the use of DLTs in refugee and 
displacement contexts (Lee 2020)7, or even the 
practical internal developments outlined by the 
UN Innovation Network. This last one goes from 
a transparent supply-chain program managed 
by the WFP between Djibouti and Ethiopia, to 
5 https://www.accenture.com/us-en/insights/technology/
blockchain-for-good
6 https://www.ibm.com/blockchain/for-good
7 https://www.unhcr.org/innovation/connectivity-for-refugees/
It is now relevant for 
decision-makers first, to 
have an evidence-based 
perspective on which 
benefits DLTs can generate 
through projects targeting 
social and public good, and 
second, to start anticipating 
how far DLTs can move 
us, envisioning permanent 
changes from digital to 
physical structures.
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a cryptocurrency investment fund managed by 
UNICEF worldwide to target start-ups dedicated 
to the social and public good (UNIN 2020)8.
The current report intends to carry yet another 
perspective into this DLTs discussion space. 
A considerable investment was placed on an 
empirical scan of the current European ecosystem 
of projects in a broad field of public and social 
good. The goal is to know what they are, which 
are their main configurations, and namely, how 
can we show at least part of their diversity. 
We equally directed our collective efforts into 
other developments at conceptual levels. 
This elaborates on what higher intersections 
might also exist between DLTs and the notions 
of public and social good, with emphasis on 
the decentralisation effects that DLTs can 
and do enable. As mentioned before, such 
effects happen not simply at a technical level 
through features as disintermediation. And 
we also looked into what they could entail in 
more specific terms, considering alternative 
distributions of power, resources and more, 
as well as into what they could signal on 
more abstract layers, linked with values as 
trust, privacy, self-sovereignty, autonomy, 
inclusiveness, transparency, openness, or 
cooperativeness and the commons. 
1.3 #DLT4Good: Co-creating a 
European ecosystem of DLTs for 
social and public good
The European Commission has supported this 
broad field of DLTs on numerous occasions 
already, through funding programmes such 
as the Collective Awareness Platforms for 
Sustainability and Social Innovation (CAPSSI)9, 
and projects as Decentralised Citizens 
Engagement Technologies (D-CENT)10 or 
Decentralised Citizens Owned Data Ecosystem 
8 https://www.uninnovation.network/blockchain
9 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/collective-
awareness
10 https://dcentproject.eu/
(DECODE)11. Most recently, this support was 
elevated to a higher stage in terms of resources 
and outreach with a European Innovation 
Council (EIC) Horizon Prize12 of five million euros, 
which awarded directly the next generation 
of innovators in blockchains and other DLTs 
dedicated to the pursuit of social and public good.
The current report exists in this same territory 
as a part of the project #DLT4Good: Co-
creating a European Ecosystem of Distributed 
Ledger Technologies for Social and Public 
Good13. #DLT4Good is coordinated within the 
European Commission by the Joint Research 
Centre (JRC)14, through the Competence 
Centre on Foresight and the EU Policy Lab, 
in collaboration with the Directorate-General 
for Communications Networks, Content 
and Technology (DG CONNECT)15, the Next 
Generation Internet Unit. It is supported by the 
European Parliament as a Pilot Project16.
This project emerges from the need to envision 
and test new policy strategies to support 
the co-creation of a robust and cooperative 
European ecosystem of organisations and 
experts working on, or interested in, DLT 
applications for social and public good. 
#DLT4Good outputs will inform DLT initiatives 
supported or coordinated by the European 
Commission, other EU institutions, and 
numerous public and third-sector institutions 
from international to local levels. Learnings 
from this project should also serve to lay down 
guidelines for anticipatory experimentation with 
other emerging technologies that could benefit 
from targeted investments in similar fields.
11 https://decodeproject.eu/
12 https://ec.europa.eu/research/eic/index.cfm?pg=prizes_
blockchains
13 https://blogs.ec.europa.eu/eupolicylab/dlt4good/
14 https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/joint-research-
centre_en
15 https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/communications-
networks-content-and-technology_en
16  https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.
html?reference=EPRS_ATA%282019%29640130 
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Our efforts in #DLT4Good are simultaneously 
placed on scanning and researching the 
potential of DLTs for social and public good, 
and on stimulating and backing the production, 
uptake, and even scaling up of DLTs in this 
context. These are two streams that run in 
parallel with feedback loops between them, and 
they constitute a new integrated approach in 
knowledge support to policy-making, going from 
technological foresight to the development of 
innovative public funding.
The first stream is where this report emerges 
from, and it relies on evidence-based primary 
and secondary research, encompassing an 
increasingly ample group of external experts 
and advisors alongside activities of stakeholder 
outreach. It aims at increasing the anticipatory 
capacity of policy-making, and it stands on a 
continuous mapping of current and potential 
applications, sectors, actors, and configurations 
of DLT projects for social and public good.
The second stream is grounded on co-design 
and support to an external accelerator program 
to stimulate not only the advancement 
of promising DLT applications for social 
and public good, but also its matchmaking 
with potential beneficiary organisations to 
increase results. This program is led by the 
#DLT4EU consortium17, which was chosen via 
a competitive call for proposals built on top of 
knowledge generated by this project, and its 
activities are continuously supported by our 
research, together with the competences of our 
advisors.
1.4 What, why, where, how and ways 
to move forward
This report is edited and produced by the Joint 
Research Centre (JRC) with valuable support 
and contributions by external experts and 
high-level advisors. Its primary objective is to 
offer independent evidence-based advice for 
a more informed and robust EU policy-making 
17  https://www.dlt4.eu/
on blockchains and other DLTs, considering in 
particular applications for social and public 
good.
The contents are, however, not restricted to this 
domain. They were created in ways that can and 
should be explored and used by other actors. 
Secondary audiences for this report include for 
example policy-makers and political agents from 
other internal organisations, national, regional 
or local bodies, business leaders and decision-
makers in the broader space of DLTs or that 
interested in its development, or researchers 
and practitioners in a wide range of disciplinary 
backgrounds, from computer scientists to 
science, technology and society scholars, and in 
a wide set of topics, from distributed networks 
and cyber-physical systems to sustainability and 
social innovation. 
The report is divided in three main parts, each 
focused on a specific research output. 
Part One offers a conceptual overview of the 
connections between main features of DLTs and 
the possibilities they enable for the pursuit of 
social and public good goals. Emphasis is placed 
on three different approaches to decentralisation 
and core building blocks of DLTs in this field.
Part Two comprises an empirical scanning on 
the current European ecosystem of DLT projects 
with activities in the fields of social and public 
good. It contains a summarized version of a 
database with 131 projects published online in 
its entirety. It also includes a closer look into 10 
projects.
Part Three concludes with six position papers 
and recommendations by experts and advisors 
of the #DLT4Good project. The topics range 
from decentralized governance to collaborative 
economies, with highlights on issues such as 
trust, verifiability, transparency, privacy or 
coordination.
PART
ONE
PART 
ONE
This first part offers a conceptual overview of the 
connections between features of DLTs and their 
potential to accomplish social and public good 
objectives. The focus is set initially on different 
approaches to decentralisation and some of the 
drivers behind them. Key principles related to 
technological and governance decentralisation, or 
autonomy, openness, privacy and data commons are 
also explored as building blocks in DLT applications 
for social and public good, with attention to 
experimentations in organisational and financial 
territories.
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2.1 What do we mean by DLTs?
Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs), the most 
well-known being blockchains, are essentially 
databases in which multiples types of data or 
transactions can be added, synchronised and 
run almost simultaneously across distributed 
networks of multiple nodes of peers. The idea 
behind DLTs is not entirely new, and we can trace 
their filiation to past and current technologies, or 
even thought experiments in economic and social 
realms. But DLTs are a particular and rather 
novel type of databases due to their combination 
of features and the possibilities these indicate 
(Nascimento et al 2019).
For example, DLTs have characteristics such 
as a single source of truth arranged in a linear 
succession of blocks of verified data, with 
internal and external trust on that truth based 
on rules followed by users to verify, validate and 
add transactions – a ‘consensus mechanism’. 
DLTs are mostly tamper-resistant, with no 
central entity in control of the database, which 
results in strong resilience against single point-
of-failure flaws, and makes it extremely hard 
to modify or delete data. They have embedded 
properties based on time-stamping, which 
means that any data they contain, such as 
details about a payment, a contract, transfer 
of rights, and others is publicly linked to a 
precise date and time. And ultimately, some 
DLTs support the existence of ‘smart-contracts’, 
which enable agreements between parties to be 
executed and enforced without need for human 
coordination or intervention, and attached to 
information contained in the DLT.
It is critical to observe, however, that there is no 
singular DLT architecture or a main standard, 
even if there are some DLTs more renowned, 
such as the blockchains of Bitcoin or Ethereum 
platforms. There are instead many protocols 
and applications with distinct prospects that 
represent the wider set of DLTs (Jeffries 2018). 
Differences are often attached to technical 
architectures and governance mechanisms, but 
we tend to distinguish DLTs by looking to the 
open, closed or hybrid access or verification 
rights users have on data and transactions, 
or yet to the different permissions they need 
to execute and validate data and transactions 
within the DLT (Nascimento et al 2019).
Furthermore, it is also crucial to understand that 
DLTs currently have a broad set of unresolved 
challenges, which among other issues still 
hamper uptake or other developments, as 
integration with legacy or other emerging 
technologies. We can highlight here the limited 
scalability and performance of some DLTs, 
often related to a low volume of transactions, 
or the high-energy consumption of others when 
operating specific consensus mechanisms. On 
another level, we can also refer to security 
vulnerabilities, such as key management 
protocols highly dependent on human actions, 
as storing information in devices susceptible to 
attacks, or the high dependency of running the 
network on a limited number of participants. The 
latter enhances the perils of collusion between 
users who may corrupt governance mechanisms 
in specific DLTs and overrun its network to reach 
results without consensus approval. As a last 
example, we can also pinpoint that other key 
issues emerge through the links between data 
immutability and transparency for instance. 
Debates may be warranted on higher levels 
considering potential conflicts between some 
DLTs and regulatory frameworks such as the 
FRAMING DLTS 
AND THE SOCIAL AND PUBLIC GOOD
DLTs are essentially 
databases in which 
multiples types of data or 
transactions can be added, 
synchronised and run almost 
simultaneously across 
distributed networks.
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European General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR). More discussions that are practical 
are needed on the safeguarding of personal, 
sensitive or confidential data in DLTs, when 
some data is not meant to be available for 
everyone publicly, or when parts or the entirety 
of this data needs changes due to inaccuracies 
or problems in its original entries.
The Joint Research Centre (JRC) has produced 
multiple technical and scientific outputs on 
DLTs and blockchains in the past years that 
offer diverse perspectives on the topic with 
different entry points for different audiences. 
This work was conducted in collaboration with 
other European Commission services and EU 
institutions to better inform and support EU 
policies with evidence-based advice, and relied 
on partnerships with research, businesses, 
industry, public authorities, civil society 
organisations and other relevant stakeholders.
As our intention here is not to explore this topic in 
depth, these JRC outputs can be consulted for a 
broader understanding of DLTs and blockchains. 
To point to a few examples, a technical report 
such as “Blockchain in Energy Communities: 
A Proof of Concept” (Kounelis et al 2017) 
dives into the challenges and opportunities 
of implementing blockchains in particular 
infrastructural contexts. A science for policy 
report as “#Blockchain4EU: Blockchain for 
Industrial Transformations” (Nascimento, Pólvora 
and Sousa Lourenço 2018) offers a sectorial 
summary of these technologies with a forward-
looking view that moves from multi-stakeholder 
engagement to speculative prototyping. The 
flagship report “Blockchain Now and Tomorrow: 
Assessing Multidimensional Impacts of 
Distributed Ledger Technologies” (Nascimento et 
al 2019), provides a full outlook on DLTs, from 
introductory aspects to policy developments 
and empirical analyses of different sectors, and 
ultimately lays down a foresight pathway for 
debates on potential impacts, bottlenecks and 
ways ahead. 
The focus on DLTs that permeates and 
structures this report takes a different turn and 
is placed on the use of these technologies for 
social and public good. Throughout the report 
we intend to shed some light on why this is 
a topic meriting attention from research to 
policy, how it is being developed empirically 
through projects on the ground, where its main 
deployments are taking place, and last, but not 
least, what kind of questions should we ask right 
now, and which expert recommendations can be 
put forward for decision-makers to reflect about 
and act upon?
The focus on DLTs that 
permeates and structures 
this report takes a different 
turn and is placed on the 
use of these technologies for 
social and public good.
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2.2 Connecting DLTs and the social and 
public good
It is crucial to understand here that blockchains 
and other DLTs are not the same as crypto-
currencies, which is only one type of application 
with its own set of issues. It is also important 
to recognise that DLTs are not limited to the 
financial applications that are usually at the 
core of discussions focusing on trading bubbles 
or initial coin offerings (ICOs), for instance. Amid 
unfolding developments and uncertain futures, 
DLTs have potential applications in numerous 
sectors, certainly from currencies to finance, 
but also from advanced manufacturing to 
healthcare, from education to public and third-
sector engagements with citizens, and above all 
from emerging sectors known or anticipated now 
to those still to be imagined . 
It is in this large territory that we observe DLT 
projects targeting social and public good goals. 
It happens in terms of specific applications, their 
purpose and what they can offer for broader 
societal benefits. But it also happens through 
what DLTs enable in terms of infrastructural 
reorganisation, from topics as better governance 
of the projects themselves, to those that imply 
or fully enable a more equitable distribution of 
resources to direct stakeholders or to numerous 
other collective and individual actors that can be 
brought into their sphere.
We scan through specific projects, their 
organisations, and their main configurations, in 
Part Two of the report, to make this field more 
tangible. This includes applications in prominent 
spaces as financial inclusion, fair supply chains, 
energy and environment, identities and vulnerable 
populations, or skills and education, just to name 
a few. There, we also see how this is a field that 
tends to blur boundaries between the public and 
third sector, private enterprise and civic tech, 
and often features organisational arrangements 
across the board. Due to the emerging 
characteristics of the field, most projects still 
seem to be looking for institutional insertions 
in the larger ecosystem, with preponderance of 
specific organisations yet to emerge. 
The exploration of DLTs for social and public good 
is sometimes distinct from their exploration by 
corporate actors and others that mainly deploy this 
set of technologies for competitive advantages 
at commercial level. But even here we observe 
a shifting field with relevant DLT initiatives for 
social and public good ranging from projects led by 
grassroot workers cooperatives or established by 
politically motivated network platforms, to projects 
tied to corporate social responsibility frameworks 
or conglomerate impact investment funds.
To better explore conceptually how DLTs can 
contribute to the public and social good, we 
chose not to offer upfront any definition built 
on top of specific sectors, such as humanitarian 
aid, nor on top of where DLT applications could 
stem from, such as civil society or governmental 
organisations. Even if not an easy task given 
the frontier characteristics of the ecosystem, 
we attempt to conceptually and empirically 
build a framework to encompass DLT projects 
that can emerge from any possible sectoral 
or organisational spaces. Our focus is placed 
above all on what projects can do for instance to 
strengthen civil society and reinforce elements 
such as public and social commons, while 
also opening up new or renewed collaboration 
paradigms and alternative forms to generate and 
distribute value. 
This field tends to blur 
some boundaries between 
public and third sector, 
private enterprise and 
civic tech, and often 
features organisational 
arrangements across the 
board.
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By this token, elements that matter the most in 
our exploration are how DLTs can help to foster 
solutions for pressing environmental, economic 
or social challenges, by addressing global 
agendas such as the United Nation’s Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) (Voshmgir et al. 2019; 
Maupin, Kahlert, and Weizsäcker 2019). Or yet, 
elements touching upon how these technologies 
can help to expand such agendas at the local 
level, from citizen empowerment to sectoral 
developments, profiting from other takes such as 
the Four Pillars of Sustainability (Dessein et al. 
2015), as in cultural activities that act as robust 
intervention spaces for the decentralisation 
capacities of DLTs (Catlow 2019; Catlow and 
Vickers 2019; Potts and Rennie 2019). 
For the purpose of the #DLT4Good project and 
goals of this report, this is where we chose to 
primarily explore how DLTs can strengthen the 
pursuit of social and public good objectives. This 
also is where we notice that core properties of 
DLTs such as decentralisation can generate even 
more benefits, by enabling not only new technical 
architectures, as DLTs do in any other context, but 
also by fostering new territories of experimentation 
where the notion of decentralisation itself can be 
taken to other degrees .
2.3 Three approaches to decentralisation 
and what they can imply
On a technical level, decentralisation is a defining 
feature of DLTs and is used as an engineering 
method for achieving specific information security 
properties, such as infrastructural resilience and 
privacy (Troncoso et al. 2017; Buterin 2017). 
Data or any other information contained in DLTs 
is stored and verified in a decentralised manner, 
meaning it is not controlled by any single, or 
subset of nodes. The motivation for this is to 
ensure DLTs cannot be easily manipulated, 
attacked, or shut down. This is what is meant by 
the typically repeated statement that DLTs as 
blockchains solve the ‘trust’ problem: no node 
in the network needs to be ‘trusted’ in order 
to be sure that the ledger is secure and valid 
(Antonopoulos 2014; Sel 2015). However, there 
are significant differences between trust as an 
information security concept and its effects in 
practice. It has even been pointed out that DLTs 
might largely contribute to diminishing trust 
by transferring it from traditional social actors 
to algorithmic structures (Mallard, Méadel, and 
Musiani 2014; Vidan and Lehdonvirta 2019; 
Dickson, Delight, and Diakomichalis 2019; De 
Filippi 2019). 
DLTs employ decentralised network topologies, 
cryptography and economic concepts in order 
to make centralised control of data and 
computation both technically and economically 
unfeasible by design (Brekke, forthcoming). 
But beyond technological aims and features of 
decentralisation, understandings of the term 
vary largely and are often not explicitly defined 
(Schneider 2019). Some attempts to overcome 
this exist and can be found for instance in 
distinctions between architectural, political and 
logical dimensions (Buterin 2017). Even so, the 
lack of a more or less solid recognition of what 
decentralisation is, or how it can be achieved, 
brings adverse consequences to fields as the one 
of DLTs for public and social good. 
This means for instance that people with very 
different world views within the DLT space are 
able to project their own ideas onto the notion of 
decentralisation and end up diluting its effects or 
yet converting it into something outside the field. It 
can also mean that otherwise centralising effects 
of DLTs can be obscured among the blank spots 
of conceptualization, whereby even if technical 
architectures are decentralised in specific projects, 
their models of governance or value distribution 
might still be highly centralised (Azouvi, Maller, and 
Meiklejohn 2018; De Filippi and Loveluck 2016).
Decentralisation is not easy to achieve in 
practice. Technical decentralisation, for instance, 
needs a large enough network, which is why new 
DLT projects sometimes decide to operate on 
top of existing networks as Ethereum in order 
to achieve architectural decentralisation. And 
governance decentralisation is even harder to 
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achieve by any measure, as it implies politically 
opening the protocol itself and decision-making 
mechanisms that are often too complex to 
implement. Moreover, the same people and the 
same projects can draw from across different 
concepts and tendencies on their pursuit for 
decentralisation, which can even lead to discord 
and confusion about it in practical terms (Swartz 
2018; Azouvi, Maller, and Meiklejohn 2019). 
Despite best intentions towards decentralisation, 
namely considering a large majority of DLT 
applications for social and public good, we can 
state that most projects do not manifest it 
entirely. Technical decentralisation in itself is 
easily conflated with supposed social, political or 
economic effects by many actors in the wider DLT 
landscape, which largely remains questionable. 
As stated before, the goal of DLTs in this field is 
to enable not only new technical architectures 
in a decentralised way, but also organisational 
and financial ones, in order to open up activities 
such as governance or allocation of resources 
to more distributed models. Therefore, it is 
significant to understand not only how different 
approaches to DLTs can nurture this disposition 
to decentralisation beyond technical realms, but 
also what they can imply in terms of broader 
impacts for the field of social and public good. 
Drawing on recent literature that has traced 
different ideas and trends in the general field of 
DLTs we may arrive at three broad approaches 
to how decentralisation is pursued, which are 
the main motivations behind them, and what 
they can ultimately imply for our field. 
First, ‘incorporativism’ where decentralisation 
is linked with new options for competitive 
advantage and tied to existing commercial or 
institutional arrangements (Swartz 2017). Second, 
‘automatism’ where decentralisation implies that 
code, protocols, algorithms and markets take a 
bigger role in coordination between humans. Third, 
‘infrastructural mutualism’ where decentralisation 
is strongly attached to value-laden frameworks 
and issues as democratisation, co-ownership, or 
commons (Swartz 2018).
2.3.1 Incorporativism
Incorporativism denotes the adoption of DLTs by 
sectors these were intended to disrupt through 
decentralisation. It entails the use of these 
technologies in ways that do not seek to change 
the status quo from an economic, political 
or social perspective; instead, they seek to 
incorporate DLT properties into existing systems 
to make them more efficient (Swartz 2017). 
Decentralisation in incorporativist approaches to 
DLTs is employed mainly in terms of technical 
decentralisation, while letting other dimensions, 
such as governance, in centralised mode. A 
concrete example is when a given blockchain 
protocol is run across a number of different 
servers, but is essentially controlled by a 
centralised corporation or institution, such as 
a commercial bank or a governmental registry 
service. This form of decentralisation can 
have practical benefits in terms of resilience, 
automation and tracking or authenticating data, 
for example proving actors are who they say 
they are, or ensuring products are where they’re 
claimed to be from and things took place when 
they were claimed. 
There are numerous attempts here to use the 
technological properties of DLTs to innovate within 
existing systems and positively impact the social 
and public good, namely through fintech or regtech 
projects, following a continued relationship with 
cryptocurrencies and automation of contracts. 
But incorporativist approaches to DLTs do little 
to shift underlying structures of infrastructural 
and informational ownership and control. Instead, 
DLTs tend to be used to strengthen and automate 
existing ownership, management and legal 
structures. This implies that organisations that own 
or run DLTs grant less control over information and 
data to its users or other actors, as well as less 
control over protocols that determine these. 
2.3.2 Automatism
In automatist approaches, trustlessness is taken 
to an extreme. The assumption is that if DLTs 
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such as blockchains can be mathematically 
proven to be beyond manipulation, then they 
are the only thing that can be trusted. With 
this approach, technical decentralisation is 
somewhat understood to be a solution to 
governance decentralisation. Code is frequently 
interpreted as more objective than natural 
languages on the basis that it executes as it is 
written (Wood 2014; De Filippi 2019). Humans 
can often be perceived as biased, egotistically-
motivated and with limited knowledge, that 
therefore require the coordination of a system 
that is often seen as embodying more neutrality. 
In these cases, decentralisation is motivated by 
the aim to reduce control by humans as much 
as possible, such that an increasing number of 
processes are automated through a trustless 
system (Antonopoulos 2014; Swan 2015).
This approach comes from network subcultures 
of crypto-anarchism alongside broader techno-
libertarian tendencies that are generally 
inclined to consider traditional institutions as an 
illegitimate and obsolete depository of power 
(O’Dwyer 2015; Swartz 2018; Scott 2014; 
Brunton 2019). It often draws on rudimentary 
ideas of markets as neutral information 
processors and the most effective means for 
coordination and encourages the use of new 
information technologies as liberating forces 
against authority (Manski and Manski 2018). 
Furthermore, this approach is also linked with 
paradigms such as ‘digital metallism’ that draw 
on ideas of gold as a material determination 
of value that is not tainted by human or 
institutional biases (Maurer, Nelms, and Swartz 
2013; Karlstrøm 2014). The idea is that gold, 
or more specifically cryptocurrencies such as 
Bitcoin as digital gold, can have intrinsic value 
instead of one determined by any traditional 
institutions (Golumbia 2016; Scott 2014).
Numerous DLT projects in the field of social 
and public good manifest this approach and 
can have wide positive impacts, both in terms 
of their specific purposes to tackle global 
or local issues, or in terms of generating 
decentralisation effects that easily surpass 
restricted technological domains. But there is 
ultimately a downplay of traditional public and 
social organisations, coupled with a primacy of 
economics over politics, and a quantification of 
citizens into network agents, that can taint these 
effects, with promises of freedom, efficiency, 
and quality that can hide processes of excessive 
corporatization in governance (Atzori 2015).
2.3.3 Infrastructural mutualism
Infrastructural mutualism, a term coined by 
Swartz (2018), describes a broad tendency 
that also includes commons and mutual credit 
approaches to DLTs (De Filippi and Hassan 
2015; Rozas et al 2018; Bass, Sutherland, 
and Symons 2018; Berlant 2016; Brock et 
al. 2017; Trustlines Foundation, n.d.). The 
term was first used to distinguish those who 
emphasised Bitcoin as a peer-to-peer mutual 
network from those who driven primarily by 
profit lead to increasingly centralised big 
mining operations (2018). Swartz traces 
elements of the infrastructural mutualist 
tendency to the ‘cypherpunk’ internet political 
movement formed around the possibility to use 
cryptography and peer-to-peer networks as a 
means to address imbalances of power (2018). 
Furthermore, this trend can also be traced to 
a longer history of peer-to-peer technologies 
that has continuously sought to advance the 
decentralisation of internet from its early 
stages (Oram 2001). 
It is significant to understand 
not only what nurtures this 
disposition to decentralisation 
beyond technical realms, but 
also which tendencies are more 
prone to delivery in the fields of 
social and public good.
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In contrast with incorporativism or automatism, 
infrastructural mutualism emphasises a form 
of decentralisation whereby more, rather than 
less, control is granted upfront over technical 
architectures and the information they contain 
and process, often tied to concepts such as 
co-production or shared utility. In addition, 
decentralisation here is also related with opening 
up governance in a wider sense, as it tends to 
exist here through peer-to-peer systems that 
distribute numerous resources in more democratic 
ways, while also organising new commons within 
networked structures where information and other 
elements are more accessible. 
Decentralisation in infrastructural mutualism is 
chiefly employed to decentralise the technical 
control of the network, as a strategy to achieve 
principles such as privacy, while governance 
decentralisation, through political and logical 
dimensions, is emphasised to achieve principles 
as self-determination, understood mostly as 
the ability for communities to determine and 
run their infrastructures. By the same token, 
this approach often emphasises the benefits of 
openness in terms of software, meaning that 
people can adopt and build on each other’s 
work, and also the ability of individuals and 
groups to determine their infrastructural 
arrangements and equally benefit from any 
value or resources involved. When in place, this 
cuts across DLT projects within public, private 
or civil society sectors and addresses questions 
of infrastructural control in wider frameworks 
(Swartz 2018; Campbell-Verduyn 2018). 
Although not exclusively, it is often closer to 
this approach that most DLT applications in 
the fields of social and public good explore 
decentralisation across a larger spectrum, with 
all this can imply in terms of impact. But there 
are however still numerous challenges that arise 
here, including technical issues such as ensuring 
continued availability of data as well as specific 
types of information security concerns (Troncoso 
et al. 2017), and political issues in terms of 
governance and accountability structures, which 
tends to be ad hoc, informal and vary significantly 
(Meiklejohn 2018). Moreover, projects in this 
space are also not invulnerable to co-optation 
and can be absorbed or diluted by strictly 
oriented commercial ventures, which is clearly 
one more signal that no possible approach to 
decentralisation is without challenges.
2.4 Decentralisation and other key 
principles for social and public good
DLTs such as blockchains are explored in this 
field not only to transform technical structures, 
but also to transform other arrangements 
from organisational to financial dimensions, as 
for instance towards more equitable network 
governance or distribution of value and resources 
(Kouhizadeh, Zhu, and Sarkis 2019; Allen, Berg, 
and Novak 2018). Numerous projects reach for 
this kind of impact by exploring DLT properties 
such as decentralisation through different 
approaches. But it is perhaps by looking at how 
such a property can be explored in its larger 
spectrum, combined with, or augmented by other 
value-laden elements or frameworks, that we 
can better frame both how DLTs can effectively 
contribute to the social and public good, and 
which key principles might be some of the most 
appropriate building blocks for such a process. 
The following concepts represent some of these 
principles more in depth. They are not static and 
mainly illustrate core ambitions and claims of DLT 
applications seeking systemic change towards a 
more equitable distribution of decision-making, 
benefit and value, on and off chains. Critically, 
they are principles rather than features, and 
often times DLT applications for social and public 
good do not to entirely live up to them, or fail 
to embody its substance in their day-to-day 
operations, even when showcasing best intentions 
to explore decentralisation. Moreover, this is not an 
exhaustive description. Here we mostly aim for an 
epistemological exercise around these principles as 
building blocks in DLTs for social and public good, 
instead of crystallising any kind of representative 
empirical observation of selected projects.
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2.4.1 Technological decentralisation
DLTs came around as a disruption to centralised 
institutional and infrastructural control, initially 
in response to major financial crises (Faria 2019; 
Campbell-Verduyn and Hütten 2019), and later, 
more explicitly, in response to the centralisation 
of network infrastructures by major players, in 
cloud computing, platform economies and others 
(Guyer 2016; Langley and Leyshon 2016; De 
Filippi and McCarthy 2012). They reflect the history 
of a wider group of peer-to-peer technologies 
where decentralised architectures were used 
to achieve network resilience and certain forms 
of information security properties (Troncoso et 
al 2017; Oram 2001). But as the excitement 
for decentralisation expanded, so has the 
understanding of what it means (Schneider 2019). 
The degrees to which DLT infrastructures 
and applications stand close to the varied 
promises of decentralisation has been under 
scrutiny. Technological decentralisation has 
benefits in terms of information security 
(Troncoso et al 2017), but there is no major 
evidence that it triggers other effects such as 
a democratisation of control at larger scale. 
As mentioned before, infrastructures and 
protocols might have centralising traits or are 
simply not decentralised in implementation. 
On another level, DLTs might be technically 
decentralised but their social and economic 
effects are centralising, as for example in 
the case of Bitcoin mining, or in situations 
where a single organisation or small group of 
people holds the majority of tokens (Swartz 
2018). And there is also always a danger 
that technical decentralisation, rather than 
empowering actors of a given system, merely 
decentralises its risks and exacerbates its 
existing inequalities (Manski 2017). For 
example, holding one’s own cryptographic keys 
might be empowering to some people, but can 
entail losing access to funds for others. Also, 
decisions about how, when and where to invest 
can equally represent an opportunity for some, 
while others will experience it as risk or anxiety.
2.4.2 Governance decentralisation
As stated earlier, some DLT projects work 
towards decentralisation of governance 
based on limitations of mere technological 
decentralisation. Two major events shifted 
some focus from DLT applications to how 
protocols themselves are maintained, corrected 
and governed: ‘who decides on how things are 
decided’ (Kreutler 2018). What is now framed 
as the Bitcoin scaling conflict (Wirdum 2016; 
2015; Musiani, Alexandre, and Cécile 2018; 
Narayanan 2015), along with the Ethereum 
DAO exploit (Dupont 2018), caused significant 
splits in the Bitcoin and Ethereum networks, 
which at a specific time were the most visible 
representations of DLTs. These conflicts 
highlighted how seemingly technical issues can 
be of core relevance, at social, economic and 
political levels, thus requiring robust governance 
processes. In sequence, decentralised governance 
can be set both as a potential application (Field 
2020; Honigman 2019), as well as in terms 
of how the protocols themselves are, or can 
be, governed (Dupont 2018; Azouvi, Maller, 
and Meiklejohn 2018). These processes are 
emergent, entailing new vocabularies, power 
divisions and forms of deliberation and signalling 
(De Filippi and Loveluck 2016; Islam, Mäntymäki, 
and Turunen 2019). 
Efforts to address the ambition of decentralised 
governance draw on a wide spectrum of ideas, 
Debates on governance, 
such as who gets to 
decide, what and how, 
are instrumental to the 
maturation of DLTs, as 
governance determines 
questions of access, use and 
benefit.
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from commons to market design approaches 
(Rozas et al 2018; Posner and Weyl 2018; 
Brekke forthcoming). They also sit alongside 
other initiatives to change the ownership and 
management models of internet and other 
computing infrastructures, such as ‘platform 
cooperativism’ and ‘prosumer’ networks 
(Schneider 2018; Viñas, n.d.; Morell 2010). 
Commons based approaches emphasise 
deliberative democratic decision, where people 
retain control over the data and infrastructures 
affecting their lives. While market design 
approaches tend to emphasise the use of 
economic incentives and game theory in order 
to achieve desirable behaviours. In practice, 
networks such as Bitcoin and Ethereum entail a 
little bit of both, although deliberative processes 
have tended to be more informal (Swartz 
2017). Debates on governance, such as who 
gets to decide, what and how, are instrumental 
to the maturation of DLTs, as governance 
determines questions of access, use and benefit. 
Nonetheless, there can be a disposition to want 
to preempt and resolve all problems within 
specific DLTs through governance only, which can 
be costly and ineffective, or hamper alternative 
actions (Kreutler 2018; Schneider 2018; Field 
2020).
2.4.3 Autonomy
DLTs targeted at social and public good can aim 
to enable autonomous infrastructures, meaning 
being run and governed by those who use them 
(Clippinger and Bollier 2014). This ambition is not 
exclusive to the field in question of DLTs, and long 
precedes its existence with roots in many other 
protocols and systems. Autonomy in the overall 
context of DLTs has often come to mean autonomy 
for the systems themselves, beyond the control 
of any single individual, company or institution. 
Autonomy here implies particular forms of 
automation, as for example the execution of code 
through ‘incentive-driven’ decentralised networks 
(Boucher et al 2017; W. Wang et al. 2018) with 
the intention of minimising human control over 
processes (Filippi and Wright 2015). But this 
largely contrasts with other ideas of autonomy 
mostly present in DLTs for social and public good, 
taken mostly as self-determination, or ability for 
individuals and communities to run and govern 
their own network infrastructures (Oram 2001; 
Viñas, n.d.; Manski 2017). 
On another level, autonomy and self-
determination in DLT applications aimed at 
broader social and public benefits can also 
imply an ability to control one’s own digital 
identity. There is growing awareness of how 
personal data informs scoring, ranking and 
reputation systems and helps to create digital 
profiles of people with very little recourse to 
understand or control these. Human digital 
identities are beyond their immediate control, 
and for the most part are barely transparent to 
people themselves. To counter this, some DLTs 
contribute towards the notion of self-sovereign 
identities, where individuals retain more control 
over their digital identities (F. Wang and De 
Filippi 2020; Kondova and Erbguth 2020; Mühle 
et al 2018). This includes for instance advanced 
cryptographic techniques, such as Attribute 
Based Credentials or zero-knowledge proofs, to 
allow people to reveal only what is required to 
access a given service (Sonnino et al 2018).
Openness is a catalyst for 
more socially beneficial 
innovation as more people 
can also build and develop 
from existing work, and 
it allows advances in 
democratisation of DLTs, 
with their inner works being 
more easily scrutinised and 
debated.
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2.4.4 Openness
Openness as a principle in DLTs is manifested in 
a number of ways, among them transparency 
of software and hardware (Gaba 2018), ability 
to join and add to the network (Kadiyala 2018), 
and ability to adopt, modify and fork it (Andrews 
2019). General features of the larger set of DLTs 
such as trustlessness depend on this trait, and 
they are often linked with open source that allows 
code and protocols to be audited and understood 
by external actors at any given stage. 
This is also core in DLTs for public and social 
good. If openness allows for better security, more 
people can check the quality of what is encoded 
and which architectures are adopted (Clarke and 
Dorwin 2009). But it is also a catalyst for more 
socially beneficial innovation as more people can 
also build and develop from existing work, and 
it allows advances in democratisation of DLT 
technologies, with their inner works being more 
easily scrutinised and debated.
Apart from this conception of openness 
related with code, the notion is also linked to 
the network itself. The early protocol layer 
blockchains and DLT projects are open in this 
sense of the word. They are now described 
as permissionless, which means there are no 
permissions required in order to join as a peer 
and contribute to such networks (Neudecker and 
Hartenstein 2019). The notion of permissionless 
blockchains should not be mistaken as neutral, 
as all possible protocols will prioritise specific 
kinds of uses or require particular skills in order 
to be able to contribute, such as computational 
power as in the case of cryptocurrency mining 
(Kwon 2014; Paul, Sarkar, and Mukherjee 2014). 
But of main significance to DLTs for social 
and public good is at least the notion that, in 
principle, such architectural choice has lower 
entry levels in terms of access and participation, 
with often less conditions imposed to execute 
or validate operations. On one hand, this allows 
for larger and more diverse sets of participants 
to have a stake in this kind of DLTs. On the 
other hand, such easiness can be countered 
by permissioned chains sensible for smaller 
networks of communities, who might instead 
create safer spaces of participation in DLTs, or 
adopt non-technical forms of verification based 
on shared values, for example, in order to join 
the network (König 2015). 
2.4.5 Privacy
Privacy in this context of DLTs is part of the 
particular goal to regain democratic controls 
in the production and use of data within the 
age of digital networks (Monsees 2019). As 
an increasing amount of activities take place 
via digital networks and applications, these 
activities leave data trails that inform data 
processing often beyond people’s immediate 
knowledge and control (de Vries 2010; Acar 
et al 2014). For example, one of the main 
impulses for the invention of Bitcoin, and with 
it the blockchain as most well-known DLT, was 
a response to the production and capture of 
economic data as a consequence of the rise in 
digital payments (Nakamoto 2008). 
Nowadays numerous DLT use cases in the field 
of social and public good are strongly linked 
with privacy and the search for less intrusive 
requirements for accomplishing tasks in the digital 
world. On top, techniques linked to cryptography 
and zero-knowledge proofs, fine grained enough 
to reveal only necessary information for a given 
digital interaction, also allow for a wider respect of 
privacy (Gurses, Troncoso, and Diaz 2011; Sonnino 
et al 2018), with fair information practices at 
Privacy in this context of 
DLTs is part of the particular 
goal to regain democratic 
controls in the production 
and use of data within the 
age of digital networks.
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least partially enabled by the confidentiality these 
techniques facilitate (Kshetri 2017).
Privacy protections have been reinforced for 
digital contexts through the European General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and expanded 
to give more control to individuals over their data. 
Nevertheless, even considering DLT applications 
with the best intentions, at least for now there 
is still little escape from tensions between GDPR 
and DLT architectures at large (Finck 2019). 
First, GDPR depends on the existence of 
identifiable ‘data processors’ in relation to which 
anyone can enforce their rights, and in DLTs 
with wider decentralisation properties there is 
not any one particular data processor. Second, 
much of GDPR rests on the ability to delete 
data if and when requested, while one of the 
main features of DLTs is immutability of the 
ledgers which hampers the right to data erasure, 
best known as ‘the right to be forgotten’ (Finck 
2018). Nevertheless, some DLTs in our scope 
have potential as means for extending the aims 
of GDPR by making advanced cryptography 
more broadly available (Truong et al. 2019) 
and enabling more control over personal data 
and more transparency of who can access data 
(Wirth and Kolain 2018). 
2.4.6 Data commons 
Coming back to what it means to partake in 
infrastructural mutualism tendencies, data 
commons approaches to data governance 
contrast with what can be classified as the 
techno-determinst or market-driven paradigms 
that still dominate the main debate spaces 
on DLTs (Rozas et al 2018). Data commons 
emphasises the relational production, shared 
value and collective governance of data 
(Morell 2010; De Filippi and Hassan 2015). 
Data commons approaches also open up for 
different ways of addressing questions such 
as privacy, as a collective issue rather than an 
individual concern. Instead of treating data as 
private property, whether owned by individuals 
or groups such as commercial corporations, 
a commons approach to data recognises its 
collective nature (Mantelero 2016; Mahieu, 
Asghari, and van Eeten 2018). By this token, 
even personal data is at nearly all the time 
related to someone else’s data, with elements 
as names indicating family ties, or location data 
implying proximity or behaviours more easily 
categorised (Véliz 2019). 
Repeatedly linked with the privacy issues 
discussed before in DLTs aiming at having impact 
for the social and public good, the collective 
nature of data also has a number of implications 
where the disclosure of specific elements might 
unwittingly identify someone else, and individual 
choices can have collective implications. This 
affects market approaches to personal data in 
particular, where one person’s personal data 
might be more or less valuable than another, 
for instance. But as most of the value of data in 
our time lies in the interrelations of larger data 
sets (Steel et al 2013; Williams 2019), and given 
centralised DLTs often imply more and not less 
connectedness, it is crucial how projects and 
applications choose to manage and control their 
data, especially if they emphasise and enable the 
collective utilisation, governance and ownership 
of data.
The argued benefit of this latter approach 
is that it recognises consequently how the 
nature and value of most information lies in its 
aggregated and relational uses. Appropriated 
technical and governance DLT frameworks can 
contribute towards this end in the context of 
social and public good applications, where for 
example people would be able to determine 
what personal data they want to keep private 
and what data they want to share as a data 
commons governed through ‘Data Trusts’ or 
even by respected public sector organisations 
(Symons and Bass 2017).
2.5 Current and upcoming territories 
of experimentation 
As explored until now, we can choose to define 
DLTs in this field in a general way through its 
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intentions to decentralise and some of the 
approaches followed in that process. Such 
choice largely implies looking at decentralised 
architectures, but it also points us towards 
other effects, such as the distribution of control 
and value at the protocol layer. It is here that 
we find current and upcoming territories of 
experimentation worthy of a preliminary review 
before moving into its empirical illustration with 
several of the projects scanned in Part Two.
Although not exclusively, we can point to these 
territories as being predominantly based on 
a disposition to tackle organisational and 
financial challenges, with current and upcoming 
innovation streams that cut across numerous 
sectors, applications, and more (Ostrom 1990; 
Oram 2001; Rozas et al 2018; De Filippi and 
Hassan 2015; Brekke 2019; Posner and Weyl 
2018). Nevertheless, even here we find a 
propensity for some debates to still be focused 
on individualised narratives, such as stories 
around crypto-currencies such as Bitcoin and 
akin, or even others about DAOs, meaning 
that much of the otherwise alternative acts of 
sociotechnical disruption and experimentation can 
be missed out on or ignored (Maddox et al 2016).
In the midst of all the distinctiveness in this 
field of DLTs for social and public good, we 
also see influences of a moral economy widely 
extended to all DLTs, and where a majority of 
failures tend to be individualised in detriment 
of structural critiques (Campbell-Verduyn and 
Hütten 2019). A crucial point is that a significant 
problem emerges here due to the still immature 
and alternative characteristics of this field, as 
it seems to allow for heavier disputes in terms 
of immaterial occupation in this regard. Glitches 
potentially attributed to specificities of one or 
more limited projects seems to be more easily 
pushed here, than in any other context, into 
shocking narratives of general failure. This, 
in turn, serves to counter less conventional 
or frontier experimentation endeavours for 
instance, and to render some institutionally 
sanctioned acts as more being legitimate, such 
as experimenting within the organisational 
confines of simulatory sandboxes (Faria 2019). 
But the potential missteps or errors emerging 
from experimentation in a field where DLT 
applications target social and public purposes 
appears as normal and needed as in other 
alternative experimentation fields with social 
and public innovation (Pólvora and Nascimento 
forthcoming). DLT experimentation for social 
and public good is still risky and with unproven 
assumptions, but it serves as an innovative 
testbed for broader and more inclusive 
innovations necessary for larger DLT spaces. We 
believe this can be made visible by observing 
and discussing at least some territories with 
developments between organisational and 
financial dimensions. They can provide indications 
about the most mature possibilities, while 
simultaneously displaying signs of anticipatory 
innovation prone to foresight explorations.
2.5.1 Organisational territories
DLT protocols aim to enable agreements and 
coordination across local and global scales. 
This has led to organisational innovation that 
enables people to establish and run networked 
organisations that are less bounded by 
geographical location and emphasise autonomy 
in digital processes (Zwitter and Hazenberg 
2020). The idea is that verifiable ledgers 
DLT experimentation for 
social and public good 
is still risky and with 
unproven assumptions, but 
it serves as an innovative 
testbed for broader and 
more inclusive innovations 
necessary for larger DLT 
spaces.
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might serve as a shared reference point to 
form communities in which people can easily 
determine their own terms of engagement. This 
includes enabling people to design and set up 
voting and decision-making systems, issuing 
tokens and creating binding agreements that 
can work across location or legislative contexts. 
Some of the most notorious cases of 
organisational experiments with DLTs include 
Decentralised Autonomous Organisations 
(DAOs). These are constructed as platforms that 
enable people to set up internal governance 
for nearly any organisation, with main claim on 
code as replacing other forms of enforcement 
of agreements. DAOs have been defined as 
‘organisations where rules are coded and run on 
a public, permissionless blockchain with ‘rules 
automatically applied and enforced when the 
conditions specified in the software are met’ 
(Honigman 2019). 
A major criticism of DAOs is that they are 
solutions looking for a problem, and the claims 
around them often seem over the top, from 
becoming the ultimate organisational model 
for companies, to fully replacing geopolitical 
infrastructures (Swan 2015). But experiments 
are still in process, with ambitions on DAOs 
going through major changes, and more 
emphasis placed on governance since the first 
explicit DAO launched in 2016, as a type of 
Ethereum venture capital fund, was hacked for 
ETH 12.7M, or around EUR 135M (Zamfir 2018; 
Dupont 2018; Brekke 2019). 
Another approach on organisational 
experimentation with DLTs focuses less on 
automation and more on autonomy and self-
determination. DAOs tend to exist on DLTs where 
automation occurs by enforcement through 
their execution across a single ledger. Other DLT 
protocols enable actors in peer-to-peer networks 
to retain their own cryptographic ledgers rather 
than the network being determined by a single 
blockchain ledger. Blockchains take a ‘data 
centric’ approach, for example with Bitcoin every 
node of a network maintains the same state of 
the network, the consensus is protected by a 
lot of work, which makes it possible to think of 
Bitcoin as one global database. 
For example, protocols as Holochain can use 
what is called an agent-centric approach, 
focused on the digital autonomy of actors 
engaging with one another (Luck 2018; Brock 
et al 2017). Each actor maintains their own 
history, and their own tamper proof chain of 
cryptographic hashes storing that actor’s history. 
This personal ledger is controlled by the actor 
themselves through their private cryptographic 
keys. Nevertheless, there is not a major practical 
implementation of organisations using this kind 
of protocols so far, as these DLT networks are 
to a large extent still being built out. In addition, 
they also face some of the same issues as DAO 
platforms in terms of wider adoption, being 
significantly new ways of approaching and 
describing organisations.
Other DLT projects draw on the histories and 
frameworks of the commons at large in order 
to develop organisational and economic models 
that do not rely on state nor market frameworks 
(Rozas et al 2018; Bollier 2014; Catlow 2019). 
The commons in DLT networks are also distinct 
from private property and rights tied to 
markets or central institutions as nation states. 
Commons organisational 
experiments with DLTs also build 
on broader efforts towards what 
some call commons-based peer 
production, emphasising the 
potential of digital networks to 
radically transform productive 
processes towards large-scale 
collaborative models outside of 
market contexts.
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Instead, resources are shared, maintained 
and governed by a community as a matter of 
interdependence, with principles for successfully 
governed commons in physical worlds frequently 
transported into digital contexts (Ostrom 1990; 
Rozas et al. 2018; De Filippi and Hassan 2015), 
and often able to even maintain democratic 
principles at scale within highly complex 
contexts (Morell 2010). 
Commons in DLTs enable prosumer relations 
where anyone can partake in online communities 
both as producers and consumers of value 
within that community. But commons 
organisational experiments with DLTs also build 
on broader efforts towards what some call 
commons-based peer production, emphasising 
the potential of digital networks to radically 
transform productive processes towards large-
scale collaborative models outside of market 
contexts (Benkler and Nissenbaum 2006). And 
there are even concrete experiments based on 
alternative views of data economies, with the 
adoption of commons enabling management of 
personal data and capture, storage and use of 
data as public good rather than private property 
(Vercellone et al 2018).
Yet, organisational innovation within DLTs 
can also be focused on design of economic 
incentives building on the notion of markets 
as organisational and coordination tools 
(Ossandón 2019; Ossandón and Ureta 2019). 
Some experiments claim to be distinct from 
capital markets by suggesting that markets 
can be designed to achieve outcomes for the 
social good (Posner and Weyl 2018). This radical 
approach puts forward market design theories 
that aim to solve issues such as economic 
inequality, stagnation, and political instability 
(Posner and Weyl 2018; Buterin, Hitzig, and Weyl 
2018). The idea is that market incentives can be 
designed in order to achieve broader desirable 
outcomes for society (Ossandón 2019; Posner 
and Weyl 2018). One such design idea is that all 
asset owners would have to name the price they 
would sell their asset and taxed accordingly. The 
intention is that ownership would thereby also 
function as form of public auction that provided 
social and public dividends. The proposal would 
imply quadratic voting to allow allocation on 
issues according to what mattered the most 
(Lalley and Weyl 2018). 
2.5.2 Financial territories
On the side of financial experimentation, it is 
nearly impossible to not start with currencies. 
They were in fact the first use for DLTs such 
as blockchain and simultaneously functioned 
as a way to finance first DLT infrastructures, 
with Bitcoin introducing the idea of a network 
that would pay for itself, through miners who 
while securing the ledger would at the same 
time be rewarded for doing so through the 
creation of new cryptocurrency. This created 
a huge momentum but at the same time 
opened the way for speculation, scams, and a 
fluctuating currency market with many dubious 
effects on organisations and individuals. Initial 
Coin Offerings (ICOs) were a result of this 
trend and while they functioned as a means 
to facilitate independent fundraising for 
blockchain infrastructure adding tokens with 
cryptocurrencies, they also led to scams and 
speculative uses that marked the initial DLT 
spaces of cryptocurrencies as nothing else 
(Alexandre 2018).
Recent financial experiments aimed at enhancing 
social and public good have been focusing on 
solving some of the problems of ICO scams 
and speculation for the internal fundraising of 
DLTs. What are called curation markets is yet 
an unproven market design approach that is 
popular in the blockchain builders’ community 
to establish alternative finance mechanisms 
as further away as possible from speculative 
practices. The concept is that tokens are bought 
and sold according to an automated market 
maker contract or bonding curve, with the goal 
of providing liquidity and access to finance. A 
continuous bonding curve is a type of bonding 
curve that issues its own tokens through buy 
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and sell functions. This price increases as token 
supply grows (Titcomb 2019; Balasanov 2018), 
with the intention that this would incentivise 
early support for good ideas. 
Within this territory of financial experimentation, 
tokens can be minted and bought at any time 
according to a price set by a smart contract. The 
cryptocurrencies used to pay for tokens are kept 
in a smart contract, often deemed as reserve 
pool, and tokens can be burned and sold back to 
the contract at any point (Balasanov 2018). The 
designs of token minting and the protocols for its 
valuation in these schemes can be designed in a 
more fine-grained manner than ICOs. This allows 
the idea that incentives can therefore be better 
aligned to serve the financing needs for the public 
good of a project, a community, or even a whole 
system, rather than for speculation. 
For another financial example we can look at the 
worlds of transfers and lending with new DLT 
peer-to-peer models emerging among the major 
fintech players also using DLTs for their gain. 
The ubiquity of smartphones has given rise to 
a number of projects and companies extending 
financial and payment services to unbanked and 
other service deprived populations via mobile apps 
and text messages. Financial inclusion agendas 
often motivate these kinds of applications. 
Nonetheless this space is ruled by large network 
operators and other sizeable market players with 
other motives beyond the social and public good. 
Concrete examples can be found where these 
operations give rise to new forms of debt or 
monopolistic financial data economies (Donovan 
and Park 2019). And while extensions of financial 
or payment services might grant some freedom, 
they are also prone to allow for new limitations 
and dependencies, establishing intermediaries 
that separate deprived groups from their funds ( 
Donovan 2018).
A number of DLT projects have sprung up 
with the intention of tackling some of these 
problems by disintermediating remittance 
payments, enabling peer-to-peer lending, or 
even transparent donations to charities and 
aid projects. Some of these do it by enabling 
payment and financial services through peer-
to-peer platforms operated by a community of 
users. However, even here there are risks that 
need to be factored when using blockchain 
without significant research and limited 
involvement with intended users, as within some 
contexts where these applications exist they 
can easily become a form of ‘techno-colonial 
solutionism from above’ (Scott 2016).
Economic autonomy and other issues such 
as financial privacy remain one of the main 
ambitions in the development of DLT projects 
that push for broader decentralisation, which 
at times can take the form of libertarian anti-
central bank sentiments, and at others seek to 
enable economic empowerment of communities. 
Blockchain as DLT was initially invented in 
Bitcoin with the goal of enabling cash-like direct 
transfers between people, and without the 
creation of additional data and intermediation 
of payment providers. In terms of financial 
experimentation within this field of DLTs such 
purpose is still one of the most chased ones. 
The road ahead remains even so paved by 
commercially oriented agendas as the cashless 
approaches to finance and banking. Some of 
these can open the way for a wider impact of 
DLTs on the ground, but they could also help 
to concentrate even more financial power with 
payment providers and financial institutions if 
data does not become more than just technically 
decentralized (Scott 2018). Ultimately, it can even 
entail an expansion of economic surveillance 
at larger scales, with potential geo-political 
consequences in terms of economic sovereignty 
for individuals and groups (Arauz 2019).
We can look at the worlds 
of transfers and lending 
with new DLT peer-to-peer 
models emerging among the 
major fintech players also 
using DLTs for their gain.
PART 
TWO
This part comprises an empirical scanning of 
the current European ecosystem of DLT projects 
pursuing social and public good goals. It contains 
a summarized version of an online database with 
131 projects and an aggregated quantitative 
analysis of its trends and patterns. It also includes 
a qualitative review of ten projects to showcase 
heterogeneity in the field, regarding approaches 
to decentralisation, impacts, geographies, sectors, 
applications, technical and governance structures, 
funding models, lessons learned, and anticipatory 
outlooks.
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The current European ecosystem of Distributed 
Ledger Technology (DLT) projects on public 
and social good is not boundless. It is however 
composed of a diffuse and fast-changing set 
of initiatives, organisations, platforms, with 
varying governance models, goals, and more. 
This resulted in challenges when scanning for 
projects, when choosing which criteria were 
essential when reviewing them, and ultimately 
when deciding which projects could be selected 
as potential representatives of the ecosystem 
in terms of what they offer, although never 
as potential representative examples of this 
universe in statistical terms. However, this 
also allowed us to build more than just a 
plain collection of projects assembled with no 
thorough examination. The database published 
with this report embodies a stewardship 
process of structuration and indexation where 
some projects were deliberately incorporated 
while others were not.
Following conceptual developments, like those 
explored in Part One on what defines DLTs 
in this field, plus a combination of specific 
analytical criteria outlined below, we compiled 
a database with 131 projects, from January to 
April 2020. This was achieved through numerous 
rounds of review and validation conducted on an 
initial sample with more than 180 projects.
This is primarily an exploratory exercise 
to inform and support decision-makers, 
practitioners, researchers, and other relevant 
stakeholders, in laying down foundations for 
future endeavours. In addition, by this token, 
this is an output fully open to updates with new 
data on currently listed projects, or even to new 
projects, provided they fit our framing. 
The full version of the database is published 
on the European Commission’s Knowledge4 
Policy platform as ‘#DLT4Good Scanning’, a 
tool of the Competence Centre on Foresight . 
This report provides a summarized listing of 
the 131 projects with core information on each 
of them and a statistical analysis of overall 
patterns and trends related to this compilation 
of projects. Moreover, the current report also 
offers a deeper dive into ten of these projects, 
created via primary and secondary research 
with remote interviews, content analyses, and 
technical assessments.
Any reference to any project, or organisations, 
activities, products, services, and related 
technical, economic and governance 
configurations, does not constitute or imply 
endorsement, recommendation, or favouring 
of the European Commission, any of its 
departments, or any person acting on their 
behalf. Moreover, neither the database nor the 
deep dive into the selected projects entail a 
stamp of approval with quality recognition for 
commercial or other purposes. The European 
Commission takes no responsibility for any use 
that might be made of the information collected 
and presented in this report and all its derived 
online outputs. 
COMPILING A DATABASE 
OF DLT PROJECTS FOR SOCIAL AND 
PUBLIC GOOD IN EUROPE
The current European 
ecosystem of Distributed 
Ledger Technology (DLT) 
projects on public and social 
good is not boundless. 
It is however composed 
of a diffuse and fast-
changing set of initiatives, 
organisations, platforms, 
with varying governance 
models, goals, and more.
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This is a research overview conducted for policy 
advice by the JRC in collaboration with DG 
CONNECT and can only be interpreted as such. 
All data presented is made available under this 
assumption. All efforts were made to ensure 
accuracy and completeness of the information 
at the time of data collection and analysis 
for this report but no guarantee is given, nor 
do we warrant external elements provided 
by the projects, such as hyperlinks or code 
repositories.
3.1 Methodological outline
3.1.1 Sources for the database
Adding to the diffuse and fast-changing 
characteristics of this ecosystem of DLTs, 
another challenge was the unavailability 
of official, public and accessible records 
on the vast part of the selected projects. If 
the larger blockchain and DLT spaces are 
already characterised by an absence of 
extensive information on most projects and 
organisations, this field can take it to higher 
levels, for example when considering projects 
only supported by non-profit structures with no 
major commercial presence, or when looking 
into projects that depend mostly on extremely 
small communities of users and developers.
 The creation of this database had to resort to 
different alternative data sources and other 
resources for this reason. On one hand, this 
added multiple layers of complexity in the 
obtention and verification of specific data. But 
on the other hand, it also increased the reach, 
diversity and robustness of the information 
analysed and now published.
The first entry point was secondary desk 
research on outputs already published in this 
and contiguous fields, from scientific papers to 
institutional reports. This was complemented 
by extensive primary online research, which 
led to a preliminary identification of projects 
and experts and subsequently to a snowball 
exploration of other information sources.
The second entry point was previously 
engaged experts and key informants who 
provided references from projects and 
other relevant initiatives. Research through 
personal networks or communication channels 
from collaborators in this report was also 
used here, including social media scanning 
on hashtags as #Blockchain4Good or 
#Blockchain4SocialGood.
The third entry point was public databases 
and lists already produced by researchers and 
practitioners within and around the field of 
blockchains and other DLTs for social and public 
good. These all had different geographical 
scopes, purposes or depth from ours, and 
often had different or non-disclosed criteria 
for inclusion of projects. They were mainly 
used for triangulation purposes regarding 
visibility or significance of projects, with our 
main sources being the EIC Horizon Prize 
‘Blockchains for Social Good’18, EU Blockchain 
Observatory and Forum19, Positive Blockchain20, 
Ledger (H2020 Project)21, Illinois Blockchain 
18  https://www.ngi.eu/event/blockchains-for-social-good/   
19  https://www.eublockchainforum.eu/initiative-map  
20  https://positiveblockchain.io/ 
21  https://ledgerproject.eu/   
This is primarily an 
exploratory exercise to 
inform and support decision-
makers, practitioners, 
researchers, and other 
relevant stakeholders, in 
laying down foundations for 
future endeavours.
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Initiative22, Blockchain for Humanity23, Center 
for Biomedical Blockchain Research24, 
Blockchange25, Blockchain / Web3 Open 
Science Ecosystem Telegram group26, Clean 
App report on Clean-[Block]-Tech27, and the 
Blockchain-Unica curated list on Blockchains 
for social good28.
The fourth and last entry point was an online 
survey designed with a similar structure to the 
final version of the database. This survey was 
open throughout four weeks to any project, 
organisation or initiative that wished to add 
themselves to our initial pool of projects 
for later review. Notwithstanding a wide 
dissemination campaign, only 21 projects 
replied to the survey with information enough to 
merit review, which we attributed both to lack 
of reach and to the small size of the overall 
universe. After the publication of this report and 
the online database, the survey will be reopened 
to additional contributions on a rolling basis so 
that we can update the currently listed projects 
and include new relevant ones29.
3.1.2 Criteria for the selection of projects
A combination of multiple criteria determined 
the inclusion of the selected projects in the 
database. Specific projects were analysed 
beyond such criteria for extra validation. 
First, based on our conceptual understanding 
of DLTs for social and public good anchored in 
the potential of these technologies to generate 
22  https://airtable.com/universe/expsQEGKoZO2lExKK/
blockchain-in-government-tracker?explore=true
23  www.b4h.world 
24  https://db.biomedicalblockchain.org/companies 
25  https://blockchan.ge/   
26  https://hackmd.io/QTaG8S3LQAeBfnCT-EFFfQ#   
27  https://medium.com/cleanapp/clean-block-tech-
83a130417721 
28  https://github.com/blockchain-unica/social-good 
29  https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/runner/dlt4goodscanning
decentralisation, projects had to illustrate how 
this could have effects at much more than just 
technical levels. To the extent of our capacities 
to fully evaluate this point in all projects, 
we considered elements from supporting 
better governance models at internal levels, 
to promoting a wider or better distribution 
of values, resources, and other benefits to 
external stakeholders.
Second, projects included in this database also 
had to rely on a specific use of DLTs with a clear 
aim to positively impact social and public sectors. 
This meant broadly that their existence attempted 
to tackle at least relevant issues at local levels, 
and at most, to follow socially or publicly 
significant larger mission-driven frameworks, 
or yet contribute to global agendas such as the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
Third, projects had to be established in one or 
more European countries, with special attention 
given to those inside the European Union (EU-
27) or the European Economic Area (EEA). For all 
purposes, projects in the UK were still analysed 
in this framework as all of them were founded 
prior to January 2020. In the case of projects 
developed in countries outside Europe, we only 
considered those with operations also taking 
place in at least one European country and 
whose outputs have visible ocurrence in Europe.
Fourth, projects had to use DLTs with credible 
degrees of functionality, quality, complexity, 
activity, or innovation considering non-DLT 
solutions. This was set as a criterion to discard 
copycats, fakes, vaporware, or projects with 
non-verifiable operations. Possible criteria 
such as Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) 
were not considered due to the limitations 
in scope of the project and the challenges 
in verifying them beyond the information 
each project would provide directly. Projects 
are in the database if they have functional 
software, either in proof of concept demo, pilot, 
or in production and live stages. Projects in 
whitepaper stages or projects only developed 
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for fundraising through ICOs but abandoned 
afterwards have not been included. Regarding 
permanent activity, meaning projects not 
abandoned or stalled, this was bypassed in 
some cases where projects were particularly 
relevant and had a significant amount of 
prior development. In addition, the existence 
of publicly accessible and updated code 
repositories, such as Github, with the software 
developed as open source has been positively 
evaluated, although it was not considered an 
exclusion criterion. 
3.1.3 Categories of the database
Below is a summarised explanation for each 
category used during the processes of data 
collection and review of the projects included 
in the database. The majority were created 
prior to the empirical exploration, while 
some emerged or were modified during our 
assessment. 
In some of the categories, it was not possible 
to collect or generate relevant information 
for a significant number of projects, which 
led to its exclusion from the final database. 
Nonetheless, based on available data there was 
still an effort to analyse all categories in all 
projects, and all categories contributed to our 
general understanding of the field. 
The following categories compose the database 
and constitute the basis of our analysis: 
• Name: open response on official or most 
known designation of project;
• Description of project: open response 
according to information provided by the 
project itself in websites, documentation, or 
through direct contacts;
• Main sectors: multiple choice response with 
up to maximum of 3 options in pre-coded 
list of 21, as for example ‘Arts, Media and 
Entertainment’ or ‘Energy, Climate and 
Environment’; 
• Application: multiple choice response with up 
to maximum of 3 options in pre-coded list of 
38, as for example ‘Asset Registry’ or ‘Digital 
Currencies / Cryptocurrencies’; 
• Year: numeric response on the year of 
the project’s foundation, with focus on 
the introduction of DLTs if project existed 
previously; 
• Implementing organisation: open response 
on the legal name of organisation(s) leading 
the project, or main organisation in case 
more than one exists;
• Type of organisation: single choice 
response in pre-coded list with options 
including ‘Companies (for-profit)’, 
‘Companies (non-profit)’, ‘Organisations (not 
companies), ‘Research Institutions’, ‘Public 
Administration’ or ‘Consortium’;
• Sub-type of organisation: single choice 
in pre-coded list dependant on previous 
response, with options including ‘Startup’, 
‘SME’, ‘Enterprise’ in case the options 
‘Companies (for-profit)’ or Companies (non-
profit) were chosen previously; ‘Foundation’, 
‘NGO / Non-profit, ‘Association’ in case the 
option ‘Organisations (not companies) was 
chosen previously. 
• Team size: numeric response on the number 
of people in the core group;
• Gender diversity: numeric response on 
the number of women or other non-male 
members of the core group;
• Founders: open response on personal names 
of founding members according to information 
provided by the project itself in websites, 
documentation, or through direct contacts;
• Partners: open response on associate, 
collaborator, user or other stakeholder 
organisations in the project, according to 
information provided by the project itself in 
websites, documentation, or through direct 
contacts;
• Country/ies: single choice response on the 
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country or multiple countries where the 
project is established, or operates if more 
relevant;
• City: open response on the locality where 
physical headquarters are established, if 
they exist;
• Geographical reach: single choice response 
in pre-coded list with options including 
‘International’, ‘National’, ‘Local’, and ‘N/A’
• Expected impact: single choice response on 
the estimated number of people the project 
planned to reach, in pre-coded list with 
options including ‘Above 1M’, ‘100k-1M’, 
‘1k-100k’, and ‘Below 1k’;
• Timeframe for impact: numeric response on 
the estimated year the project planned to 
reach its expected impact; 
• Stage: single choice response on the current 
status of the project in pre-coded list with 
options including ‘Demo’, ‘Pilot’, and ‘Live’.
• Type of DLT / Blockchain: originally multiple 
choice response in pre-coded list with 5 
options including for example ‘Existing 
public blockchain (eg. Bitcoin or Ethereum)’ 
or ‘Private or permissioned blockchain 
(whitelisted access eg. Hyperledger)’, which 
were later modified in the review stage to 
‘Public’, ‘Private’, and ‘Other’.
• Name of DLT / Blockchain: open response on 
which DLT / Blockchain platform, protocol, or 
other related technical architecture is used 
by the project;
• Other technologies: multiple choice response 
with up to maximum of 3 options in pre-
coded list of 16, including for example ‘IoT 
/ Smart Appliances / Wearables’ or ‘Virtual / 
Augmented Reality’; 
• Additional information such as: existence 
and accessibility of a code repository, such 
as Github; Repository URL, Whitepaper URL; 
Twitter URL; and contact email.
 3.1.4 Data collection, validation and 
analysis
The main stages that allowed us to have a robust 
process to collect, validate and analyse the 
projects were the following:  
• First, continuously searching and selecting 
potential projects that met the criteria. 
• Second, filling in all possible categories in all 
possible projects with information available 
through the main sources already detailed.
• Third, technically assessing projects to 
validate functionality, quality, innovation, or 
more, via code repositories, white papers, or 
other publicly available elements. 
• Fourth, reaching out directly to projects as 
much as possible, not only to collect primary 
data, but also to verify information gathered 
through other sources. 
The steps occurred frequently in parallel, with 
feedback loops between them, and multiple 
rounds of each, which allowed for better 
quality control on the collected information and 
continuous refinement of the database until the 
final decision on inclusions or exclusions.
Based on publicly available information, it was 
possible to fill in data of 7% of the projects. In 
the remaining set of projects, it was necessary to 
establish direct communication once with 53% 
of the projects, twice with 32%, and three times 
or more with 8%. In these cases, communication 
was mostly done through email or telegram, but 
there were also projects where it was required to 
rely on alternative channels or personal networks.
Nevertheless, despite best efforts to reach out to 
projects, not all those contacted were responsive 
or provided the required information for their 
inclusion in the database. This means that a 
small number of projects were not included in 
the final database even if they apparently met 
criteria, due to the shortage of sufficient data for 
empirical verification.
# NAME COUNTRY SECTOR APPLICATION WEBSITE 
1 Agora CH Governance; Tokenization
Voting/Elections; 
Software-as-a-Service; 
Public Records; 
Governance and voting; 
https://agora.vote
2 Agriledger UK 
Agriculture and Forest-based 
Activities; Supply Chains and 
Logistics; Food and Drinks
Supply Chain Management/Trade http://www.agriledger.io/
3 Aidcoin CH Tokenization
Digital Tokens; 
Financial Services/Market 
Infrastructure; 
Payments/Financial Infrastructure
https://www.aidcoin.co/
4 Akropolis UK Banking and Financial Services Payments/Financial Infrastructure https://akropolis.io/
5 Alice.si UK Banking and Financial Services
Financial Services/Market 
Infrastructure; 
Payments/Financial Infrastructure
https://alice.si/
6 Ambrosus IE; EE; CH
Supply Chains and Logistics; 
Food and Drinks; Healthcare and 
Biotechnologies
Supply Chain Management/Trade; 
Disintermediation and 
decentralized networks
https://ambrosus.com/ 
https://tech.ambrosus.com/
7 APPII UK Arts, Media and Entertainment Software-as-a-Service;  
Public Records
https://appii.io/
8 Aragon CH Governance; IT and 
Telecommunications
Governance and voting;  
Payments/Financial Infrastructure; 
Regulatory; 
Disintermediation and 
decentralized networks
https://aragon.org/
9 Arcadia EE Social Economy Software-as-a-Service; 
Payments/Financial Infrastructure
https://www.arcadiablockchain.
com/
10 Auxilium NL Banking and Financial Services Financial Services/Market 
Infrastructure
https://auxilium.global/
11 BetterChain ES Supply Chains and Logistics; 
Energy, Climate and Environment
Supply Chain Management/Trade; 
Tracking of goods, supply chain, IoT
https://www.bcha.in/
12 BitDegree LT Education and Research Business Formation/Licensing https://www.bitdegree.org/
13 Bitdust NL IT and Telecommunications; 
Social Economy
Public Utilities; Cybersecurity; 
Disintermediation and 
decentralized networks; Self 
Sovereign - digital identity
https://bitdust.io
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3.2 Summarized database30
30 https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/foresight/topic/dlt4good-scanning_en
# NAME COUNTRY SECTOR APPLICATION WEBSITE 
14 BitHope BG Platform Economies and Service 
Sharing
Software-as-a-Service; 
Financial Services/Market 
Infrastructure
https://bithope.org/
15 Blockchain My Art FR; DE Arts, Media and Entertainment
Disintermediation and decentralized 
networks; Software-as-a-Service; 
Payments/Financial Infrastructure; 
Economic Development; Supply 
Chain Management/Trade; Digital 
Tokens; Disintermediation and 
decentralized networks; Payments 
and international transactions
https://www.blockchainmyart.org/
16 Bloomio CH; MT; RU Banking and Financial Services Financial Services/Market 
Infrastructure
https://www.bloomio.com/
17 Bloxberg DE Education and Research Research/Standards; 
Strategy/Research
https://bloxberg.org/
18 Centrifuge DE Supply Chains and Logistics
Data Marketplace/Data 
monetization; 
Supply Chain Management/Trade
https://centrifuge.io/
19 CHOOOSE NO Energy, Climate and Environment Software-as-a-Service https://chooose.today/
20 Circles UBI DE Social Economy; Platform 
Economies and Service Sharing
Digital Tokens; 
Payments/Financial Infrastructure
https://www.joincircles.net/
21 Circularise NL Supply Chains and Logistics Supply Chain Management/Trade https://www.circularise.com/
22 CLIMATETRADE ES Energy, Climate and Environment
Financial Services/Market 
Infrastructure; 
Digital Tokens
https://climatetrade.com/
23
COIN (Coffee 
Source 
Information)
CH; CN; SG 
Supply Chains and Logistics; Raw 
Materials and Natural Resources; 
Food and Drinks
Supply Chain Management/Trade; 
Financial Services/Market 
Infrastructure
https://www.scantrust.com/
24 CoinSence DE; TN Banking and Financial Services
Data Marketplace/Data 
monetization; 
Financial Services/Market 
Infrastructure; 
Payments/Financial Infrastructure; 
Economic Development
http://www.coinsence.org
25 Colendi CH Banking and Financial Services
Financial Services/Market 
Infrastructure; 
Payments/Financial Infrastructure
https://www.colendi.com/
26 Colony UK; KY IT and Telecommunications Software-as-a-Service; 
Supply Chain Management/Trade
https://colony.io/
27 Com'Chain CH; FR Social Economy; Energy, Climate 
and Environment
Digital Currencies/Cryptocurrencies; 
Voting/Elections; Supply Chain 
Management/Trade
https://com-chain.org/
28 CommonsHood IT Tokenization Digital Tokens; 
Economic Development
https://www.commonshood.eu/
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29 Content Blockchain NL; DE Arts, Media and Entertainment
Supply Chain Management/Trade; 
Disintermediation and 
decentralized networks
https://content-blockchain.org/
30 Creary ES Arts, Media and Entertainment Digital Tokens; 
Asset Registry
https://creaproject.io/creary/
31 Cudo Donate UK Social Economy; Platform 
Economies and Service Sharing
Software-as-a-Service; 
Loyalty Rewards
https://www.cudodonate.com/
32 DAO IPCI RU Energy, Climate and Environment Carbon markets https://ipci.io/
33 DAOStack UK Governance; IT and 
Telecommunications
Disintermediation and 
decentralized networks; 
Governance and voting
https://daostack.io/
34 DAppNode ES; CH IT and Telecommunications
Disintermediation and 
decentralized networks; 
Internet of Things; 
Public Utilities; 
New Products/Services
https://dappnode.io/
35 Datafund SI IT and Telecommunications
Data Marketplace/Data 
monetization; 
Software-as-a-Service; 
Identity (credentials/licenses/
attestations)
https://datafund.io/
36 DECENT CH Supply Chains and Logistics
Supply Chain Management/Trade; 
Disintermediation and 
decentralized networks; 
Payments/Financial Infrastructure
https://decent.ch/
37 Decentralized Science ES Education and Research
Software-as-a-Service; 
Research/Standards; 
Disintermediation and 
decentralized networks
https://decentralized.science/
38 DECODE ES; NL IT and Telecommunications
Internet of Things; 
Disintermediation and 
decentralized networks
https://decodeproject.eu/
39 Decred N/A Tokenization
Disintermediation and 
decentralized networks; Digital 
Tokens
https://decred.org/
40 District0x SK; BG; KY Governance; Tokenization
Governance and 
voting;Financial Services/Market 
Infrastructure;Voting/Elections
https://district0x.io
41 Empower plastic NO Energy, Climate and Environment
Tax collection/Credits; Digital 
Tokens
https://empower.eco/
42 Energimine UK Energy, Climate and Environment; 
Tokenization
Disintermediation and 
decentralized networks
https://energimine.com/
43 Energy Web DE Energy, Climate and Environment Research/Standards https://www.energyweb.org/
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44 Etherisc DE; CH Banking and Financial Services
Disintermediation and 
decentralized networks; 
Financial Services/Market 
Infrastructure
https://etherisc.com/
45 EthicHub ES Agriculture and Forest-based 
Activities; Financial Services
Financial Services/Market 
Infrastructure; 
Payments/Financial Infrastructure; 
Economic development
https://ethichub.com/
46 EthKids NL Other/s; Social Economy Benefits/Entitlements/Donations https://ethkids.io/
47 Everledger UK Supply Chains and Logistics Supply Chain Management/Trade; 
Tracking of goods, supply chain, IoT
https://www.everledger.io/
48 Evertrace DE Supply Chains and Logistics Supply Chain Management/Trade https://www.evertrace.io/
49 E-Women NL; EE; BE; 
UA
Governance; Education 
and Research; IT and 
Telecommunications
Governance and voting; 
Public Records; 
Strategy/Research
http://dli.websoftdev.net 
https://www.instingov.org/proj-
ects/e-women
50 Exonum NL 
Land Management and Real 
Estate; Retail and Consumer 
Goods; Supply Chains and 
Logistics
Supply Chain Management/Trade; 
Purchasing/Procurement/
Contracting; 
Payments and international 
transactions
https://exonum.com/
51 Fairbike NL 
Platform Economies and Service 
Sharing; Social Economy; Local 
Economy
Public Transportation; 
Public Utilities
https://the-incredible-machine.
com/fairbike.html
52 Fairfood NL Agriculture and Forest-based 
Activities
Supply Chain Management/Trade; 
Asset Registry; 
Economic Development
https://fairfood.nl/en/
53 FlexiDAO ES Energy, Climate and Environment Self Sovereign - digital identity; 
Software-as-a-Service
https://www.flexidao.com/ 
54 Give Bytes UK 
IT and Telecommunications; 
Platform Economies and Service 
Sharing
Data Marketplace/Data 
monetization; 
Software-as-a-Service; 
Economic Development
https://givebytes.com
55 GIVE Nation UK Education and Research Digital Tokens https://givenation.world/
56 GivethDapp ES Platform Economies and Service 
Sharing
Supply Chain Management/Trade; 
Public Utilities; 
Software-as-a-Service
https://giveth.io/
57 GoHelpFund RO Banking and Financial Services Financial Services/Market 
Infrastructure
https://gohelpfund.com/
58 Gradbase UK Education and Research Software-as-a-Service;  
Public Records
https://gradba.se/en/
59 Grapevine World AT Healthcare and Biotechnologies
Data Marketplace/Data 
monetization; 
Personal Records (Health, Financial, 
etc)
https://www.grapevineworld.com/ 
https://grapevineworldtoken.io/
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60 Hiveonline DK Banking and Financial Services Payments/Financial Infrastructure https://www.hivenetwork.online/
61 Holochain DE; UK
Governance; IT and 
Telecommunications; Supply 
Chains and Logistics; Platform 
Economies and Service Sharing
Disintermediation and 
decentralized networks; 
Data Marketplace/Data 
monetization; 
Supply Chain Management/Trade; 
Identity (credentials/licenses/
attestations)
https://holochain.org/
62 Humaniq UK Social Economy; Tokenization
Payments/Financial Infrastructure; 
Financial Services/Market 
Infrastructure
https://humaniq.com/
63 Idbox UK IT and Telecommunications Self Sovereign - digital identity https://www.idbox.io/
64 Iden3 CH; ES IT and Telecommunications
Identity (credentials/licenses/
attestations); 
New Products/Services; 
Software-as-a-Service
https://iden3.io/
65 Imagjn NL Arts, Media and Entertainment
Identity (credentials/licenses/
attestations); 
Disintermediation and 
decentralized networks
https://imagjn.datafloq.com/
66 Infrachain LU Education and Research; 
Governance
Research/Standards; 
Strategy/Research; Governance and 
voting
https://infrachain.com/
67 Iomob ES; EE Platform Economies and Service 
Sharing
Software-as-a-Service; 
Disintermediation and 
decentralized networks
https://www.iomob.net/
68 IPCHAIN NL Arts, Media and Entertainment Copyright and intellectual property 
protection
https://ipchain.eu/org/
69 Iryo Network SI Healthcare and Biotechnologies; 
Tokenization
Public Records; 
Identity (credentials/licenses/
attestations); 
Digital Tokens
https://iryo.network
70 iVoting PL Governance Governance and voting; Voting/
Elections;
https://ivoting.pl/en/kontakt/
71 Ixo CH Banking and Financial Services
Financial Services/Market 
Infrastructure; 
Payments/Financial Infrastructure; 
Economic Development
http://ixo.foundation/
72 Jolocom DE IT and Telecommunications Self Sovereign - digital identity; 
Software-as-a-Service
https://jolocom.io/
73 Kleros FR Platform Economies and Service 
Sharing; Tokenization
Disintermediation and 
decentralized networks; 
Law/Legal Enforcement/Courts
https://kleros.io/en/
74 Mattereum UK Arts, Media and Entertainment; 
Retail and Consumer Goods
Supply Chain Management/Trade; 
Regulatory
https://mattereum.com/
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75 Medibloc UK Healthcare and Biotechnologies
Personal Records (Health, Financial, 
etc); 
Data Marketplace/Data 
monetization
https://medibloc.org/en/
76 MEDICALCHAIN UK Healthcare and Biotechnologies
Identity (credentials/licenses/
attestations); 
Personal Records (Health, Financial, 
etc)
https://medicalchain.com
77 Medichain UK Healthcare and Biotechnologies Data Marketplace/Data 
monetization
https://medichain.online/
78 Meditect FR Healthcare and Biotechnologies; 
Supply Chains and Logistics
Supply Chain Management/Trade; 
Disintermediation and 
decentralized networks; 
Data Marketplace/Data 
monetization
https://www.meditect.com/
79 Mimirium BG
Government and Public and 
Social Services; Healthcare 
and Biotechnologies; IT and 
Telecommunications
Data Marketplace/Data 
monetization; Software-as-a-
Service; Identity (credentials/
licenses/attestations); Personal 
Records (Health, Financial, etc); 
Voting/Elections; Data Marketplace/
Data monetization; Cybersecurity
https://mimirium.io/
80 Minespider DE; CH 
Raw Materials and Natural 
Resources; Supply Chains and 
Logistics
Public Records; 
Supply Chain Management/Trade
https://www.minespider.com/
81 Minexx UK 
Raw Materials and Natural 
Resources; Supply Chains and 
Logistics
Supply Chain Management/Trade; 
Disintermediation and 
decentralized networks; 
Data Marketplace/Data 
monetization
https://minexx.co/
82 Modum CH Supply Chains and Logistics Supply Chain Management/Trade; 
Internet of Things
https://modum.io/
83 Monnaie Libre FR
Education and Research; Platform 
Economies and Service Sharing; 
Local Economy; Social Economy
Digital Currencies/Cryptocurrencies; 
Disintermediation and 
decentralized networks; Personal 
Records (Health, Financial, etc); 
Self Sovereign - digital identity; 
Strategy/Research; Governance and 
voting
https://axiom-team.fr
84 Mosoly Project HU Governance
Governance and voting; 
Disintermediation and 
decentralized networks
https://www.mosoly.live/
85 MyBit CH Banking and Financial Services
Financial Services/Market 
Infrastructure; 
Payments/Financial Infrastructure
https://mybit.io/
86 NutraSign ES
Agriculture and Forest-based 
Activities; Supply Chains and 
Logistics
Supply Chain Management/Trade; 
Tracking of goods, supply chain, IoT
https://www.nutrasign.io/
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87 ODEM CH Education and Research Data Marketplace/Data 
monetization
https://odem.io/
88 Open Source University BG
Education and Research; 
Tokenization
Payments/Financial Infrastructure; 
Economic Development
https://os.university/
89 OPUS UK Arts, Media and Entertainment
Software-as-a-Service; 
Data Marketplace/Data 
monetization
https://www.opus.audio/ 
90 OriginalMy EE; BR
Government and Public and 
Social Services; Other/s; 
Cybersecurity
Self Sovereign - digital identity; 
Cybersecurity; 
Governance and voting
https://originalmy.com/
91 OriginTrail SI Supply Chains and Logistics Supply Chain Management/Trade https://origintrail.io/
92 Orvium EE Education and Research
Research/Standards; 
Software-as-a-Service; 
Compliance/Reporting
https://orvium.io/
93 PharmaTrace DE Healthcare and Biotechnologies; 
Supply Chains and Logistics
Supply Chain Management/Trade; 
Data Marketplace/Data 
monetization
https://www.pharmatrace.io/
94 Pharmeum UK Healthcare and Biotechnologies
Personal Records (Health, Financial, 
etc); 
Data Marketplace/Data 
monetization
https://pharmeum.io/
95 Polkadot DE; CH Governance; IT and 
Telecommunications
Disintermediation and 
decentralized networks; 
Governance and voting
https://polkadot.network/
96 PolloPollo DK Other/s Benefits/Entitlements/Donations https://pollopollo.org/
97 Prosume IT Energy, Climate and Environment General Infrastructure; 
Supply Chain Management/Trade
https://prosume.io
98 Provenance UK IT and Telecommunications
Supply Chain Management/Trade; 
Software-as-a-Service; 
Asset Registry
https://www.provenance.org/about
99 PUBLIQ CH Arts, Media and Entertainment Disintermediation and 
decentralized networks
https://publiq.network/
100 Pylon Network ES Energy, Climate and Environment General Infrastructure; 
Supply Chain Management/Trade
https://pylon-network.org/
101
Rec (Real 
Economy 
Currency)
ES Social Economy; Local Economy
Economic Development; Digital 
Tokens
https://rec.barcelona/en/home/
102 RIGHT MESH CH IT and Telecommunications
Software-as-a-Service; 
New Products/Services; 
General Infrastructure; 
Public Utilities
https://www.rightmesh.io
103 Safe Haven BE; SG IT and Telecommunications
Identity (credentials/licenses/
attestations); 
Payments/Financial Infrastructure
https://safehaven.io
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# NAME COUNTRY SECTOR APPLICATION WEBSITE 
104 Sandblock FR Tokenization
Payments/Financial Infrastructure; 
Financial Services/Market 
Infrastructure
https://sandblock.io/
105 SERATIO (CCEG) UK 
Banking and Financial Services; 
Tokenization
Digital Tokens; 
Financial Services/Market 
Infrastructure; 
Payments/Financial Infrastructure
https://www.seratio-coins.world/
106 Slavefreetrade CH Supply Chains and Logistics; 
Social Economy
Supply Chain Management/Trade https://slavefreetrade.org/
107 Slock.it DE Supply Chains and Logistics New Products/Services; 
Tracking of goods, supply chain, IoT
https://slock.it/
108 Smilo NL 
Government and Public and 
Social Services; Healthcare 
and Biotechnologies; IT and 
Telecommunications
Financial Services/Market 
Infrastructure; Supply Chain 
Management/Trade; Software-as-
a-Service
https://smilo.io/
109 Solar Bankers CZ Energy, Climate and Environment; 
Tokenization
Disintermediation and 
decentralized networks; Digital 
Tokens
https://solarbankers.com/main_
block.html
110 SolarCoin US Energy, Climate and Environment
Digital Tokens; 
Research/Standards; 
Data Marketplace/Data 
monetization
http://solarcoin.org/
111 Spectral NL Energy, Climate and Environment
Software-as-a-Service; 
Data Marketplace/Data 
monetization; 
General Infrastructure
https://spectral.energy
112 Sunchain FR Energy, Climate and Environment Public Utilities; 
General Infrastructure
https://www.sunchain.fr/
113 SunCore IE
Banking and Financial Services; 
Healthcare and Biotechnologies; 
IT and Telecommunications; 
Tokenization
Public Records; Data Marketplace/
Data monetization; Personal 
Records (Health, Financial, etc); 
Digital Tokens; Process digitization; 
Tracking of goods, supply chain, IoT
https://suncoretech.net 
https://suntoken.io 
https://wakeup.zone
114 Synergy EL IT and Telecommunications; 
Social Economy
Financial Services/Market 
Infrastructure; 
Economic Development; 
Loyalty Rewards 
https://idea.synergatika.gr/
115 TE-FOOD DE; HU; VN
Supply Chains and Logistics; 
Food and Drinks; Agriculture and 
Forest-based Activities
Supply Chain Management/Trade; 
Internet of Things; 
Disintermediation and 
decentralized networks
https://tefoodint.com/
116 The Commons Stack CH Other/s
Disintermediation and 
decentralized networks;
https://commonsstack.org/
117 The Democracy Notary MK
Government and Public and 
Social Services
Public Records
https://democracynotary.org/
en.html
40
Scanning the European Ecosystem of Distributed Ledger Technologies for Social and Public Good. 
# NAME COUNTRY SECTOR APPLICATION WEBSITE 
118 ThreeFold Network
BE; CH; ES; 
AE
IT and Telecommunications
Economic Development; 
Cybersecurity (Critical 
Infrastructure); 
General Infrastructure; 
Internet of Things
http://threefold.io/
119 TiiQu UK IT and Telecommunications
Identity (credentials/licenses/
attestations); 
Self Sovereign - digital identity
https://tiiqu.com/
120 Tykn NL Government and Public and 
Social Services
Self Sovereign - digital identity; 
Personal Records (Health, Financial, 
etc)
https://tykn.tech
121 Unbiased SE
Platform Economies and 
Service Sharing; IT and 
Telecommunications
Data Marketplace/Data 
monetization; Digital Tokens;  
Governance and voting
https://unbiased.cc/
122 Uniris FR
Banking and Financial Services; 
IT and Telecommunications; 
Tokenization
Financial Services/Market 
Infrastructure; Identity (credentials/
licenses/attestations); Governance 
and voting
https://uniris.io/
123 Usody ES Supply Chains and Logistics; Raw 
Materials and Natural Resources
Asset Registry; 
Supply Chain Management/Trade; 
Compliance/Reporting; 
Disintermediation and 
decentralized networks
http://www.usody.com/
124 We Power LT; EE; ES; 
AU
Energy, Climate and Environment; 
Social Economy; Tokenization
Financial Services/Market 
Infrastructure; 
Supply Chain Management/Trade
https://wepower.network/
125 Weeve DE
Supply Chains and Logistics; 
Manufacturing and Engineering 
Industries; Banking and Financial 
Services
Supply Chain Management/Trade; 
Internet of Things
https://weeve.network/
126 Vidchain ES IT and Telecommunications
Self Sovereign - digital identity; 
Disintermediation and 
decentralized networks
https://www.validatedid.com/
vidchain/
127 Vigicard FR Healthcare and Biotechnologies Software-as-a-Service https://vigicard.eu/
128 Vinturas NL Supply Chains and Logistics
Supply Chain Management/Trade; 
Data Marketplace/Data 
monetization; 
Identity (credentials/licenses/
attestations)
https://www.vinturas.com/
129 Vocdoni ES Governance Governance and voting https://vocdoni.io/
130 Wordproof NL Arts, Media and Entertainment
Software-as-a-Service; 
Identity (credentials/licenses/
attestations)
https://wordproof.io/
131 ZINC UK Other/s Public Records https://zinc.work
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3.3 Quantitative analysis
The following output is based on a statistical 
analysis of the database after a final review 
of all projects. Based on the unavailability 
of official, public and accessible data on the 
majority of selected projects, our assessment 
relies mainly on data provided directly or 
indirectly by the projects themselves through 
interviews or other sources. For example, 
91 projects (69% of our universe) have a 
whitepaper or at least more or less detailed 
information sheets about their project with 
links available for public consultation. In 
addition, a total of 94 projects have an 
accessible Github (72%). But the remainder 
have a private repository, declared not to have 
one, or the information was not available 
through primary or secondary sources.
Whenever possible this information was 
triangulated not only with some of the 
secondary sources mentioned before, but also 
other external sources. This included data 
sets curated by third parties with commercial 
or investment focus, such as Crunchbase31 or 
AngelList32, data obtained via media outputs in 
which projects were featured, such as articles 
published in FT Alphaville33, Cointelegraph34, 
or Coindesk35, or yet information obtained via 
public events in which projects participated, 
such as the finalists day of the EIC Prize on 
Blockchains for Social Good 36.
These results are by no means representative 
considering possible European and global 
universes of DLT initiatives targeting social 
and public good. They should also not be 
interpreted as proportional in any way in 
relation to larger universes of blockchain or 
31   https://www.crunchbase.com/
32  https://angel.co/
33  https://ftalphaville.ft.com/
34  https://cointelegraph.com/
35  https://www.coindesk.com/
36  https://www.ngi.eu/event/blockchains-for-social-good/
DLT organisations, projects, applications, or 
use cases at large. Any major considerations 
or conclusions coming from this analysis are 
solely referring to this specific database of 
projects.
Overall, this is a small field that remains 
relatively unexplored, and there is a significant 
degree of analytical uncertainty that comes 
with it. 
As much as we strived to produce the most 
comprehensive knowledge up to now of this 
field at European level, on one hand, the 
information amassed is still limited in scope, 
fragmented or overall insufficient to generate 
any basis for extrapolation. On the other hand, 
it depends highly on elements such as the 
qualitative features of our research with its 
inherent biases, flows and timings of data 
gathering, and criteria chosen for inclusion or 
exclusion of projects, etc. Nevertheless, we aim 
for these results to shed light on what is still 
an unknown territory for the most part.
The results emanate from a univariate analysis 
on the main frequencies in percentages, 
always indicating in each variable analysed 
the calculation base (n). Significance tests 
and bivariate contrasts were performed 
depending on the level of measurement of 
variables (correlations using Pearson’s R, cross-
tabulation using Chi2 and means contrasts 
using t-Student). 
Some independent variables were considered 
for cross-analysis, and despite the low 
statistical significance of any contrasts, it 
was possible to find interesting relations 
in the percentage distributions. However, it 
was chosen not to perform any multivariate 
analyses considering more than two variables 
as no dominant or major trends warranted it.
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3.3.1 Countries, regions and 
geographical reach
Fig. 01 - Main country of origin (N37=131)
All projects in the database have their main 
headquarters in at least one European country. 
But numerous projects have collaborative 
activities across countries, and this leads to 
some projects being linked to from more than 
one country, even outside Europe. 
Fig. 02 - Geographical reach of the projects 
(N=131)
37  ‘N’ refers to the number of cases that have been used for 
calculations, such as percentages, in each category. The 
number may be inferior to the total number of projects 
(131). This can happen because it was not possible to 
obtain data for all cases, there are variables not applied 
to all cases, or the number of cases can be reduced when 
there is a cross variable analysis. In addition, in a small 
number of cases, the number can be much higher than 
131, as for example when all answers in multiple-choice 
questions are taken into consideration.
The majority of projects are developed in 
a single country, (78,5%), while 13% are 
developed in two countries, 5% in three 
countries, and finally 3% in four countries, and 
this information can be consulted for each 
project in the online database.
 For statistical purposes, we counted the main 
country where the project is developed, or 
yet the first country the projects themselves 
declared in our primary research. 
The main countries with the largest number of 
projects considered in our review are the United 
Kingdom 20% (26), Spain 13% (17), Netherlands 
12% (16), Germany 11% (14), Switzerland 11% 
(14), and France 7% (9). There are 23 other 
countries with projects included in the database, 
but these only encompass 3 or less each.
The projects within the EU-27 are 66% of all 
projects (86), within the United Kingdom are 
19% (25), and the projects in other countries are 
15% (20), with Switzerland having the most as 
detailed before, with 11% (14).
In terms of their geographical reach, the vast 
majority of projects are internationally oriented 
(92%), with the remainder having a local (4%) 
or national (2%) focus. 
3.3.2 Years of origin
Fig. 03 - Years when projects were established 
(N=131)
The majority of the projects in our database 
have their origins in between 2016 and 
2018 (68%), with special incidence in 2017 
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Fig. 04 - Main sectors of activity of all projects (N=131)
Fig. 05 - Relation between sectors of activity and region (N= 131)
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(40%). Only 8 were established in 2019 (6%). 
Some projects adapted DLTs to some of their 
previously existing solutions, but there are two 
projects with origins even older than this set of 
emerging technologies, one dating to 2002 and 
the other back to 1984.
3.3.3 Activity sectors
Looking at the distribution of projects by main 
sectors of activity, we observe that in a total 
of 16 sectors there are 7 which account for 
70% of the 131 projects in our research. Up 
to 3 options were possible by project, but the 
first response given was the one considered for 
statistical purposes after final data assessment. 
Information on the remainder of sectors for each 
project can be found in the online database.  
The distribution by sector is of: 16 projects in 
‘Supply Chains and Logistics’ (12%); 16 in ‘IT 
and Telecommunications’ (12%); 14 in ‘Energy, 
Climate and Environment’ (11%), 14 in ‘Banking 
and Financial Services’ (11%), 10 in ‘Education 
and Research‘ (8%), 10 in ‘Governance’ (8%) and 
10 in ‘Arts, Media and Entertainment’ (8%).
When crossing data between activity sectors 
and EU-27, UK and other countries, there are no 
statistically significant differences with similar 
concentration levels. But we can see for instance 
the UK with a higher volume of projects in some 
sectors, such as IT and Telecommunications 
compared to the EU and other countries. Breaking 
it down, our analysis shows the following.
The main sectors in EU-27 projects are 
‘Supply Chains and Logistics’ (13%), ‘IT and 
Telecommunications’ (12%), ‘Energy, Climate 
and Environment’ (10%), ‘Banking and Financial 
Services’ (9%) and ‘Education and Research’ 
(8%). Although with lower numbers, we can 
also mention ‘Governance’ (7%) and ‘Platform 
Economies and Service Sharing’ (7%) and ‘Arts, 
Media and Entertainment’ (7%). All these sectors 
account for 73% of the EU-27 cases (86 in total).
The UK concentrates 76% of their total 
25 projects in the 6 sectors of ‘IT and 
Telecommunications’ (20%), ‘Healthcare and 
Biotechnologies’ (16%) ‘Banking and Financial 
Services’ (12%), ‘Arts, Media and Entertainment’ 
(12%), ‘Education and Research’ (8%) and Social 
Economy (8%). 
Other European countries concentrate 70% of their 
projects (14 in total) in the 4 sectors of ‘Supply 
Chains and Logistics’ (20%), ‘Energy Climate 
and Environment’ (20%), ‘Banking and Financial 
Services’ (15%), and ‘Governance’ (15%).
3.3.4 Applications
Fig. 06 - Types of applications in all projects 
(N=273) 
In terms of applications, each project classified 
itself, or was classified in, up to 3 options within 
38 possible applications. The first variable was 
not selected as the most representative, such 
as in the previous category, and percentages 
were calculated from total number of responses 
not projects. More information on applications 
for each project can be found in the online 
database.
After our final analysis, 11 options included 
71% of the 131 projects. Supply Chain 
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46
Scanning the European Ecosystem of Distributed Ledger Technologies for Social and Public Good. 
Management / Trade’ has 32 answers (12%); 
‘Software-as-a-Service’ shows up 25 times 
(9%); ‘Disintermediation and Decentralized 
Networks’ and ‘Financial Services / Market 
Infrastructure‘ have 23 and 22 options 
respectively (both 8%); ‘Payments / Financial 
Infrastructure’ and ‘Data Marketplace / Data 
Monetization’ were mentioned 20 times (both 
7%); ‘Digital Tokens’ has 13 options selected 
(5%); ‘Governance and Voting’ is an application 
for 12 projects, while ‘Identity (credentials / 
licenses / attestations) is chosen by 10 (both 
4%); last, ‘Public Records’ and ‘Economic 
Development’ have the same number of 
projects, 9 (3%).
3.3.5 Types of organisation 
Fig. 07 - Types of organisations leading the 
projects (N=131)
The majority of the organisations leading the 
131 projects in the database can be defined 
as companies (72%). 61% of the total are 
companies for profit and 11% are non-profit. 
19% are organisations (not companies), 
followed by 5% in consortiums of multiple 
types, including research groups. There are 
2% with other types of organisations with 
heterogeneous definitions, including one 
research institution.
Projects coordinated by other organisations 
than companies, can also have a for profit 
orientation. In this case, running a cross-
variable analysis of all projects we can observe 
that 89 are working for-profit, while 36 are 
non-profit oriented. 
3.3.6 Profit orientations by regions and 
sectors
In all cases, for-profit projects are more than 
non-profit projects. But with a closer look we 
find EU-27 projects being 66% for-profit projects 
and 28% non-profit projects, with a ratio of 7 to 
3, UK projects being mostly profit oriented with 
84% in this bracket, and the other countries with 
a more equal proportion regarding profit 
orientation.
Fig. 08 - Relation between profit orientation 
and region (N=131)
Regarding relationships between for-profit 
or non-profit orientations and main sectors, 
we observe no statistical significance and 
can point out that the for-profit approach is 
dominant in nearly all sectors. Nonetheless, 
three main observations merit a note. 
Sectors where for-profit projects are in the 
majority and there are hardly any non-profit 
projects are ‘Energy Climate and Environment’ 
and ‘Healthcare and Biotechnologies’. 
Sectors that are the most significant for having 
both for profit and non-profit projects are ‘Supply 
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Fig. 09 - Relation between profit orientation and sectors of activity (N=131)
Fig. 10 - Types of DLTs / Blockchains used by the projects (N=131)
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Fig. 11 - Types of public DLTs / Blockchains used by the projects (N=95)
Fig. 12 - Types of private DLTs / Blockchains used by the projects (N=21)
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Chains and Logistics’, ‘IT and Telecommunications’ 
and ‘Banking and Financial Services’. 
The most significant sectors for non-profit oriented 
projects are ‘Governance, Education and Research’, 
‘Social Economy’, ‘Government and Public Services’ 
and ‘Agriculture and Forest-based Activities’
3.3.7 Types of DLTs / Blockchains
Most projects (73%) have a well-known public 
blockchain, such as Ethereum. 16% have 
private or permissioned technology. 4% have 
another type of DLT, such as less popular 
blockchain, or their own chains or DLTs.
Fig. 13 - Relation between types of DLTs / 
Blockchains and profit orientation (N=116) 
Among the projects with a well-known public 
DLT / blockchain (95) we find that they mostly 
use Ethereum (62 projects). 13 of these 
projects state they have a “new” blockchain, 
although in a majority they are essentially 
forks of other platforms, such as Ethereum38. 
Bitcoin, EOS and Stellar are a choice for 3 
38  There are chains or DLTs that can be classified either as 
part of the Ethereum category, or with the name of their 
modification, which usually is the name of the project. In 
order to proceed with our analysis, we chose to reproduce 
the definition and explanations provided directly or 
indirectly by the projects, without further assessments on 
its belonging to Ethereum branches or a unique or novel 
class. Whenever the same denomination has obtained two 
scores it has been considered as a category of its own.
projects each. CREA and Tobalaba for 2 projects 
each. Monero, Multichain and Smilo have 1 
project each.
Within the private DLTs / blockchains we find 
21 cases: 12 use DLT Hyperledger, together  
with variations of public blockchains in 
order to adapt them to private use, such as 
Ethereum (5) or Bitcoin (1). Finally, other DLTs 
reach 3.
Both for-profit and non-profit oriented 
projects mostly use blockchains and public 
DLTs. However, it should be noted that we can 
observe a significantly greater use of private 
DLTs in projects oriented towards profit. 
3.3.8 Project stages
Fig. 14 - Stages of the projects (N=131)
Projects in whitepaper stages, or projects just 
developed for ICO launches were not included 
here for statistical purposes. Only projects with 
functional software, either in demo, pilot, or 
live stages have been taken into consideration. 
The majority of the projects within a functional 
mode is in pilot stage (53%) or has at least 
reached the demo or equivalent proof of 
concept stage (24%). One in five projects 
(22%) has surpassed the pilot phase and was 
already live or in full production mode at the 
time of this analysis.
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Fig. 15 - Relation between stages of the 
projects and profit orientation (N=124) 
Considering possible relations between stages 
and profit orientation, we found no statistical 
significance. Apart from the profit oriented 
projects doubling the non-profit ones in all 
stages, there is a similar distribution, with a large 
number of projects in pilot stages, and almost the 
same proportions between demo and live. 
In relation to project stages and types of blockchain, 
the situation is similar with minimal to absent 
quantitative relevance, apart from an observation 
on the existence of more demo projects with private 
DLTs (30%) than public DLTs (23%).
3.3.9 Convergence with other technologies
Fig. 16 - Convergence with or use of other 
technologies by the projects (N=78)
One of our departure questions was on the 
concrete recognition of convergence with other 
technologies by some of these DLT projects. 
We found limitations in both the reply rates to 
this question, and in the information we were 
able to collect through secondary sources. 
Even so, we found that in 78 projects, 47% of 
the answers are concentrated on ‘AI / Machine 
Learning / Deep Learning’, followed by ‘IoT 
/ Smart Appliances / Wearables’ with 23%, 
‘Social Media / Social Networking’ with 15% 
and ‘Renewables’ with 4%. In the category 
others with 47% we have limited data, but can 
highlight the use of ‘Additive Manufacturing / 
3D Printing’, ‘Virtual / Augmented Reality’, or 
Robotics / Physical Automation’.
3.3.10 Workforce and gender composition 
Within a sample with numerous projects based 
on fluid communities or collaborative efforts 
with sporadic, informal, or no contractual 
bonds, it is somewhat difficult to gather 
quantitative data on elements such as 
workforce or its gender composition.  
Fig. 17 - Relation between number of women 
and rest of workforce in projects (N=103) 
Even so, with information gathered from 103 
projects, we observed the following distribution 
of workers or core team members per project. 
14 projects have 1 to 4 workers or team 
members, 44 projects have 5 to 9, 29 projects 
have 10 to 19, 11 projects show a workforce of 
20 to 49 people, 3 projects have from 50 to 99 
workers or team members, and 1 project has 
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from 100 to 199, while another has more than 
200. This generates an average of 14.6 workers 
or team members per project.  
In terms of gender composition, of the 104 
projects where information was provided or 
available on this category, 88 have female 
workers. In the EU we observed an average of 
2.4, in the UK 3.0, and in the other countries, 3.7 
women per project. 
3.3.11 Expected impacts
The inclusion of this topic in our data collection 
and analysis presupposed a certain level of 
complexity and subjectivity. On one hand, it is 
inherently difficult to estimate the impact of 
emerging technologies, in particular those that 
are still in demo or pilot stages for the most 
part. On the other hand, this is a forward-looking 
topic attached to the ambitions each project 
has, and beyond any models or forecasts, this 
depends highly on the anticipatory capacity of 
the subjects working within the projects. On top, 
all of the answers provided are shots in time 
and are fully subject to change due to internal 
developments of the project or external and 
conjectural circumstances.
Fig. 18 - Number of people the projects 
estimate to reach (N=65) 
Our review was mainly qualitative and based 
on information directly provided by the projects, 
with no secondary sources used for verification 
of plausibility. All average and discrete values 
were added up and the resulting values divided 
by the total number of cases with valid answers 
to obtain estimated averages for each.
A possible measurement to evaluate perceptions 
on expected impact concerns the number of 
people each project believes it will reach at full 
capacity, even if a large part is still in demo or 
pilot stages. Only 65 projects provided an 
answer in this category, with an average 
expected reach of 942,331 people. The highest 
frequency of answers falls in between 71% of 
the projects pointing to a scope more than 1 
million people and 15% to a scope between 100 
thousand and 1 million people. This offers us at 
minimum an estimation of a collective perceived 
potential, not only on the projects, but also of 
DLTs applied to this field, as observed by these 
projects.
Fig. 19 - Expected timeframe to reach 
maximum impact (N=57)
A key dimension we also wanted to observe 
in terms of perceptions on impact was the 
expected timeframe to reach it, with a starting 
point in 2019. Once more, the reply rate to this 
question was low with information provided by 
only 44% of the full sample of projects. Average 
ranges were calculated based on more detailed 
replies, and according to their own prospects, 
a vast portion of the projects expect results in 
at least 5 years. The majority (59%) foresees 
reaching estimated impact up and until, while 
34% of the projects point to up until 2025. 
Finally, there are three projects that envisage 
2030 as the time by which they will reach their 
goals, and one project that considers it has 
reached its expected impact already in 2019.
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Based on the broad range of projects present in 
the database, and on the challenge to showcase 
some of their most particular traits through this 
kind of indexation, we opted to approach ten of 
these projects with a closer lens. Similarly to 
the database, this smaller sample of projects 
should not be seen as representative of any 
larger universe, and neither should their main 
characteristics be interpreted as proportional to 
the database itself.
The ten projects are Polkadot (#095), Creary 
(#030), Pylon Network (#100), Alice (#005),  
Bloxberg (#017), Holochain (#061), Com’Chain 
(#027), Wordproof (#130), Giveth (#056), and 
Origin Trail (#091). 
Our main purpose with their selection and their 
deeper exploration is above all else to depict the 
diversity in this field considering intersections with 
social and public good, general goals and origins, 
funding models, governance structures, technical 
structures, and even diversity in lessons learned 
and their considerations for the future. 
To ensure this smaller set of projects was as 
diverse and as comprehensive as possible 
we grounded our decision processes in the 
following qualitative sampling criteria: 
• Diversity in focus and solutions of the 
projects, considering both their approaches 
to decentralisation and ways to positively 
impact the social and public good;
• Diversity in terms of geographical 
implementation and reach of the projects, 
mostly at European level but also 
considering other potential territories; 
• Diversity in sectors, applications, 
implementation and funding models, with 
special focus on originality of main use 
cases from commercial to research spheres;
• Diversity in blockchain or DLT platforms and 
development stages, although looking for 
technological robustness consolidated by 
significant milestones;
• Diversity in communities and pathways 
for engagement, prioritizing open source, 
horizontal, participatory or gender-inclusive 
frameworks.
Our research on these projects relied 
simultaneously on interviews conducted 
remotely, content analyses, and technical 
assessments. All the streams were kick-started 
during the data collection and analysis for the 
database but continued beyond its completion.
In the first stream, an open script was created for 
the interviews with all projects, and then adapted 
according to each project. In the second stream, 
secondary research was performed on relevant 
documentation and media made available by the 
projects or published by other sources. The third 
stream relied partially on data obtained through the 
interviews but also depended on an assessment of 
specific structures and code elements each project 
has publicly available in their repositories or has 
granted us access to them.
The resulted in ten deep dives published in the 
next section with an analytical synthesis of 
topics that run across all projects. This aims to 
provide summarized and accessible information 
on each project and their diversity in several 
analytical dimensions. Nevertheless, this is also 
a way to facilitate a collective exploration of the 
projects whenever possible or appropriate. 
Given the qualitative attributes of our sample, 
it was decided not to conduct a structured 
comparative analysis, even when identifying 
commonalities or trends among some or all 
projects. However, there are still various hints 
that we can extract from this exercise when 
grouping them. The ten fiches can and should 
be read separately to capture the diversity of 
the projects. What we offer here are cross-
references for a possible combined reading. 
4.1 A possible combined reading
4.1.1 Goals and intersections with 
social and public good
Relating to goals and intersections of the 
projects with social and public good, we can 
TEN DIVERSE PROJECTS 
UNDER A CLOSER LENS  
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highlight as a general point their shared 
criticism of current network structures and 
the centralization these structures embody at 
multiple levels. DLTs emerge in all of them as an 
opportunity to counter it through organisational 
to financial experiments, and to bring changes 
to technological architectures and governance 
or economic models, incorporating values linked 
with the commons, autonomy, openness, privacy, 
data protection, and more.
These projects have different positions 
between radical complete transformations and 
improvement or reform of current network 
structures. But analytically they all seem to 
value positively both the means and ends 
enabled by DLTS to achieve their main goals 
through the use of these technologies. 
Amongst the ten projects, we have large scope 
projects that aspire to transform society as a 
whole via decentralized solutions, projects that 
want to create a new decentralized internet with 
novel applications, or yet to transform energy 
systems while empowering communities. We 
have projects that operate with a more focused 
approach to guarantee data integrity through 
copyright and fight against misinformation, 
or projects that aim to improve relationships 
and value distribution in cultural and research 
sectors by empowering creators and scientists 
with new tools. We have projects that focus 
on particular issues such as donations, with 
initiatives to ensure control mechanisms via 
smart contracts, or others that want to generate 
new economies with new benefits assigned to 
the acts of donating. Moreover, we have projects 
on the ground investing in the improvement of 
communities of producers and consumers, aiming 
to boost social and local markets via social 
currency mechanisms, or providing solutions 
to ensure local traceability of products and the 
information associated with their exchanges. 
4.1.2 Organisational origins and 
gender diversity
When looking at the starting points of these 
ten projects, they can be divided by those that 
emerged already within the specific field of 
DLTs, and those that adopted previously existing 
solutions to include DLTs in general, or specific DLT 
properties that fulfil their goals. Some projects 
are created by organisations that already worked 
in technical fields and embraced DLTs as an 
opportunity, some by entirely new organisations 
or consortiums, and others have emerged from 
informal groups that started DLT structures to 
work on new solutions for common problems.
A special note is merited here on the gender 
diversity of these organisations, as it seems to 
constitute a deficit in the majority of projects, 
despite some sensitivity and openness to the 
topic revealed in the interviews. Technological 
domains are still largely male-dominated, 
and the spaces of blockchains and other DLTs 
are not immune to this, this smaller space 
dedicated to positive impacts on the social 
and public good alike. We found that project 
founders and coordinators were overwhelmingly 
male, and it was only possible to interview two 
women in the projects. Moreover, development 
communities are also largely male, a trend that 
equally seems to occur in user communities, 
although this is impossible to verify empirically 
beyond what is captured in the interviews as the 
projects have more or less fluid communities 
and do not register this type of personal data.
DLTs emerge in all these 
projects as opportunity 
to counter centralisation, 
and to bring changes to 
technological architectures 
and governance or economic 
models, incorporating values 
linked with the commons, 
autonomy, openness, privacy, 
data protection, and more.
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4.1.3 Funding models
Assess to funds in these projects, expectations 
and needs are diverse and highly dependent 
on financial and technical maturity, but all 
projects are relatively successful with access 
to their own capital, to external investors, or to 
other financial resources as ICOs. This allowed 
them to sustain activity until now, even if one 
project relies mainly on voluntary work, and 
other projects are not yet profitable or do not 
have that ambition. When looking into business 
models we find common points in these 
projects for instance when some offer their 
technology as a service or charge for specific 
network transactions. But perhaps the most 
relevant point is when projects rely on a blend 
of profit and not-for-profit activities, meaning 
a separation between operations with revenue 
from technical development and those without, 
with the first funding the second and often 
supporting the open source choices.
4.1.4 Governance structures
Governance is essential for any DLT initiative 
and here it emerges connected with specific 
models of community building or engagement, 
from plain vertical transmission channels to new 
participatory platforms that should be able to 
sustain organisational overhauls. 
All projects have communities, such as managers, 
workers, developers, users, beneficiaries, or 
even investors or speculators in some cases, 
as governance stakeholders. In some projects, 
this means top-down relations with reduced 
participation of stakeholders in technical or 
management processes. But we see trends 
towards more horizontal forms of involvement in 
the majority of projects, with assemblies, online 
meetings through Telegram and Discord, or tools 
such as Loomio, and also wider roles and voting 
powers, linked to financial or technical capitals. 
Moreover, there are also more complex models 
with codified mechanisms through which decision 
powers are allocated, and how these can be 
exercised or delegated runs on the DLT through 
tokenized processes and smart contracts.
4.1.5 Technical architectures
In terms of DLTs or blockchains used, we note 
a prevalence of Ethereum-based structures, 
together with so-called agnostic blockchains 
or even new DLT platforms and protocols. This 
Governance is essential 
for any DLT initiative and 
here it emerges connected 
with specific models of 
community building or 
engagement, from plain 
vertical transmission 
channels to new 
participatory platforms that 
should be able to sustain 
organisational overhauls.
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is often signalled by the projects as influencing 
their forms of participation and governance, 
as some of these DLTs or blockchains, as 
Ethereum, provide more possibilities connected 
to smart contracts and wider or more engaged 
communities. On the other hand, motives such 
as the need for scalability or overcoming the 
large amounts of energy involved in DLTs such as 
Bitcoin or Ethereum itself, led some projects to 
build their own solutions. A trend worth noticing 
here is the existence of projects that embrace 
direct connection or integration with different 
blockchains and DLTs, not only for interoperability 
but also for broader outreach and impact of 
the project itself. On a more extreme end of the 
spectrum, we also have one specific project where 
the main argument for its existence is specifically 
tied to the search for completely alternative DLT 
protocols aimed at total internet decentralisation 
through an interconnected system of applications 
where all contain their own rules. 
The ways tokens are used within these projects 
are diverse, and it ranges between their 
existence as a form of initial financing through 
crowdfunding such as ICO, as a gatekeeping and 
anti-spam measure with a minimum value aimed 
at preventing fraudulent operations, to having it 
as a reward for community involvement. 
Looking at GDPR compliance, to remark this 
still intricate issue in the world of DLTs, one 
finds different approaches that these projects 
take to address it. In some of them, there is an 
intentional effort not to collect any personal data, 
and in others, this data is not stored at all in the 
project’s blockchains or DLTs but instead in higher 
layers so that public data exists elsewhere in the 
network. In others yet, DLTs are permissioned 
with limited access rights and allegedly comply 
with EU data protection regulations.  
4.1.6 Lessons learned and future scenarios
Last but not least, our combined reading of 
some lessons learned by these projects brings 
us to shared spaces where communities of 
users and others are as important as the 
internal organisation. Furthermore, some of their 
thoughts on the future highlights shared visions 
of a better tomorrow, not only for the projects 
through the realization of their organisational 
objectives but also for the fields of social and 
public good with impacts on several societal 
domains, all enabled by the decentralizing 
powers their DLTs embody.
In the lessons learnt, we find better engagement 
and commitment strategies regarding users 
and other beneficiaries, with highlights on early 
relationships and deeper interactions to counter 
some adoption challenges. But we can further 
capture general learnings regarding internal 
workings of the projects, such as the need 
for full commitments to open source models 
from the beginning, or the necessity for the 
establishment of adequate collaboration and 
interoperability structures.
As regards best future scenarios, we observe 
commonalities around the desire for the 
widespread adoption of DLTs leading to high 
levels of individual empowerment, obtained 
through more transparent and open networks, 
better control over data structures, or yet 
the full transference of DLT governance and 
outputs to communities at large. This is taken 
to a next level by some of these projects with 
larger ambitions to create new social and 
economic patterns of organisation, extraction 
and distribution of value. DLTs emerge in their 
view as structures that could replace centralized 
and hierarchical network formations and major 
players that currently dominate the internet, 
and above all as autonomous and common 
structures in which to build more just and fair 
social systems by inherence. 
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ORGANISATION HEADQUARTERS ESTABLISHED GENDER COMPOSITION
Non-profit. 
Startup (Parity Technologies). 
Foundation (Web3 Foundation)
Germany (Berlin) and 
Switzerland (Zug) 
2018
27 women in a group of approximately 
200 people
Overview and goals
Polkadot is presented as a next-generation blockchain platform that will connect multiple DLTs into 
one unified network, enabling interoperability between them regardless of features or permissions. 
It can be considered a set of independent chains, containing Ethereum, Bitcoin or other DLTs in itself, 
and allowing multiple protocols to communicate with each other to build a more comprehensive and 
inclusive web. As they claim, if blockchains are to enable a better internet for everyone, they have to 
talk to each other in what is deemed by Polkadot to be a Web 3.0.
Their interoperability should allow any actor to take public or private chains and link them with a 
shared connectivity layer, whether deciding to maintain their original validation systems or rely on 
a new pooled security system. It should also support trust-free interchain transactability for diverse 
chains to deal with all kinds of assets in the same system, from text messaging to the exchange of 
value and resources. 
Polkadot declares itself heterogeneous and flexible as it claims to make no assumptions on nature 
or structure of chains. Even non-blockchain systems or data structures may be hosted and become 
parallelized chains if they fulfil criteria. 
Final users of Polkadot are currently developers that want to build better solutions on top of a large 
universe of blockchains or other DLTs. But the end beneficiaries should be users of the internet at large, 
given the potential for new decentralized services that can return ownership and governance of data to 
individuals or communities. According to Polkadot, this will happen over larger organisations that force 
reliance on what is now a broken internet where they can violate trust.
Intersections with social and public good
Polkadot’s main purpose is stated as resetting interactions and economic incentives of the 
internet, and giving people tools that are inherently attached to the pursuit of social good. The 
project expresses its intentions to press restart in the current internet so that they can provide the 
infrastructure to build a new one which anyone can trust.
The scalability and interconnectivity of their proposal could ultimately mean that all possibilities 
of one DLT can be leveraged by another DLT and lead to sharing and decentralisation levels never 
observed before. Moreover, the project is thought to release network control to the community, and 
these effects could transpire to places where innovation for one becomes innovation for many, if a 
strong focus on fairness is placed beyond technical dimensions.
4.2.1 POLKADOT (#095)
https://polkadot.network/ 
Polkadot plans to enable a new web where users are in control and individual sovereignty is prioritized over 
centralized control. It is built to connect private and consortium chains, public and permissionless networks, and 
future technologies yet to be created. It aims to facilitate an internet where multiple DLTs can exchange information 
and transactions in a trustless way, and make it easier to create and connect decentralized applications, services, 
and institutions.
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How it started
Gavin Wood, the founder of Polkadot, wrote the Polkadot white paper in 2016, which prompted a 
bigger group to be involved.  
He left the Ethereum Foundation, after having co-founded it, to found Parity Technologies, and him, 
Peter Czaban, now Technology Director of the Web3 Foundation, and Robert Habermeier, a Thiel 
Fellow, launched a model for a sharded blockchain to allow several chains to be connected in a single 
network.     
The research, development and roadmap were done by Wood, Web 3 Foundation and Parity 
Technologies. The project as it exists now came to light in July 2019. The Web3 Foundation began 
running the initial nodes that are now live and stable. 
Funding models
Polkadot held an initial crowdsale (ICO) and there have also been some public and private token 
sales. Parity Technologies supports part of Polkadot and has a wide range of commercial clients. 
The other supporter, the Web 3 Foundation has a grant program where teams around the world apply 
to deliver core components for Polkadot. Parity Technology has been contracted to build the core of 
the code. More than 60 projects have received $4.4 million from the Web3 Foundation to build their 
solutions on the Polkadot blockchain. 
There is a Polkadot Ecosystem Fund operating with the support of Polychain Capital, and Polkadot 
has its own digital economy. The idea is that in the future it will have its own community treasury. 
Someone, using his Polkadot account, will make a proposal to the treasury stating their needs and the 
developing proposal, and then all parties can vote. 
Governance structures
Polkadot has a tricameral governance model that is housed on the blockchain and relies on holding 
of DOT tokens. People vote for council members, for the technical committee and on proposals, 
and topics such as network upgrades can be proposed and voted on All DOT holders can vote for 
proposals, council members, and the technical committee. 
The Council has between 12 and 24 seats and is voted by the entire community of DOT holders. Non-
contentious obvious upgrades can be moved forward by the council managing the proposals on topics 
like treasury or upgrades. The council rotates on a regular basis, and anyone can be part of it.
The technical committee is a body mainly composed of developers and researchers with technical 
competence on the Polkadot protocols. A combination of a majority vote of the technical committee 
and the council can fast track an upgrade in order to provide a quick fix within Polkadot. There will be 
other supportive governance entities like an oracle committee.
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For Polkadot, governance is about decision-making processes and how to codify such decision-making 
processes, formalised discussion, stakeholders voting, etc. In their perspective, blockchains are social 
coordination tools and the governance they build is indicative of what they propose at large. Also, 
according to them, not having structured governance is sometimes seen as decentralisation, but in 
reality, it is often a construction that can serve to maintain a few people in control.
Technical configurations
Polkadot relies on a new blockchain designed from the ground up named Substrate and associated 
with Parity. It is public and permissionless, but a private permissioned network can be built on top, for 
example for the healthcare data of a hospital.
The main technical challenges in the blockchain are interoperability, scalability and governance. 
Polkadot has solved scalability. Regarding interoperability, Polkadot has taken a big step with the 
parachain bridge architecture. 
The DOT token is critically important for the operation of the network, with four main functions.
First, it is used for security. Validators have to stake DOTs in order to run their nodes, to get rewards 
and if they misbehave their DOTs get removed. 
Second, it is important for the funding of the network. In order to deploy what is called the parachain 
on Polkadot, the shards are heterogeneous, thus highly customizable and connected through a 
process called bonding. People require DOTs to participate in a parachain auction, and those who win 
a parachain auction, use those DOTs to participate in the validation and get rewards.
The third use is interoperability and message passing, to send a message from one parachain to another 
or to another network. It is charged with a fee (this point is under discussion, but the fee still exists). 
The fourth function is governance, as participants in the network can use DOTs to let their voice be 
heard. Having tokens means voting power. But there are also ways to empower the voices of minority 
groups. Timelock voting avoids the vote-buying issue.
Thinking about the future
As learning, Polkadot manifests a will to observe less tribalism in the blockchain world. 
As best future scenario, they would like the project to be well received and recognized, delivering 
tools that allow the building of a more just and fair internet. They also wish to provide a key 
historical step towards the future of a Web 3.0. According to them, this is a crucial moment to get 
us to a point where “network systems work for us instead of us working for them”, implying that 
democratization of the internet means democratization of social systems at large.
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Non-profit. Foundation (Creativechain). Spain (Barcelona) 2016 1 woman co-founder in a core group 
of 12 people.  
Overview and goals
Creary is defined as a 3.0 social media portfolio network on a new blockchain technology which attributes 
rewards to users that share their digital creations with the community. It is built on the CREA Network 
blockchain, an open source network specially designed for the creation of decentralized applications and 
social networks of digital content on the blockchain. 
The project instigates authors and curators alike to publish their work and make their community of 
followers grow, but also to follow other creators in the network to earn rewards in digital tokens getting 
votes from the community. It is both a P2P social network and a marketplace in this sense, where users 
can post, comment, give likes, and also sell their work.
According to Creary, anyone can post digital content and be rewarded for their work based on votes 
received from the community. The reward distribution system is governed by the community itself, and 
any user can vote freely and in real-time on how they want the development of the network to evolve.
The Creary rewards are made with the platform’s own token called CREA, which can be converted into any 
other currency, be it digital or fiat. An algorithm distributes the tokens according to the vote of all users 
in the community. Anyone that creates interaction in the network can be rewarded. All users have wallets 
which they can use to manage earnings inside the platform, and with which they can sell and change their 
tokens, or even transfer them to other users. 
Creary seems to offer a public and transparent alternative of intellectual property registration, with a 
blockchain platform that automatically creates incorruptible timestamps. The network then issues a 
certificate of authorship and a distribution license for any digital work, with different options suited to 
frameworks such as creative commons licenses which they offer upfront. This feature is designed to 
protect the work of artists, designers, and multimedia creatives who share on the platform, and can 
ultimately be used as evidence in conflict resolution around intellectual property or other disputes.
Intersections with social and public good
Their decentralized ecosystem has been designed to distribute power and resources among all 
users, who are the ones who add value to the community. Their aim is to become one of the 
largest networks of this type to empower creators and avoid traditional data use such as personal 
information mining and misuse attached to most conventional social networks. 
In decentralizing this space for the exchange of digital goods, Creary also provides tools for creative 
actors who may have difficulties accessing financial resources through other means, so they can 
have the possibility to monetize their creativity and participate in a community-based economy with 
fewer restrictions.
4.2.2 CREARY (#03)
https://creaproject.io/creary/ 
Creary is a decentralized social network of creative portfolios on the blockchain that rewards creatives and 
curators. In Creary, authors can register the copyright of a creation and distribute their work directly to their 
fans, share creative works and rewards. Content can be sold directly to followers without intermediaries or 
commissions, with an algorithm distributing tokens constantly to authors and curators as rewards according 
to the vote of all users in the community.
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How it started
Creary began as a common interest in a group of friends active within the arts sector. They believed 
this sector is dominated by intermediaries who decide, control and research data of users under 
abusive conditions. This group was also in the Bitcoin world, so they realized blockchain or other DLT 
technologies could address the problem of trust and content distribution.
The three co-founders engaged developers to create the blockchain and the platform Creary. They 
were inspired by Steemit, which is a blogging network. 
The final phase of the project has been achieved and now it is a matter of scalability. In the past year 
since launching their Beta version, the project team and the community have used the network in a 
real environment, detecting potential spaces for improvement and also some additional user needs. 
They are currently working on the next stage and functionalities.
Funding models
This project has been financed by contributions, donations, and a small crowdfunding system up until 
now. Recently Creary has also been interested in applying for external funding such as grants, or to 
partner up with other entities. In addition, generating revenue through the creation of challenges for 
network users is a possibility. 
Different products are offered by Creary to achieve self-sufficiency, such as technology audits, and 
they also provide solutions to other projects that want to be connected with Creary. The expectations 
of the technology are growing, not only in financial self-sufficiency. They will look for external 
financial partners to achieve the technology they want.
Governance structures
Two types of groups compose Creary’s ecosystem: developers and users, which are typically artists 
and curators. They have 18.000 users, but the number of users seems to be growing and they will try 
to reach 100.000 users by the end of 2020. 
An algorithm called Delegated Proof of Stake (DPOS) is used. Users vote for the proposals of 
developers. The developers are in terms of governance classified as witnesses. There are no miners 
as the blocks are created by the witnesses.
Witnesses can decide on the control of the network in terms of code, as they issue the block and 
decide which is the best option on how the network has to be developed. The witnesses are not fixed, 
they vary quite often depending on the votes, and only the 20 most voted take part in the decisions 
and how the network evolves. Witnesses make proposals to the rest of the community. The other way 
around, in the case users (artists, curators, others) want the network to be developed, they need to 
make a proposal to a witness already elected by the community. 
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The system does not follow the rule 1 user equals 1 vote, but 1 user equals 1 witness of nodes, 
through voting. Creascan.net is the block explorer where anything can be verified, from votes to 
donations, with full transparency for the community.
Technical configurations
Creary runs a new blockchain and after having started with a Proof of Work protocol, they recently 
changed the protocol into Delegated Proof of Stake (DPOS). The change of protocol was relatively 
easy according to their team, as the community was already used to it because of using other 
platforms such as Steemit. 
DPOS is presented as fairer for the community, as it allows everyone to take part in decisions. Richer 
nodes, those with more tokens, do not have more voting power. People can choose witnesses that 
represent their vote.
This protocol is also presented as faster for transactions. They have 1000 transactions/interactions 
per second, including data, tokens, likes, comments etc. Data and metadata are stored in the 
blockchain. But content such as designs or videos is stored in an IPFS file storage system. 
CREA is the main unit of accounts in the Creary blockchain. The number of CREA tokens is infinite 
as they are not a pre-issued token. All other tokens gain their value from this main asset. CREA is a 
liquid currency, and it works like Bitcoin (BTC) or any cryptocurrency, so it can be traded in exchanges, 
sent to other users or directly used as a payment method. 
Users can be rewarded tokens for activity in the platform: such as publishing content, being a witness 
node, holding coins in the wallet and getting a percentage of interest, and participating in the social 
platform. In addition to the CREA tokens, there are also CREA Dollars and CREA Energy. Tokens can be 
used to buy digital goods inside the platform. 
There are no fees in the network, and tokens can be bought or earned by interacting in the network. 
There is nonetheless a promotion section where users can put their work on the top of a list to get 
more visibility, but this ‘costs’ tokens.  
Thinking about the future
Their main lesson would be to start using Delegated Proof of Stake (DPOS) protocol from the 
beginning so that their network had a different ground from the beginning.
The best future scenario for Creary is that all users of centralized networks migrate to decentralized 
ones because they understand the benefits and are empowered users. They would like to create a 
network of decentralized networks, not only for creative sectors, always using open source public 
technologies.
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For-profit. Startup. Spain (Benicarló) 2015 1 woman in a core group of 10 people.
Overview and goals
The Pylon Network database stores and shares energy data such as consumption and production 
volumes. This database allows users to remain the owner of their energy data and to take part in the 
market on a different stakeholder level, as well as to keep control over who their data is shared with. 
Their proposal implies that consumers, prosumers or producers as individual actors or communities 
can decide how their information is used. They can also choose which third-parties, such as energy 
service companies or other energy retailers, can access this information and offer back digital 
services, leading to direct savings, better energy management, and other gains. 
This idea comes attached to the concept of data neutrality, which under Pylon’s rationale can play the 
role of enabler for a new level of innovation and competition capacity in the energy markets from the 
moment it promotes unlocking of data.
The blockchain developed for the Pylon Network became available as one of the first DLTs designed 
to decentralise the energy sector not only from a technical perspective. Their investment in a fully 
open source protocol seems to bring also added value to an overall decentralisation of the market, 
from economic to governance dimensions.
They aim to tackle lack of communication between stakeholders through open source, which among 
other challenges results in unequal access to data, and generates a lack of trust not suited for 
cooperation between different actors such as cooperatives or municipalities. This should generate 
benefits for a wide set of stakeholders, from consumers to producers, with Pylon claiming it as both a 
strategy and a statement for fast and scalable adoption of smart sustainable technologies.
Intersections with social and public good
The framework proposed allows local communities to participate in the energy system and creates a 
path to avoid leaving them behind when it comes to the energy transition, in what Pylon defines as a 
fast-evolving era of decentralisation, digitalization, customer engagement and transparent cooperation 
in the energy sector. 
Their stake in open source is strongly related to this point and emerges as the backbone of an inclusive 
protocol accessible to stakeholders with different needs. According to Pylon, this is not only something 
in line with the inherent values and incentive mechanisms DLTs were originally created for, but it also 
allows their system to have long-term viability which they deem crucial in the longer time-horizon 
needed to deal with global sustainability problems such as climate change. 
4.2.3 PYLON NETWORK (#100)
https://pylon-network.org/ 
Pylon Network has developed a neutral database based on blockchain technology where energy data, 
like consumption and production, from energy market stakeholders, are stored and shared. Pylon Network 
database allows the user as data owner to be in control and decide who they share their energy data with, 
hence actively participating in the market.
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How it started
The primary motivation was to accelerate the decentralisation of the energy model, with common 
users being able to produce electricity. They looked into dollar panels and started with storage 
solutions in the form of a battery, but the market was too challenging. They later went into software 
and data and realized this could be key to deal with inefficiencies. 
From there, blockchain emerged as a potential solution to work with energy and the data it generates, 
namely the way it is handled, stored, shared, and they found data digitization and management as the 
bridge for DLT development. 
Simultaneously, Pylon also learned about Goiener, an energy cooperative in Spain, got inspired by its 
model of a shared network where the owners are also users, and decided to pilot their solutions in this 
context.
They grew to offer a blockchain consensus algorithm for the energy sector after collaboration with the 
development teams of Entropy Factory, CREAtivechain and Faircoop.
Funding models
On top of their open source database and blockchain, Pylon develops commercial tools for profit to 
finance their operations and support the whole ecosystem. 
They currently offer 3 tools which are not on their blockchain but are integrated. Other tools are in 
development but are dependent on regulation at the national level to be established before they can 
be used. 
Governance structures
In terms of technology, official energy players can participate by becoming a node, validate data or 
become shareholders of the database. In terms of data, Pylon offers individual users or collective ones 
the possibility to manage their energy data and to enact actions from cost renegotiation in an aim to 
tackle energy poverty. 
Nevertheless, none of these individual or collective actors has governing power in the Pylon network, 
such as access to decision-making, even if there are feedback loops namely when dealing with 
information.
Pylon has a number of tokens that belong to the federated nodes, which represent ownership, but also 
a way of becoming a stakeholder in the database without needing to install an actual node. For being 
a federated node, the nodes receive Pylon Coins, which are premined by a predetermined amount per 
block. 
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The uses of the token are still under validation, not fully implemented yet. The launch of the token 
comes with the launch of the mainnet. Moreover, the use of these tokens is not imposed by Pylon 
as they offer all services commercially, but it is available for interested parties for internal use in 
exchange for something, such as energy or data services. 
Technical configurations
The whole Pylon network is open source and the code is free to copy, edit, modify or be integrated with 
any smart meter or any other energy tool or platform. Nevertheless, the database is not public and 
has different levels of access.
The blockchain developed is a new permissioned protocol that uses Proof of Cooperation. It has 
elements from other DLTs such as CREA, Litecoin and Faircoin, but it was created to avoid dependency 
on other platforms and developers, and also to better deal with problems of speed, scalability and 
network energy consumption. 
The energy sector is highly regulated and compliance is key for any innovation. Pylon has certificated 
nodes that should allow adaptation to current and new regulations. 
Thinking about the future
As lesson Pylon underlines is fostering more synergies and collaborations from the beginning, 
including with academics and public institutions. But a core learning was also that the best way to 
create engagement is through cooperatives or municipalities, as direct paths are difficult in the energy 
sector with consumers opting mainly for easy and friendly solutions. As they state, just because the 
technology is free and trendy it does not mean that people will use it, and their main example is that 
in a pilot with 10.000 potential participants only less than 100 downloaded their app. Moreover, Pylon 
also points out numerous challenges they had to learn from, including blockchain still having a bad 
reputation that creates commercial problems, or the adaptation to energy, financial, and data privacy 
regulations that are currently complex. 
As best future scenario, they would like to have the issue of interoperability solved, meaning the 
existence of not single blockchains, or Pylon’s blockchain, but rather something that has become a 
common infrastructure, a public good that works for the whole energy sector, with potential standards 
created by the EU. This could be crucial, between the convergence of different technologies, including 
blockchain, different products inside the blockchain, and numerous sectors looking at all of it.   
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ORGANISATION HEADQUARTERS ESTABLISHED GENDER COMPOSITION
For-profit. Startup. UK (London) 2016 2 women in a core group of 6 people
Overview and goals
Alice points towards the decentralisation of impact funding and its management. It allows social organisations, 
impact investors, family funds and even governments to fund social and environmental projects and transparently 
track the impact of their fundings. They want impact data to be shared with the public, to be able to design better 
projects and actually help those people rather than gather funds that do not generate some probable impact. 
Its operations imply upfront the evaluation of needs and the measurement of goals of funders and beneficiaries. 
Alice then incorporates the funders’ capital into an Alice account, and every time a goal is achieved and validated, 
they transfer the funds out of this account and into the account of beneficiaries. 
Alice creates a smart contract on the blockchain which states that once a goal is achieved and validated, the 
money can be taken out and put into these beneficiary accounts. This is how they ensure transparency and impact 
tracking because a percentage or even the full amount of the funds is received by the charity only when it is seen 
that the action was achieved. 
The charities need to establish concrete impact goals and Alice also supports the whole process. The flux usually 
implies first that impact investors release money for a concrete goal. Second, that the goal is measured, such as 
in the delivery of 50 homes to homeless populations with total costs of EUR 10 000, broken down by units. Third, 
that the work is completed by the charity, audited and evidenced. And fourth, depending on the outcome, that the 
funds are released to pay back the investors plus any potential interest. 
Intersections with social and public good
The proposal that Alice puts forward is to run projects transparently, using smart contract-based incentives to ensure 
their impact is independently verified and accessible to everyone, while reducing due diligence, reporting and other 
transaction costs. Ultimately, their system should allow everyone to automatically see what amount of money 
achieves which impact.  
Their vision points towards the use of blockchains to help restore trust in the charity sector, by creating a 
decentralised system that incentivises charities to innovate and take risks with promising but untested approaches to 
social issues, considering the needs of all parties involved, from beneficiaries to managing organisations and funders.
How it started
Alice has its roots in the necessity to avoid recent funding scandals in the third sector, as for example the 
case of the Haiti earthquake and the Red Cross. In their view, people need to account for all the billions 
that go to targeted projects, and above all, they need to account for individual achievements rather than 
generating reports at the end of the year. Blockchain track and tracing properties seemed fit for purpose, also 
considering the need to bring impact investors into spaces once occupied only by philanthropic donors, who are 
now not as active as before because of motives such as the lack of transparency and high transaction costs.
4.2.4 ALICE (#005)
https://alice.si/ 
Alice is a decentralised platform for measurable impact projects in the social finance sector. Alice helps 
impact investors, governments and non-profits fund projects with fully tracked impact data and low 
transaction costs. Its operations make payments conditional to verified impact, and they allow anyone to 
create and monetise transparent social funding.
alice
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Funding models
Alice began with a government grant for which they had a partnership with Imperial College London, a grant 
from Gnosis which is another blockchain project, as well as a partnership in an accelerator structure with 
funding coming from 7 investors, both individuals and companies. 
This project is already generating revenue and has expectations of becoming self-sufficient in the medium term. 
Their current business model is based on charging for building applications and protocols for new third sector or 
governmental clients upon their framework, as well as associated fees for software maintenance, transactions, 
and management. In terms of funding of the charitable projects themselves, Alice allows for money donations 
without a blockchain wallet, as it offers operations through debit and credit cards or bank transfers. 
Governance structures
Alice has what can be considered a normal governance model for a non-profit organisation, based on 
stakeholders and voting rights attributed accordingly to the percentage they own. There is a board of 
directors where founders have a seat.
Technical configurations
Alice runs on top of Ethereum, with a public, permissionless and open source architecture that relies on Proof 
of Stake. They already have implemented a second version of their protocol, that allows external actors to 
decentralized apps, and are currently looking into Substrate as a framework to improve their network and its 
governance. They chose Ethereum mainly for its ability to enable smart contracts. Another reason for their 
choice was that it is often seen as an inclusive community with the largest group of developers in the DLT 
space, and it is compatible with other open source blockchains, with wide availability of development tools. This 
ultimately fits their interest in interoperability and should allow them to explore connections with other DLTs. 
The network allows updating a smart contract and implementing a majority voting mechanism through 
stakeholders’ participation. If the vote is in favour, the smart contract becomes updated. On top, they offer 
off-chain ID verification and have a marketplace for legal matters that are bound to smart contracts’ code and 
it provides governance tools.  Their team has plans to implement a token-based voting system, for the token 
holders to be able to vote on whether specific goals in the projects are good, if they can have long term effects, 
or other project features. Alice has also created the Etheroscope in partnership with Imperial College London to take 
raw data of the blockchain and convert it into a readable graph. Etheroscope takes the smart contract legible, and 
converts the hash of the blockchain into simple data visualisations that can better showcase the allocation of funds 
and goal achievements. 
Thinking about the future
Multiple lessons are highlighted by Alice. On user relationships, establishing continuous feedback loops and 
avoiding assumptions is one. On a commercial level, establishing an engagement platform for stakeholders 
instead of a door-to-door approach, is another. On team-building, aligning individual with collective goals is 
something they also underline. As best future scenario, Alice would like to become the standard platform and 
protocol used by and for charities, funding agencies, and governments around the world.
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ORGANISATION HEADQUARTERS ESTABLISHED GENDER COMPOSITION
Non-profit. Research consortium Germany (Munich) 2018 N/A
Overview and goals
The bloxberg infrastructure offers a blockchain established by a consortium of leading research organisations 
to provide services worldwide to researchers. The focus is placed on a wider autonomy and decentralisation 
for scientific outputs. 
Researchers can leverage the bloxberg blockchain to create a transparent footprint of their research work. 
Their research can be confirmed by a whole trusted network instead of relying on validation by centralizing 
actors, may it be publishers or review boards. This network can have the participation of organisations and 
other researchers with excellent reputation which will encourage the use of the network and the applications 
built on top of its infrastructure. 
Additionally, multiple organisations in the field can integrate bloxberg into existing institutional services 
for their scientists, and therefore open up their centralized services to decentralized components such as 
DLT timestamping. The network can be used to validate research outputs autonomously by researchers 
themselves without revealing content. They can generate a certificate that proves specific data was uploaded 
at a certain time, thus protecting their results. 
By establishing the permissioned public blockchain, the network is safeguarded against the cryptographic power 
of third entities, with the credibility of research organisations in the network allowing trust in the system to be 
generated. Also, starting with a research data certification system, the bloxberg infrastructure is destined to be 
extended and enhanced with tools and myriad decentralized applications as needs grow and shift. 
Intersections with social and public good
By putting science back in the hands of researchers, bloxberg expects the public to receive more benefits 
from what science produces. The goal is decentralisation of knowledge beyond centralised gatekeepers. 
The idea is that science production and dissemination revolve around a few central parties, and this blocks 
innovation, with publishers having the monopoly on what is made public, what other actors see as scientific 
advancement, and ultimately what type of research is funded. 
Following the work previously done to expand Open Access in science by leading institutions in the bloxberg 
consortium, they are now building an infrastructure to reinforce this mechanism and offer it to a larger 
universe. This appears to come with a robust set of guarantees for quality assessment, which should also 
incentivise Open Access at large.
How it started
In February 2019, with coordination of the Max Planck Society, leading research organisations from around 
the world came together to formally constitute the bloxberg consortium. With the 11 bloxberg founders, 9 
different countries are represented with at least one renowned research organisation. 
4.2.5 BLOXBERG (#017) 
https://bloxberg.org/ 
The bloxberg consortium aims to foster collaboration among the global scientific community, empowering 
researchers with robust, autonomous services that transcend institutional boundaries. With the bloxberg 
infrastructure, research claims need not be limited to one institution alone but can be confirmed by the 
whole trusted network.
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Several researchers inside the consortium, namely at Max Planck, claim they often fear having data 
stolen, that someone else publishes that data first, and also that it is impossible to claim the data was 
stolen until after its publication. With in-depth knowledge of the groundbreaking possibilities of DLTs for 
science, many inside these institutions saw blockchain as a potential solution to tackle these challenges.
They began a pilot and tested different blockchains, like Bitcoin, but because of its negative reputation, 
the consortium opted for a blockchain maintained only by research organisations worldwide, which 
are recognized as trustworthy and normally funded by public capital. Thus they are also avoiding 
speculative DLT frameworks.
Funding models
Bloxberg is often presented as a research project with resources shared between universities. In 
this model, all organisations in the consortium bring something, such as server capacity or technical 
developers, and all also run a node of the network. 
There is no current financial structure formalized. But the consortium is looking for additional internal 
capital, as well as external funds from European RandD calls or even from the Ethereum Foundation. They 
are also working with other institutions that can use bloxberg as infrastructure for their projects, thus 
bringing potential additional resources.
All transactions in the bloxberg blockchain are free of charge. There is no trading of coins since the 
funding they receive comes from the public and they want to give it back to the public. The use of the 
blockchain is not only for the universities but also for the students and for commercial parties.
There are companies that provide applications on top of bloxberg, which are commercial as bloxberg cannot 
build all the infrastructure. Those companies that are building, for example, user interfaces on top of bloxberg 
are charging for use of this interface. However, on the base distributed layer there are no fees involved. 
Governance structures
At the time of kickstart, Max Planck engaged organisations worldwide with the idea that there was no 
initiative like this. The founding 11 research organisations agreed, and besides deciding to start on a small 
scale, they also decided to discuss the governance model upfront. 
The original organisations met in Germany for 3 days of internal discussion about the governance model 
and how to shape the infrastructure. This was done through participatory methods. They voted on which 
governance rules should be put in place and they have continued this voting process on-chain with often 
monthly votes on new ones. Candidate institutions are supposed to be vetted through a peer-review 
process from entities already part of the network. 
A meeting is held once a year in the bloxberg Summit where normally many of the most substantial 
decisions are taken. Everybody can make any proposal there and everybody can vote on it. 
The consortium has recently introduced bloxberg improvement proposals: anybody can suggest an 
improvement, technical- or governance-related, and people can discuss in an open way. 
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Those that can vote are the institutions, not the developers making suggestions. These developers may 
belong to start-ups, or enterprises, etc.
Technical configurations
The bloxberg infrastructure consists of the two main components, first the bloxberg technology (nodes, 
smart contracts, etc.), and second the governance model which defines the ground rules of the network. 
The bloxberg infrastructure is developed on top of a permissioned public blockchain network driven by a 
Proof of Authority algorithm called Aura, forking Ethereum. They believe Ethereum has one of the strongest 
communities out of any blockchain network and it has been shown to be resilient and stable against many 
attacks while running on the mainnet.
Each of the validating nodes, or authority nodes, corresponds to a research organisation and they are 
selected through the voting process. In other networks, the stake is on the computational capacity, but 
bloxberg stakes it on reputation, because if a research organisation does not deliver, then everybody can see 
it on the blockchain and identify them. 
Efficiency is achieved as the amount of Authority nodes processing transactions is kept relatively low, so 
block confirmations happen quickly, without the long confirmation times commonly seen in other blockchains. 
Security is guaranteed through the fact that nodes are distributed among entities and are numerous enough 
to prevent malicious attacks. Technical decentralisation is realized through limited control of the chain from 
any single institution with voting powers also divided.
Their token is called Berg and is used to pay network transactions but without real monetary costs. There is 
an application allowing someone who wants a few tokens to request them for free. Transaction fees exist 
only to limit spam. If someone wants to create a token on the top layer for profit it is possible, but not on the 
basic layer.
Regarding GDPR, no data is stored on the blockchain itself, but on a top layer which they claim to be GDPR 
compliant.
Thinking about the future
One of bloxberg’s main learnings pertains to having everybody synchronized, which involves robust 
networking, and in the case of research organisations, it entails a lot of bureaucracy that creates 
additional barriers to success.
Their best future scenario is to create a global network with one consortium member in every country 
in the world, and that blockchain gives power to people to actually take control of their data, security 
or privacy, and this is vital.
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ORGANISATION HEADQUARTERS ESTABLISHED GENDER COMPOSITION
Non-profit. Foundation (Holochain). 
For profit. Startup (Holo)
Gibraltar 2017 9 women in a core group of 30 people
Overview and goals
Holochain positions itself by asking what comes after blockchain? It offers a new type of open-source 
development framework and networking protocol, where the goal is to provide a seamless experience to web 
users, that operates in similar ways to a normal web App but without the need of a central entity. 
Holochain applications (hApps) are held entirely by users with no trusted third parties as mediators. They 
enable direct architectural consent and cryptographic communication. This lets people provide value into a 
sharing framework, not into a centralized one where gatekeeper organisations usually extract all financial 
and other resources.  
Every user runs the application on their own device, creates and stores their own data, and talks directly to 
other users. The proposal is compared to lightweight, secure decentralized computing possible on mobile 
devices. Main use cases are decentralised governance and collaboration, sharing economy and platform 
co-ops, supply chain wins and social communities, and social media, social networks and vendor links.
Intersections with social and public good
Holochain allows its end users as ordinary users of the internet to experiment with new decentralised 
organisational structures and build upon them, helping people control and own their data towards what is 
deemed as a new regenerative economy and a more human internet.
It also aims to provide decentralized capacities at scale that improve DLT sustainability arguments by 
requiring reduced amounts of energy consumption compared with other DLT architectures like the major 
blockchain platforms. 
How it started
Holochain emerged as part of the Ceptr project. Ceptr is a rebuild of a technology communications 
currency stack, mimicking natural patterns of coordination. With a wide variety of features in terms of 
protocols, its main purpose is a “quantum of deep in human coordinative capacity”. 
The main work came from the Metacurrency project. This project looks at currencies not just as money 
but more as current-sees. Not just flows of exchanges of goods and services, but as elements that help to 
manage flows as means of caring, sharing and giving, which is how the intended uses for currencies are 
ultimately modelled in this context. 
When blockchain emerged, the initial Ceptr team wanted to take a small piece of it and make a new 
version that could interface with more contemporary systems. An internal group met regularly to discuss 
developing their ideas from concept to implementation, and create the shift from a visionary project to 
4.2.6 HOLOCHAIN (#061)
https://holochain.org/  -  https://holo.host/  
Holochain is an open-source data-integrity engine that enables the self-hosting of P2P apps on a 
distributed web with user autonomy built directly into its architecture and protocols. Holochain avoids the 
need for global consensus and aims for massive scalability, as well as user-control of identity and data. 
Distributing the storage and processing of this information can change how people coordinate and interact 
and gives back control on digital integration.
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a more practical one. They named it Holochain, to compete with blockchain and show a viable model for 
scaling that blockchain was not suited to accomplish in their view.
Funding models
Metacurrency came first. It is a non-profit initiative that does not have any funding. Ceptr began similarly, but 
someone showed interest in funding and made it possible to create Holochain and Holohost.
Holohost was created to sustain Holochain. The former is a for-profit company that operates as a hosting 
network. This is the revenue strategy for maintaining the open source infrastructure of Holochain. Holochain is 
currently a non-profit foundation that owns Holohost.
Holohost began an initial community offering on Ethereum of a token that was a placeholder for the holofuel: 
the currency run in Holochain. 
Governance structures
There is no formalised governance in the Holo ecosystem. Multiple participatory channels are in place, and 
decision making emerges as an ongoing dialogue between numerous actors. Nevertheless, the governance 
of Holochain aggregates several more or less decentralized layers, from investors and fund managers to 
developers and other core team members. 
Holochain enables a set of agreements encoded in the application, with each node being compared to an 
organic cell which can mutually direct action and ensure that rules are being followed. No node has special 
power over any other nodes. 
Contrasts between roles, capacities, and the concept of having limited to none hierarchical elements have 
created tensions. Furthermore, as Holochain tries to be initiative driven by both the community and team 
members, they recently pulled back and focused on core efforts to get the Holohosting and Holochain live 
and functioning.
The communities around Holochain are: developers that hold camps and houses, the host community 
composed of less technical people who can also participate by buying into the system in plug and play, the 
fan community who supports the vision in terms of building the next internet as participatory, equal and 
decentralized, and also the speculators, who are the people that buy the token and nourish the credit system.
Discord and Telegram are used for regular communication, as well as for more complex discussions on 
projects and visions. But there are also other sub communication channels for specific applications such as 
Slack chats by invitation only.
Technical configurations
There is no single Holochain DLT. Every Holochain application has its own P2P encrypted network and these 
cover the spectrum from public and permissionless DLT to private and permissioned depending on the rules 
of the application. The Holochain has an open source approach while Holohosting contains elements that are 
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not open source. To access Holochain’s chain the user signs in with a private key which is what allows the 
user to write to her/his chain. Once that is done, the chain gets sharded to the distributed hash table and 
other nodes validate it. If someone finds that rules are broken, then they will mark users’ data as rejected. 
For an application everybody has the same copy of the core, which means the same data and the same 
rules. 
The sharded data store works as a distributed hash table. Data can be sharded across all the nodes but 
users can still be routed to the nodes that are holding the data, very sensibly. This is how the Holochain DLT 
works. It is not a single chain, but each user has their own chain of only the state changes they have made 
and the actions they have taken, and then they are published to a shared space at a distributed hash table. 
It works like an index across millions of nodes. 
Holochain runs a specific type of apps (hApps). This is maximizing individual sovereignty as the user can 
choose which Holochain apps to run or install. Each Holochain application is a separate P2P network, but 
when the user is running an application she/he is constrained to the rules of that application. 
Holohosting’s main mission is to host Holochain applications. With Holohosting, the user is their own server 
that is using a distributing data engine underneath to break up and synchronize the data with the other 
nodes, that also are their own servers. Holohosting allows some nodes running Holochain to share excess 
capacity with web users who are not self-hosting and they are paid to share this excess capacity. It is a 
distributed hosting business. Instead of paying companies like Amazon, users pay P2P networks of host 
providers.
Holofuel is an asset-backed currency by hosting power. The issuers of the currency become the producers 
of the value. It is a counting based approach; a mutual credit system. They use REA (resources event agent 
accounting) which is a cross-organisational accounting between different economic agents exchanging 
resources. This REA sits on top of the Holochain which means it is cryptographically signed, immutable, 
auditable and has the potential that every unit of accounts in a business becomes a cryptocurrency by virtue 
of being able to borrow against your future production. 
Holochain claims to be in line with GDPR as users can be the full owners and custodians of their data, which 
is always hosted on their own computers, and which they can selectively and temporarily share or revoke the 
share at any time. 
Thinking about the future
A lesson learned at Holo is to keep smaller and focus, while managing the growth slowly.
A best future scenario would be where a majority of P2P initiatives create new social patterns for 
organizing and will be able to out-compete the old centralized commanding hierarchy-controlled 
structures of the industrial age, because these cannot keep up with integrating information fast 
enough for a network age. 
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ORGANISATION HEADQUARTERS ESTABLISHED GENDER COMPOSITION
Non-profit. Association (Société 
Coopérative Com’Chain - 
Blockchain des communs) 
Switzerland (Geneva) 
France (Vallée de la 
Chevreuse)
2015 (local currency), 
2017 (blockchain 
solution)
7 women in a core group of 12 people.
Overview and goals
Com’Chain is a cooperative with the main goal to create an electronic version of Leman, a local currency 
of the Leman lake area around Geneva. Their main challenge was to create two types of currency in one: 
a mutual credit currency and pledge money (IOU, promise currency). These two versions of the same local 
currency remain separate, and the technical solution still needs to remain simple. 
At first, Com’Chain created two local currencies: e-Leman (the pledge currency) and the Leman (the 
mutual credit currency) and both are in the same wallet. Further, Com’Chain wants to be a global solution 
for other local currencies, such as La Racine already inside their platform. The purpose is to provide a door 
for currencies which seek an electronic solution.
As next steps, Com’Chain aims to establish other connections with new or already existing currencies, and 
create something bigger which will also take into account the user management and the localisation of 
the shops accepting local currency. 
Furthermore, Com’Chain also intends to create other applications such as voting systems for local 
communities, as for example housing cooperatives, and tracking mechanisms to check ethical compliance 
of specific organisational pledges.
Intersections with social and public good
Com’Chain fosters local economies and could contribute to more economic, social and ecological resilience 
both locally and globally with biodynamic practices applied to the whole project. A large portion of their 
decentralisation potential is placed on its currencies allowing for a larger and more distributed circulation 
of resources between local actors without intermediaries or monetary commissions.
The solutions offered by Com’Chain also stimulate more sustainable practices, on consumption and 
production dimensions. It promotes for example localised buying with companies that show interest in the 
territory where they are located, and it simplifies provenance tracking in localised supply chains with direct 
relationships between actors.     
How it started
Com’Chain implements local currencies and they decided to use blockchain because they see it as the 
most universal tool to develop local currencies as well as universal solutions. 
An initial group of three people decided to launch the project. They had exchanges in four previous years 
around the possibility and decided to launch the currency part of the project in September 2015 at the 
mobilization of COP21 in Paris. 
4.2.7 COM’CHAIN  (#027) 
http://com-chain.org/
http://monnaie-leman.org/
https://laracine-monnaie.fr/ 
Com’Chain is a group of local and/or complementary currencies such as Monnaie Leman and La Racine 
that pool their resources and skills to develop shared IT solutions. It is a non-profit and self-organized 
consortium blockchain.
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They have been inspired by two types of projects: local currencies launched after the 2008 economic crisis 
and the Swiss complementary currency WIR.
The currency was originally set in paper money but the group planned to create an electronic version. After 
checking several options, they got a support offer to develop it in on a blockchain as one of the people 
involved in the local currency was an IT security developer. 
Funding models
The whole project has functioned on a voluntary basis until now, and they have already funded a group of 
developers. The main business model is a fee on B2B transactions, but never on B2C. Fees are collected 
every year through the system. 
Governance structures
Com’Chain has two levels of governance. The governance of the Com’Chain, organised as a cooperative, 
which has decision powers over the blockchain. And the governance of the consortium composed by the 
local currencies using the wallet that govern the wallet. In this scheme, the consortium is a customer of 
the blockchain services provided by the cooperative. 
The cooperative part functions based on a cooperative type assembly and board model, with no technical 
developers having a seat.  
The consortium has no structured decision making at the moment, and decisions are based on informal 
interactions. Every local currency has its own strong rules of governance, and no governance model rules 
the code of their existence on the blockchain which allows it to remain a system for payments above all.
Technical configurations
Com’Chain runs on an Ethereum-based blockchain, which is permissioned for the different local currencies. 
Cassandra is used as the distributed database and IPFS as the distributed file system.
Ethereum was chosen because they wanted to use smart contracts, and it appeared as the most efficient 
solution. 
Com’Chain is a consortium blockchain. Not completely public, nor private. The consortium of organisations 
gives permission to others to enter in the blockchain. The different currencies belong to the organisations 
in the consortium. Each currency has to bring some nodes. 
They opted for a consortium solution because they did not want speculation with the currencies like with 
Bitcoin (BTC). The mining on their blockchain has no value. If a local currency adds a node, the node has 
no advantages over other users. The local currency can decide how many nodes they need so they can 
have control over the power consumption of the full system. This solution requires a very low energy 
consumption.
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Each local currency is responsible for the link with the users, but the blockchain has no link with the users 
of the local currencies specifically, thus not capturing personal data from its users beyond payments.
The application can be linked to a computer or to a phone so the user can create a file or a paper copy of 
the wallet. Thus, the blockchain is not linked to a device. 
Each local currency is a token. The value depends on the local currency. In the case of Lemanit: it is 1 
Leman = 1 Swiss Franc. Each currency has a different smart contract for tokens and these define the 
characteristics of the currency in that contract.
Thinking about the future
Main lesson for the future is that even though objectives can be clear, how to get there may not be so 
clear, and thus more planning is always good. 
A best future scenario includes different communities building their own currency and using the Com’Chain 
application.
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ORGANISATION HEADQUARTERS ESTABLISHED GENDER COMPOSITION
For-profit. Startup. Netherlands 
(Amsterdam)
2019 2 women in a core group of 8 people
Overview and goals
The Wordproof ecosystem is building a layer of trust into the internet, assuming it is fundamentally 
built on insecure tracks given the amount of content that is currently false, not verified, or that was 
changed without permission. It offers tools for timestamps and tools for verification, and has two 
main objectives: ensure content protection and counter fake news.
On content protection: Wordproof has a timestamp for the content which is a unique fingerprint, a 
hash. With this timestamp, anyone can prove that the content existed at a specific moment in time, 
and there is also the possibility of walking through the history of the content. 
On fake news, through Wordproof a blockchain account can be connected to an identity. Wordproof 
has a TIER level system that goes from no identification (TIER 0) to connecting government-issued 
identities to your blockchain account (TIER 6). 
Wordproof aims to be adopted at large by search engines, e-commerce, newspapers. etc. it is not 
only people that can read blockchain with timestamp certificates but also search engines and social 
media. For example, social media platforms use languages as schema.org to check how content 
is structured. If a blockchain timestamp is added in the source, search engines can check the 
authenticity of the content.
Intersections with social and public good
Wordproof claims a space of inclusiveness and trustiness on the internet by working to provide 
authenticity of online information and content and making it verifiable through open source protocols.
Its decentralisation efforts are mainly placed on opening up blockchain as a technology to the needs 
of laypeople, diverting power concentration from bigger players to smaller actors, and extending 
accountability and consumer protection online.  
How it started
Wordproof’s origins are linked with its founder’s background in open source content management systems. 
The founder also created one of the first Wordpress companies in The Netherlands.
Wordproof founder’s first encounter with DLTs was in 2013 through the Bitcoin blockchain. By then he 
thought about how to combine his knowledge of WordPress, legal and regulatory frameworks that later 
would integrate GDPR, and ultimately blockchain, coming up with the idea of a timestamp content system 
to bring a new layer of integrity to the internet.
4.2.8 WORDPROOF (#130) 
https://wordproof.io/ 
WordProof gives content creators the tools to protect copyright and website visitors the tools to verify 
information. Content, combined with its date, time, and URL is transformed into a unique string of 
characters called the hash. This is then published on a blockchain and through Wordproof timestamping 
content owners can show they did not tamper with their content. Also, as content changes and develops 
over time, history becomes verifiable for both humans and machines.
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Funding models
Wordproof was created by its founder within his existing successful company and needed no extra funding 
given original investor resources. At a later stage, one grant was obtained from a blockchain venture 
organisation, and a local innovation fund also attributed a loan to the project. 
Wordproof is not fully sustainable in terms of financial operations yet, but that is also not the wish stated by 
the founder. 
Governance structures
The biggest shareholder in Wordproof is the previous company owned by its founder, with a stake of 
around 70%, and another major investor around 20%. This structure determines a big part of the project’s 
institutional governance.   
There is a community of users, a community of developers, and developers on the payroll. The community 
shows strong engagement with the project, providing feedback that is often used for new developments or 
even developing features themselves. 
300 people are usually engaged in this community through Telegram. This is considered a relatively 
small community by Wordproof which could possibly be explained by the absence of value tokens and 
speculatory activities. There is one token, nevertheless, but there are no monetary credits attached to it, 
and it is used by the system as an anti-spam measurement.
Technical configurations
Wordproof is currently blockchain agnostic as their standards can run on multiple blockchains, with 
planned integration in Ethereum soon. They began with the EOS blockchain nevertheless, which is a public, 
permissionless DLT, considered fast on operational terms. 
EOS was chosen due to multiple reasons in the Wordproof ecosystem. Among them, its easiness for 
adoption, as setting up the surface could take 10 minutes, and allowed Wordproof to pay fees for their 
users, thus staking their resources. Also, its low environmental impact, as it does not require proof of work 
but proof of stake, and according to Wordproof it registers substantially less energy consumption than 
Bitcoin for example. 
With EOS, Wordproof states that it can also stamp on behalf of users through an API without them losing 
control over their accounts. This could be a big risk because Wordproof is timestamping on behalf of the 
users and there is no decentralisation, but for instance, in EOS there are advanced permission systems 
and users can give consent to timestamps without forgoing control from their identities.
Thinking about the future
Main lesson for Wordproof is that it should not be possible to go halfway in open source, as this is a 
mindset and not purely a technical issue. They consider that going open source means doing it all the 
way. As added advice, something the founder wants to highlight is contacting influential people in the 
industry and working all together from the beginning.
As best future scenario, Wordproof wants to build a social media where all users are shareholders. 
In that way, all the value in the ecosystem could be redistributed to all the people who use the 
software, and a universal basic income could be created with the value that is not going to 
shareholders. 
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ORGANISATION HEADQUARTERS ESTABLISHED GENDER COMPOSITION
Non-legal entity. Goal is to become 
a Decentralized Autonomous 
Organisation (DAO)
None 2016 2 women in a core group of 6 people
Overview and goals
Giveth wants to build a new system to provide value and the provision of non-excludable economic goods. 
As part of the Commons Stack, its major purpose is to support the creation of new economic models to 
sustain public goods through incentive alignment, continuous funding and community governance. 
At a technological level they have the Giveth Donation Application (DApp). This works through the creation 
of a currency that incentivises a specific behaviour. The currency then creates a financial asset as well, 
and on the back of this, participants in the ecosystem create a demand for that asset. 
In the offline world, donors usually donate directly to the community, but in this scheme donating to the 
“X” commons and receiving a voting token in return has a speculative value. If more people come into the 
project, the price of the token goes up. And if donors move their donations to another cause, the price will 
go down and participants will start to lose money. 
The ultimate goal of the participants in this model is to curate applicants or decentralized grant 
foundations for example. If they create value for their cause, people will see that the community is doing 
a good job, so other people will donate.
Intersections with social and public good
Giveth aims to decentralize governance and distribution of donation resources, within a wide network 
of organisations in the non-profit space where they also aim to ensure high levels of transparency and 
accountability towards donors. 
As part of the Commons Stack framework, the project also works towards public goods being valued for 
the benefits they deliver to the communities that use them, and operates in a larger ecosystem to build 
commons-based microeconomies to sustain public goods through incentive alignment, continuous funding 
and community governance. 
How it started
The beginnings were very fluid. The original goal was to build the future of giving and to create economies 
around causes. To do that, infrastructure and Decentralized Autonomous Organisations (DAOs) are needed 
as well as a transparent accountability layer. The Giveth community started with a donation platform.
At the very beginning, Giveth had a donor. Things were transformed when the people within the project 
changed and decided to pursue more accountability of donations for new economies. The project turned 
into a social non-profit system. 
4.2.9 GIVETH (#056) 
https://giveth.io/ 
Giveth is a community focused on bringing new governance models into the non-profit space through 
blockchain technology. The flagship Giveth Donation Application (DApp) will be an integral part of the 
Commons Stack project, which will allow realigning incentives for public good by creating microeconomies 
around causes anyone can support. The Giveth Galaxy will foster a larger network of organisations to help 
build the future of giving that Giveth envisions.
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Giveth and the Commons Stack are now the same thing. The original mission of Giveth is the current 
mission of Commons Stack, which is to create a very high level of change in the economic layer of society 
instead of trying to create business models. Giveth and Commons Stack are building a win-win situation, 
where people supporting a good cause are rewarded.
Funding models
Giveth is a non-profit and has relied on donations over the last 3 years. On one level, the project currently 
does not count with high donation amounts from large donors. Donations seem to work mainly towards 
Giveth maintenance and daily operations so they can build the Commons Stack.
On another level, the Commons Stack has more opportunity to raise funds and support Giveth, therefore 
assuming the future role of being the economic engine for Giveth.
Governance structures
No governance rules exist in Giveth code, as they have no governance code. They recur to a Spreadsheet 
DAO. Governance decentralisation works through open source protocols and horizontal decision-making 
processes where 1 person equals 1 vote.
Governance meetings take place in open conference calls periodically through Loomio. Anyone can join the 
calls, and between 8 and 20 people are regular participants in these meetings.
Technical configurations
At a technological level the project has the Giveth Donation Application (DApp). It needs a particular level 
of user experience, but overall it seems to function with 15 different projects currently using it. 
Giveth uses Ethereum mainnet, proof of work, and testnet. They created a bridge between the two. When 
donations are sent, this occurs through the mainnet, and the tokens are created in the testnet. They move 
tokens around on the testnet, and when donations and accountability happens, then the token goes across 
the bridge again and payout happens on the mainnet. All this works towards cost reductions in terms of 
technical operations. 
Giveth states it wants to make it easy for people to donate and avoid value retention in Ethereum for 
instance. Giveth uses a sidechain called rinkeby to bypass transaction fees, and also because there were 
no other sidechains with block explorers except rinkeby at the time of development. 
Giveth uses its c-stack token to identify c-members. The c-stack token holders are part of the trusted seed 
and they are invited to help other communities to launch their tokens. People can deploy their own tokens 
since Commons Stack is an open source platform. 
C-stack tokens have no value, are not transferable and they are not attached to the bonding curve. 
C-token is for people working for the Commons Stack and people who donate to the Common Stack. 
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It does have access privileges since with the token, you are able to initialize other economies and you 
have the opportunity to participate in a c-round investment in other non-profit ventures. 
Regarding data protection frameworks as GDPR, Giveth claims to not collect any relevant data. 
Thinking about the future
As lessons for the future, Giveth states being more focused on issue solving, keeping eyes on the 
core mission, guaranteeing individual goals are aligned with collective goals, and ensuring previous 
knowledge of things such as the Elinor Ostrom principles to be able to set clear boundaries before 
full engagements.
As best future scenario, the project would like that anyone who wants to create a non-profit would 
have three options: they could go to a government and get funding, go to donors and get funding, or 
create an entrepreneurial venture around the non-profit. In their perspective, instead of creating a 
business model, it is possible to create an economic model with the creation of commons attached 
to it. Afterwards community building can happen around a cause, with economic alignment, but also 
with broader value alignments.
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ORGANISATION HEADQUARTERS ESTABLISHED GENDER COMPOSITION
Non-profit. Project (OriginTrail).
For-profit. Startup (Trace Labs).
 
Slovenia (Ljubljana). 2013 
(company), 
2017 
(blockchain 
solution).
6 women in a core group of 20 
people.
Overview and goals
The OriginTrail protocol is designed to enable trusted data exchanges in fragmented supply chains. It 
started by searching for solutions for traceability in organic beef, dairy, poultry, and vegetable supply 
chains, and is now able to certify final consumers that want additional trust in their products. 
Main goals are related to supply chain data fragmentation, centralization, and protection to guarantee 
distributed benefits across the chain.
On fragmentation with data silos and low data interoperability, they want to overcome it through 
collaborative applications that establish end-to-end supply chain transparency. 
On centralisation, their key push seems to be through data integrity and accountability through 
technical decentralisation, with efforts put on scalability and adequate database functionalities 
attached to permissionless architectures. 
On the protection of data, their aim is to set up decentralisation as an answer to reluctances to 
exchange data due to competitive positions, and they point towards new economic models that do not 
imply data exchanges with other stakeholders only for regulatory reasons or when forced by power 
asymmetries.
OriginTrail is also led within Trace Alliance through TraceLabs, a collaboration partnership hub 
connecting businesses, startups, academics, business leaders and technology vendors in the field of 
supply chains and provenance. The collaborative effort of the alliance addresses different organisational 
challenges towards decentralisation. 
There is an OriginTrail academy, as an open programme for developers with the goal to promote the 
knowledge of their technology. It is located in Belgrade as the majority of developers is placed there. 
Intersections with social and public good
Support of provenance and sustainability should provide results not only for businesses and consumers, 
but also for the environment through practices such as the tracking of food sources and their contexts of 
production and distribution.
Part of their decentralisation is focused on transferring the ecosystem to the community, as the project 
is open source and is actively working on bringing aboard stakeholders from diverse contexts so they can 
build it according to their needs. 
4.2.10 ORIGINTRAIL (#091)  
https://origintrail.io/ 
OriginTrail is an ecosystem dedicated to making global supply chains work together by enabling a universal, 
collaborative and trusted data exchange (interoperability), connecting rather than replacing legacy IT 
systems (interconnectivity), and ensuring data immutability through blockchain (integrity). The ecosystem 
builds on principles of neutrality, inclusiveness, and usability and contributes to more transparent, 
collaborative, fair, and trusted global supply chains. 
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How it started
The three founders met on a student exchange project. A local agricultural cooperative was looking for 
innovative marketing ideas. They created a traceability system based on QR codes so anyone could check for 
example the proximity of the production. It was a success in Slovenia and gained awareness on a national level. 
Other cooperatives got interested in traceability and in 2013 the founders created a company to set up 
more traceability systems, many for the food industry. The main challenge was to help local producers to 
stand out in the market and each producer wanted to highlight something. In some cases, it was that all 
the food was locally produced, or there were no GMOs, etc. The three co-founders embraced the decision 
to set up their company based on this market niche.
Funding models
The project is self-sufficient for protocol development and had a token generation event in 2018. It 
generated around EUR 18.000, which was declared as enough by then to initially fund the protocol 
according to the roadmap. 
As a core team OriginTrail has a separate entity called TraceLabs, a for-profit company which is the core 
developer of this open source protocol and offers other kinds of implementations and products, which 
constitutes the main business model.
OriginTrail as a protocol was designed not to have a business model, and they still state their intention of 
giving the project back to the community after depletion of the funds raised in the Initial Coin Offering (ICO). 
Governance structures
The decisions are made by the main core development company Tracelabs which is controlled by the 
founders. But there are plans on expanding this as they would like to introduce the community more 
in the development and decision-making. They use Discord to connect to the development community, 
which has more than 1000 members. The focus is to develop discussions there. The members are not 
formally involved but their suggestions are taken into account.  
Some governance rules are encoded, such as how a person can run a node or the kind of stake they 
need to provide to do it, but as this is not entirely run as a blockchain it does not need consensus. They 
are enabling similar functionalities as the blockchain but since data is not stored on all the nodes there 
is no need for traditional governance mechanisms.
Technical configurations
OriginTrail runs an open source protocol that can connect with several blockchains. They work on the 
mainnet and are one layer above blockchain. They have integrations available with Ethereum, because it is 
the one that has more use cases and is the most adapted for interoperability, as well as with Hyperledger 
since some corporate users prefer not to be public.
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Anyone can run a node on the network. There are around 200 nodes and the system is essentially not a 
blockchain but a network of nodes that store copies of data. When the companies want to store some 
data they can publish it on the network and these data can be stored on at least 2 or 3 nodes. This is how 
the use of the their DLT platform is optimized and the hash is on the DLT. 
The data is not stored in all the nodes and users can designate for how long and the price they want to pay. 
All the data are in graph format that assures the interconnectivity of the data. Different applications can be 
built on top of all these data. For example, for traceability, certification, or perhaps internal applications. 
The used token is Ethereum-based and is named Tracetoken. It is used for compensation for services on 
the network. 
The project deems Ethereum as expensive with transaction variable costs which are hard to cover. That 
is how they justify only data fingerprints are stored in the blockchain, not full data sets. Also, they deem 
hashes to be costly, and that is why they store the data in their network, with nodes able to choose when 
they publish data in blockchains like Ethereum. 
Thinking about the future
As a lesson for the future, OriginTrail would like to have more community contributions to the 
protocol, even if they identify challenges in the creation of adequate frameworks for collaboration. 
In their view, an open source protocol is a huge process and involving the community from the 
beginning is very important as user grounded approaches offer different outlooks on possible or 
needed features.
As best future scenario, their angle is on the protocol to become a global standard for trusted data 
exchange between organisations, and to be able to transfer the governance and the development of 
the project to the general community. 
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PART 
THREE
This part concludes the report with six independent 
position papers by high-level experts in the 
field and advisors of the #DLT4Good project. 
The topics range from the prospects of DLTs for 
decentralized governance to their potential role 
in strong collaborative economies. In addition, 
several discussions are set on current and 
future intersections of DLTs with issues of trust, 
verifiability, transparency, privacy or coordination. 
Each of these papers ends with a set of 
recommendations targeted at EU policy-makers and 
other relevant decision-makers. 
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5.1 Towards a decentralised 
governance model for public 
administration
by Marcella Atzori
Marcella Atzori, Ph.D., is an academic researcher 
affiliated to the UCL Center for Blockchain 
Technologies. She is specialized in decentralized 
models of governance, with a focus on public 
administration. Appointed by the Italian Ministry 
for Economic Development  as High-Level Expert 
for the drafting of the Blockchain National 
Strategy.
Public administrations play a crucial role 
in the innovation processes of any country, 
and therefore in the promotion of economic 
growth and social and public good on a large 
scale. They can indeed adopt solutions and 
approaches with potential positive cascading 
effects on citizens, business, and the society as 
a whole. 
As also pointed out by The Tallin Declaration 
(2017), in an increasingly interconnected and 
fast-changing world, citizens and business 
need public services to be easy to access, 
efficient, integrated and digital by default, with 
increased transparency and accountability, but 
also available at any time and independently of 
location.
Emerging technologies such as DLTs open new 
opportunities for public administrations to 
meet those needs, build a more innovative and 
secure digital society, and increase public trust.
In particular, DLTs can enable the creation of a 
decentralized model for public administration, 
based on smart processes and self-sovereign 
digital identities. These are the fundamental 
building blocks, upon which it is possible to 
generate even further disruptive services in 
public administration. 
From traditional services to smart 
processes: the Once-Only Principle.
The Once-Only Principle provides that 
“businesses and individuals only have to 
communicate their data once to public 
administrations” - as envisioned by the Digital 
Single Market Strategy in 2016, namely 
considering Action 16. The principle aims at 
promoting data re-use and integration of 
services in national administration, to reduce 
the administrative costs, improve efficiency and 
prevent fraud. Importantly, it also establishes 
grounds for cross-border data exchange among 
the Member States, so to maximize the digital 
market growth potential.
Even today, however, the data re-use is in 
practice hardly to be obtained. In most cases, 
the European public administrations still provide 
their digital services in a fragmented way and 
through a multitude of isolated data silos, which 
are costly, inefficient, with no interoperability and 
unable to optimize the use of available resources. 
Blockchain and other DLTs have the potential 
to enable a new organisational paradigm for 
public administration, achieving the goals of 
a decentralized and integrated management 
of services, and at the same time the factual 
implementation of the Once-Only Principle.
A private / permissioned blockchain protocol, 
for example, could be used to integrate all 
the different entities within the national 
administration. The traditional services provided 
by each governmental entity could then be re-
engineered and translated into a corresponding 
set of automated workflows based on smart 
contracts (Marchoni 2018). These would self-
execute when preset conditions occur, in respect 
of the specific correlations or interdependences 
between public entities, as required by the public 
administration and the law. The result would 
be that traditional centralized services – as 
well as the need to issue “documents” - would 
simply disappear, replaced by smart process 
flows instead (Marchoni 2018). The integration 
REFLECTING ON WAYS 
TO MOVE FORWARD  
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of services among different entities would also 
make the duplication of data no longer necessary.
The transformative impact of such a 
decentralized model on public administration 
would be enormous, in terms of improved 
time and cost-efficiency, security and public 
trust. Also, through the setting of adequate 
interoperability standards at international level, 
this model would improve the access to public 
records and the exchange of administrative data 
throughout Member States and thus facilitate 
the cross-border mobility of citizens and goods - 
in due respect of data protection and other legal 
requirements.
Self-sovereign identity (SSI)
The SSI consists in the possibility for the users 
to create, manage and control their own identity 
without relying on any centralized authority. 
In their digital interactions, users are enabled 
to choose which specific pieces of their own 
information, claims or credentials they can 
disclose to third parties. In particular, Verifiable 
Claims are credentials such as educational 
degrees, business licenses, citizenship, etc., 
which are issued by an authority or verifiable 
through a signature of an attestation issuer, 
who can attest its validity.
The SSI architecture is entirely user-centric and 
its application in public administration can have 
disruptive effects in the delivery of services and 
more broadly in the way institutions, citizens 
and businesses interact, manage and share 
data. Indeed it ensures full individual control on 
data and portability, avoiding data to be locked 
in silos, reducing reliance on central authorities 
and reinforcing citizens’ privacy by design.
The main challenges ahead 
The availability of technology is not sufficient 
per se to ensure the modernization of public 
services, nor to put into practice the potential 
of DLTs in terms of social and public good. The 
implementation of DLTs in public administration 
may require indeed major structural change and 
raise different challenges under social, technical 
and regulatory point of view.
Promoting Broader Digital Innovation 
Policy 
Many factors may prevent the adoption of 
DLT-based innovative solutions within public 
institution and the relative creation of social 
value. The most frequent are: 
• the lack of a systemic approach to digital 
innovation, due to the fragmentation of 
national policies and initiatives; 
• obsolete modes of thinking, outdated 
approaches to regulation and bureaucratic 
entanglements; 
• low investments in public infrastructure;
• majority of processes still based on data 
which are not digital native nor machine-
readable.
The adoption of DLTs and the social and 
public good potentially generated will remain 
partial and limited in scale in absence of 
a broader and effective strategy for digital 
innovation at national level, which demands 
deep understanding of problems, adequate 
investments and long-term engagement. 
Cybersecurity and the risk of relative 
immaturity of technology 
Public administration is a sensitive sector and 
the levels of security, privacy and scalability 
required for digital services are higher as 
compared to other industry. It is essential, 
for example, to ensure the functionality and 
the continuity of key infrastructures on which 
depend the strategic services and operations for 
a large number of users. Even if they are start-
of-art, DLTs still present a certain degree of 
immaturity, which may lead to insufficient levels 
of security for data and processes involved. As a 
consequence, any possible applications of DLTs 
for public service must be evaluated through 
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a strict risk and benefit assessment, taking 
into account the actual levels of technology 
readiness achieved and the long-term stability 
of the infrastructures used.
Regulatory frameworks for DLTs 
To speed-up DLT adoption in public sector, it is 
crucial to establish a clear common legal base 
for the deployment of smart contract and digital 
signatures, with appropriate coordination and 
convergence among all the Member States. 
Inclusiveness and equal opportunities
In the provision of digital services and 
public administrations must always ensure 
observance of the principles of equal treatment 
to all citizens. That means that the adoption 
of DLT-based services should always be 
accompanied by adequate safeguards with 
respect to principles of inclusiveness, non-
discrimination and sustainable innovation. 
The protection of individual rights is 
particularly important in the deployment of SSI 
architectures,  which may entail complex social, 
ethical and legal issues for the most vulnerable 
groups, as related for example to the creation, 
storage, management and secrecy of the 
private keys.  
Recommendations
DLTs are strongly context-sensitive and several 
major factors have to be taken into account at 
organisational and societal levels in order to 
generate real social value. It is crucial to 
promote a joint approach to DLTs among all 
Members States, with the view to advance 
mutual learning and achieving technical 
standardization, convergence of policies and 
dissemination of good practices among different 
institutions. In this context, it is of particular 
importance the role played by the European 
Blockchain Partnership. Also, the uses cases set 
out within the European Blockchain Services 
Infrastructure (EBSI) and e-SSIF can work as 
solid building blocks for the rapid development 
of further services and proof-of-concepts.
Specific initiatives and social programs should 
necessarily be put in place to ensure that 
everyone has the opportunity (and is motivated) 
to access digital services and benefit from 
innovation, improving their well-being. It is 
a priority to narrow the digital divide in the 
provision of services, especially in consideration 
of the aging population and the low level 
of digitization of many European societies. 
Technology is not an end in itself: end-users’ 
needs must be clearly targeted and services 
must adapt to such needs, taking into account 
factors such as user age, awareness, technical 
and non-technical skills, capacity to operate 
autonomously, etc. Transition to new services 
should also be gradual and in some cases the 
coexistence of both traditional and disruptive 
services may be necessary. 
Avoid fragmentation and 
develop a convergent 
approach to DLTs among all 
the Member States.
Promote social inclusion 
and a user-centric 
technological design to 
generate social value.
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5.2 Trust, blockchain-based 
technologies, institutions, and the 
social good 
by Balázs Bodó 
Balázs Bodó is the PI of the European Research 
Council funded Blockhain and Society Policy 
Research Lab. Balázs is associate professor, 
and a research scientist at the Institute for 
Information Law, University of Amsterdam. 
He is a 2 time Fulbright Scholar (2006-7, 
Stanford University; 2012 Harvard University), 
and a former Marie Skłodowska-Curie fellow 
(2013-15). He has a degree in Economics (MSc, 
Corvinus University, 1999), and a PhD in Media 
Studies (ELTE, 2011).
Trust
Trust is a basic fact of social life. It enables 
strangers to cooperate across wider social, 
economic, political, cultural distances, in face of 
uncertainty, contingencies, and potential harm. 
Trust is a way we deal with the uncertainty of 
the future, and act, despite the fact that we 
may suffer negative consequences by engaging 
with each other (Giddens 1990; Luhmann 2017; 
Misztal 1996).
We develop and nurture trust in our 
interpersonal relationships through familiarity, 
established routines, and habits, and 
maintaining reputations (Misztal 1996). But 
such interpersonal trust is not always available. 
Living in a society means that we often need to 
interact across larger cultural, social, economic, 
geographic, cultural distances beyond the reach 
of interpersonal networks. How can we trust 
a stranger? The answer is simple: we rely on 
various institutions to do so (Giddens 1990). 
Let’s suppose we go to see a doctor, step on a 
plane, or sit into a taxi. In all these situations 
we put our lives into the hands of a stranger. 
The reason that we can make this leap of faith 
is that a large number of institutional practices 
ensure the trustworthiness of professionals. In 
case of the doctor, a medical school has provided 
professional training and certified his or her 
competences. Various mechanisms maintain 
the trust in the quality of education. Medical 
professionals are regularly tested, reviewed, 
trained, re-certified by their employers and 
professional associations. Patients can turn to 
online services, and share their experiences with 
each other. In some countries, patients can sue 
doctors and hospitals for medical malpractice, 
creating an extra layer of incentives for the 
former to do their best. Doctors, institutions 
and patients can buy insurance, to compensate 
(at least in monetary terms) for the harms the 
patient should suffer. In short, we do not need to 
trust an unknow doctor, if we can be reasonably 
confident that a number of checks and balances 
are there to guarantee his or her trustworthiness.
In modern societies we rely on all kinds of such 
expert systems: schools, food supply, local 
and national governments, economy, health, 
journalism, architecture are all providing us 
essential services which we need to trust, but 
most of us cannot assess their trustworthiness 
directly. In all of these cases, we rely on a dense 
network of institutions to produce trust in these 
systems through mechanisms of mutual oversight, 
accountability, control, insurance, and competition.
In some societies such institutional trust is 
higher than in others.  Various empirical studies 
have shown that high trust societies tend to 
perform better in social, economic, political 
terms (Fukuyama 1995; Inglehart 1999; Nye et 
al 1997; Sztompka 1998). We can also witness 
how the decline of trust in various public or 
private institutions, such as government, science 
or journalism can both be a sign of crisis, and 
contribute to the deepening of a crisis in itself. 
For example, a free, trustworthy news media 
is essential for societies, democracies to work. 
If trust in news, news media, and journalism 
declines, that can have devastating effect 
on social cohesion, on politics, on the public 
debates (Nielsen et al 2020).
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The trust in / by blockchain
One of the novel, and unique technological 
features of blockchain technologies is their 
approach to trust (Nakamoto 2008; The 
Economist 2015; Werbach 2018). The first 
blockchain applications grew out of the 
crypto-libertarian ideological corners of the 
internet, which can be characterized by a deep 
mistrust of public and private institutions, 
a strong commitment to individual liberty, 
and a strong opposition to any concentration 
of private or state power which could 
unilaterally impose its will on the individual 
(Golumbia 2016). The first wave of blockchain 
technologies implement the technological 
conditions of such a libertarian ideal. In 
blockchain networks none of the participants 
is trusted, and various algorithms, and crypto-
economic incentive mechanisms guarantee 
that transactions can still take place 
(Narayanan et al 2016). 
Though there are a plethora of different 
blockchain designs and implementations, they 
all share some trust related assumptions:
• No party is trusted in the network,
• No party should be in the position 
to unilaterally control and alter the 
transactions on, or the design and operation 
of the network,
• No trust should be required (between 
transacting parties, or among the members 
of the network) to successfully conduct a 
transaction, or participate in the operation of 
the network.
Blockchain technologies are therefore technical 
architectures that:
• Assume a general lack of trustworthiness of 
all network participants, 
• do not require trust to operate, and 
• may not allow trust to develop (if they allow 
anonymous parties to transact).
There are, of course some exceptions to 
these generic rules. There are blockchain 
based systems, such as Colony39 which are 
designed to facilitate repeated, long term 
collaboration among individuals (Bellini et al 
2020). To achieve their goal, they implement 
reputation systems, which enable individual 
users to accumulate reputation scores for their 
pseudonymous online persona. Other blockchain 
based designs hope to achieve trustworthy 
behavior by requiring parties to underwrite their 
trustworthiness by staking a certain amount of 
value, as a form of insurance, to the transaction 
or service they provide.
However, both ex ante, stake-based, and ex post, 
reputation-based trust producing technologies 
suffer from a number of possible limitations. 
Staking limits participation, and reputation is 
vulnerable to gaming. The trust-minimizing 
architectures rely on the trustworthiness of 
those who design and implement such trust-
minimizing systems (Davidson, De Filippi and 
Potts 2016; De Filippi and Loveluck 2016). One 
does not need to know or trust the counterparty 
to a transaction, or a transaction validator, but 
still need to have faith in that the code is free 
of bugs, that the cryptographic algorithms are 
quantum-safe, or they do not contain backdoors. 
Trust in public institutions and services
Blockchain-based technologies operate under 
the conditions of distrust, and may actively 
prevent the emergence of trust. Permissionless 
systems are engineered to resist institutional 
control and oversight. 
On the other hand, public and private institutions 
rely on trust to operate effectively. They need 
to be seen as trustworthy, they need citizens, 
customers to have confidence in the competence 
of the organisation and its staff; they need 
to be able to seen as acting in the best interest 
of their clients, and their goodwill is dependent 
of their perceived integrity (Mayer et al 1995). 
39  https://colony.io/
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They achieve such trust by being embedded in 
a rich network of institutional control, oversight, 
transparency and accountability (Sztompka 1998).
Therefore, the trust assumptions of some 
blockchain applications, and those of public and 
private institutions seem to be diametrically 
opposed. This apparent incompatibility of trust 
needs and assumptions forces institutional 
actors to find answers for the following two 
questions: (1) can the stark value antagonism 
between the institutional and technological 
approaches be reconciled? and (2) what form 
that compromise will take?
The value antagonism takes many forms. Legal 
compliance is one dimension, which, on the one 
hand, produces trust and trustworthiness, and 
on the other, blockchain systems are struggling 
with. Public and private institutions are bound 
by institutional constraints, and non-negotiable 
legal obligations, such as the GDPR compliance 
regarding their data gathering and processing 
practices (Bodó and Giannopoulou 2019; Fink 
2018), or the Anti-Money Laundering / Know Your 
Customer (AML/KYC) requirements for financial 
intermediaries (Ferrari forthcoming).  In the 
meanwhile, legal compliance is often seen at best 
a cumbersome hurdle for blockchain technology 
developers, and as a result, blockchain systems 
are surrounded by serious compliance issues, 
and fundamental, architectural incompatibilities 
between technical design, and legal obligations.
Compliance is a significant source of 
trustworthiness. A legally legible, compliant party 
can enter into enforceable contracts, can be 
brought to court, can be obliged to honor its legal or 
contractual obligations, therefore it is accountable. 
That being said, legal compliance is a necessary, but 
not sufficient condition of trustworthiness. 
Even fully compliant blockchain designs need 
to take into account the relationship between 
their trust minimizing approach, and the pre-
existing trust in, and around the institutions, 
communities, settings, procedures to which they 
are being applied to. 
Blockchain and other DLTs minimize the need 
for trust by replacing human subjectivity, 
flexibility, and arbitrary use of power with rigid, 
standardized, self-enforcing, and immutable 
software architectures, and rules hard-coded 
into various layers of the technology. In 
small-scale, interpersonal settings, such rigid 
architectures may block the emergence of trust, 
hinder the processes of self-governance, and 
may lead to socially undesirable outcomes. 
Similar questions arise in institutional 
settings. What happens if a trust minimizing 
technology is introduced into a high-trust 
institutional environment? There is a chance 
that the new trust-minimizing systems will 
not be used, because there is no clear benefit 
over pre-existing trust-based approaches. 
But if institutions mandate the use of such 
systems, pre-existing trust may be destroyed. 
Technologies of control prescribe and enforce 
behavior, spell out penalties in case of a breach, 
limit the freedom of the transacting parties. 
Such structures may lead to the emergence 
of trust in the long run, but they can also 
easily signal distrust, and thus destroy existing 
trust among institutions, or institutions and 
individuals. (Foorman 1997).
Conclusions
Our interpersonal and institutional settings 
are ripe with their own pre-existing trust and 
distrust relations. The introduction of novel, 
trust minimizing technological systems in these 
contexts should be done with extreme caution. 
On the one hand, we should not try to replace a 
high trust environment with a trust minimizing 
technology. Pre-existing trust is very valuable, 
and no policy should endanger what is extremely 
hard to build, but very easy to destroy. On the 
other hand, in low trust environments we must 
ask: What is the best way to deal with the 
harms produced by a low-trust environment? 
Is it to implement a technology which is able 
to operate in such low trust settings? Or, do we 
try to implement technologies, policies, which 
91
PART THREE
foster the emergence of trust? What is more 
preferable: replacing distrusted entities with 
trust minimizing technologies, or improve their 
trustworthiness? Should we implement a trust 
minimizing architecture, or a trust maximizing 
one? 
There are many components of trustworthiness. 
Transparency, accountability, fairness are key 
concerns. Blockchain and other DLTs might score 
high in terms of transparency, but because 
of their low institutional embeddedness, 
lack of legal legibility, complex design, and 
decentralized nature, they lack the same level 
of accountability as other social, institutional 
actors. Our institutions may be imperfect, often 
produce arbitrary outcomes, and sometimes 
they are outright oppressive. But at least there 
are clear lines of social, pubic, institutional, 
political, economic accountability and oversight. 
Such mechanisms of trust are yet to mature 
with regard to blockchain and other DLTs. Unless 
they can be brought into the fold, they remain 
largely unaccountable, thus fundamentally 
untrustworthy. 
This should warn well-intentioned public 
servants, institutions, private actors who wish 
to implement blockchain or other DLT systems 
because they want to better their domain, want 
to be seen as innovative, or simply fear to miss 
out on a supposedly revolutionary technology 
development. It may worth not to rush. It is 
OK to be slow and cautious. Disruptive digital 
innovation that targets trust should be treated 
with extreme caution.
Recommendations
Traditional, institutional systems of 
accountability and oversight can help DLT / 
blockchain ecosystems to overcome some of 
their trustworthiness issues. For example, 
voluntary submission to regulatory oversight 
(in case of financial service providers); code 
audits, and bug bounties; compliance with 
existing regulations, such as the GDPR; or 
the legal legibility of DLT / blockchain 
stakeholders create legal certainty. 
Regulatory sandboxes are key instruments 
in such institutional support.
Closely knit social groups build trust through 
shared routines, repeated interactions, a sense 
of familiarity, reputation, which are constantly 
negotiated, and renegotiated, balanced, and 
adjusted to the highly fluid internal and external 
dynamics of the group. Usually there is much 
flexibility in the application of the rules. Internal 
procedures, practices tend to be continuously 
adopted to the internal and external challenges 
the group needs to address. Such subjectivity, 
flexibility, malleability or irregularity is not a 
bug of such interpersonal relationships, but 
a feature, and it can be a substantial source 
of trust as it proves that the community is 
responsive both to the needs of its members, 
and to the changes in the external conditions 
the group faces as a whole. Such trust is 
extremely valuable and should not be replaced 
by inflexible, external, technological, mechanical 
modes of trust minimization.
Traditional institutions can 
support the trustworthiness 
of trust minimizing DLT / 
blockchain systems. 
Technological trust, or trust 
minimizing architectures 
should not replace 
interpersonal trust, or 
prevent its emergence. 
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Though institutions are much more formalized, 
structured, and standardized as informal groups, 
still, some high levels of trust in institutions 
may originate in the institutions’ flexibility, 
sensibility. When various institutions, such as 
law enforcement, welfare administration, or 
customer service replace human discretion, 
oversight and control with fully automated 
decision-making systems, this trust may be 
destroyed (Ananny 2019; Eubanks 2017). 
Blockchain and other DLTs systems are designed 
to reduce human subjectivity and arbitrariness, 
but humans are also important point of control 
in procedures, and a potential source of trust 
and accountability. At the moment there is no 
clear, unequivocal, long term evidence, that 
would suggest that the benefits of a supposedly 
objective automated systems are superior to the 
actual and potential harms of the computer just 
saying “no”.
5.3 DLTs for social and public good: 
how do we move forward? 
By Sarah Meiklejohn 
Sarah Meiklejohn is an Associate Professor in 
Cryptography and Security at University College 
London. She has broad research interests in 
computer security and cryptography, and works 
on topics such as anonymity in cryptocurrencies, 
privacy-enhancing technologies, and bringing 
transparency to shared systems.
In the years since Bitcoin was introduced, the 
landscape of cryptocurrencies has changed 
significantly. After years in which discussions 
focused entirely on Bitcoin, people began 
to realize the more abstract potential of its 
underlying technology, the blockchain, and 
“next-generation” platforms such as Ethereum 
and Zcash were launched; indeed, there are 
thousands of alternative cryptocurrencies 
deployed today. Others have repurposed some 
of the features of the Bitcoin blockchain to 
create an even wider class of technologies 
called Distributed ledger technologies (DLTs). 
In addition to the basic usage of blockchains to 
support cryptocurrencies, people are also now 
building other applications on top of them. There 
are services that draw on the immutability of 
a blockchain to securely notarize documents, 
or to issue and transfer licenses for digital art. 
Platforms like Ethereum support the ability to 
store not only atomic transfers of funds but 
entire stateful user-defined programs known as 
smart contracts that execute autonomously. The 
greatly expanded functionality this provides has 
enabled developers to provide services for things 
like crowdfunding and identity management. 
Indeed, blockchains have the potential to solve 
a broad class of social problems, by allowing 
people to work together without requiring trust. 
This simple property creates many possibilities: 
Trust minimizing technical 
tools may completely 
crowd out and replace the 
mechanisms that produced 
high levels of trust in 
institutions. 
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individual donors could instantly send money to 
or volunteer with aid organisations to support 
only a specific effort or humanitarian crisis 
(Elsden 2019). Refugees could prove their 
identity without needing a piece of paper. A 
father working in Dubai could send payments to 
his family in India, without any of them needing 
a bank account. 
As one concrete example from the non-profit 
sector, the AIRS project at Cornell University 
aims to integrate satellite data into the 
Ethereum blockchain in order to reward 
people who take care of their local forests. 
Organisations can fund a smart contract, and 
if the satellite data provides evidence that the 
forest has been conserved well (and maybe even 
expanded), this money can be paid out to the 
local residents responsible for that conservation 
effort. This incentivises responsible stewardship, 
and the use of smart contracts provides a form 
of disintermediation that enables organisations 
to deploy this in a scalable way. 
As an example from the public sector, central 
banks around the world have discussed with 
increasing frequency the idea of a central 
bank digital currency (CBDC). This asset would 
essentially function as a hybrid between a bank 
deposit and cash: it could be used digitally, 
backed by the central bank in the way that 
banknotes are today, but would be free of any 
credit risk. As observed by the Bank of England 
(BoE 2020), it also has the potential to lower the 
barrier to entry (allowing people to use CBDC 
who may be unable to open bank accounts), 
which is crucial as we see more and more 
payments move online and businesses moving 
to a cashless operation. In addition, if central 
banks coordinate their efforts this could set the 
stage for easier and more transparent cross-
border payments. 
The point of distributed ledgers: 
verifiability and disintermediation 
In terms of understanding the value in 
distributed ledgers, it is important to 
acknowledge that being distributed is not 
always an end in itself. In fact, a common end 
for distributed ledgers is verifiability, meaning 
anyone can be assured of the contents of the 
ledger. Authenticated data structures such as 
Merkle trees, however, already make it difficult 
for a participant to lie about the contents of a 
ledger they possess (e.g., saying a transaction 
is in the ledger when it isn’t), even if no other 
participants know its full contents. 
It is thus already possible to achieve verifiability 
even with a single participant holding the 
ledger, but this makes it impossible to achieve 
a form of disintermediation: if this participant 
decides they want to censor certain types of 
transactions, or that they don’t want to accept 
transactions from specific users, then those 
users have no recourse and are essentially 
barred from using the system. Thus, while the 
participant maintaining the ledger would not 
need to be trusted to tell the truth about the 
contents of the ledger, they would need to be 
trusted to stay online and accept transactions 
from anyone and everyone. Avoiding these 
middlemen, in the form of traditional financial 
institutions like commercial banks, is often 
regarded as one of the core motivations behind 
the creation of Bitcoin and blockchains more 
generally. 
Having multiple participants who are responsible 
for adding transactions to the ledger creates the 
opportunity for this form of disintermediation, 
but to actually achieve it requires a guarantee 
that these participants are not themselves 
coordinating or colluding. This lack of 
coordination between potentially mutually 
distrusting participants also helps to provide 
verifiability: if a majority of them agree on a 
given piece of information (e.g. the inclusion of 
a transaction in the ledger), then it is reasonable 
to assume that this information is true. On the 
other hand, if a majority of these participants 
are colluding then they can censor transactions 
at will and lie arbitrarily about the contents of 
the ledger. 
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The problem in any distributed ledger thus 
comes down to guaranteeing the absence of any 
coordination or collusion. This is ultimately a 
human-centered problem, however, that clearly 
cannot be solved by technology alone. Indeed, 
in most cryptocurrency blockchains today 
there are only 2-5 participants (in the form of 
mining pools) who are responsible for adding 
transactions to the ledger. Furthermore, most 
users of these cryptocurrencies do not even 
know who these participants are, let alone have 
any reason to trust them. 
The question of trust is thus at the heart of 
distributed ledgers, even those that claim to 
be “trustless”. In considering the use of DLTs 
for social and public good, it becomes essential 
to explore whether or not some application 
contexts do have a natural set of participants 
in which a significant number of users might 
be willing to place some trust; i.e., would trust 
this fixed and identifiable set of participants 
to not coordinate or collude. Crucially, this is 
not an extra trust assumption that users would 
have to make when using cryptocurrencies 
or blockchains; they are already implicitly 
trusting mining pools to do this. Rather, this 
would attempt to provide known entities that 
could be held accountable if things went 
wrong. What’s more, it could give rise to more 
efficient solutions that could also be deployed 
in the shorter term, such as the Certificate 
Transparency project. This is especially 
important given the inefficiencies of current 
blockchains, which are at odds with many social 
and public good challenges, such as the current 
climate emergency. 
In the CBDC example, it is likely that many 
of the citizens in a given country do trust the 
central bank to act in their best interest, even 
if they wouldn’t necessarily trust a set of 
commercial banks to act in a non-exclusionary 
way. Furthermore, it is expected that the central 
bank would like commercial banking to continue 
in some form (to, e.g., enable lending), meaning 
complete disintermediation is a non-goal of 
a CBDC. This suggests that more centralized 
approaches would be well suited to this 
application. 
The AIRS example, in contrast, is essentially 
impossible without complete disintermediation, 
albeit of a different form than discussed thus 
far. Here, it is more about helping organisations 
be able to fund and reward conservation efforts 
without having to identify everyone who might 
be involved in one (and then register them, 
get their bank details, personally monitor their 
progress, etc.). The main challenges are thus 
more technical than human-centered and 
involve finding ways to integrate authoritative 
information, like satellite data, into a ledger that 
has no inherent notion of authority. 
Conclusions 
There is no doubt that experimental 
technologies such as DLTs can have an 
enduring impact on some of the world’s 
greatest challenges. Despite their broad 
potential, however, distributed ledgers are 
still very much an experimental and evolving 
technology. Indeed, in settings where the full 
decentralisation and disintermediation of 
blockchains is needed, it is clear that a serious 
overhaul is needed in many different aspects 
of their operation (Meiklejohn 2018). The AIRS 
use case, for example, would likely scale better 
if instead of storing every data point on one 
monolithic ledger, the ledger was sharded by 
region. In the CBDC use case, privacy is an 
essential property of any payment system 
designed to capture the qualities of cash, yet 
existing blockchains are known to not achieve 
any meaningful notions of privacy. In the short-
term future, it seems essential to consider all 
ledger technologies, some of which may be 
ready much faster than distributed ledgers, 
and to work in partnership with organisations 
engaged in social and public good to understand 
their requirements and the trust assumptions 
they make about participants, which ultimately 
not even blockchains can avoid. 
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Recommendations
If the goal is to tackle social and public good 
problems in the near-term future, it seems 
essential to consider all ledger technologies, 
some of which may be ready much faster than 
distributed ledgers (or are even ready today). 
Examples include the infrastructure underlying 
the Certificate Transparency project, or Google’s 
Trillian framework. These do not involve adding 
any trust assumptions, but rather make explicit 
the trust that is already inherent in distributed 
ledgers.
Different application settings have different 
requirements (e.g., disintermediation, full public 
verifiability), and come with different sets of 
participants in different trust configurations. 
Deploying workable DLT solutions for social 
and public good (or any context) requires being 
aware of all of these properties and then 
coming up with the solution that fits those 
best, not the other way around. In particular we 
should not expect a “one-size-fits-all” solution 
that would work everywhere.
Consider all ledger 
technologies, not just 
distributed ones.
Work backwards 
from the problem. 
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5.4 Getting the balance right: 
transparency and privacy in DLTs / 
blockchains
by Jaya Klara Brekke
Jaya Klara Brekke is Assistant Professor and ESRC 
Postdoctoral Fellow at Durham University Geography 
Department with research on authority and 
economics in decentralised systems, cryptographic 
geographies and political economies of disruptive 
technologies. She is also co-founder of Magma 
Collective ‘Think and Do Tank’ currently building a 
social key recovery system and p2p infrastructure for 
data sovereignty.
“But how can we know with certainty if it is 
not on the blockchain?” This sentiment was 
expressed at a recent policy-related meeting on 
DLTs / blockchains for social and public good. 
The exclamation reveals what research into the 
social implications of blockchain technology 
has noted: that rather than solving the ‘trust 
problem’ blockchain can at times lead to further 
social and institutional mistrust, creating the 
problem which it is intended to solve (Vidan and 
Lehdonvirta 2019). If only that which is recorded 
‘on chain’ can be trusted, then everything 
that happens ‘off chain’ by effect becomes 
suspicious, giving rise to the impulse to trace 
and run an increasing number of things through 
blockchains. 
One of the main promises of blockchain is 
to provide a tamper-proof ledger of events, 
agreements and applications. This promise 
can lead to the temptation of recording ever 
more things, relationships and processes on 
to the ledger in ways that can erode instead 
of strengthen privacy and trust. It is important 
to know when the forms of transparency and 
traceability enabled by blockchain technology 
is beneficial and when it merely exacerbates 
mistrust and undermines privacy. This is a 
particularly sensitive question for projects that 
seek to use DLTs / blockchains for ‘social and 
public good’, because the protocols and DApps 
developed in this realm are often aimed at the 
most vulnerable in society and include civic 
technology initiatives that shape the digital 
public realm. 
The following provides a brief update on the 
importance of transparency and privacy in the 
context of digital network technologies and 
DLTs / blockchains, two cases and examples of 
privacy strategies in DLTs / blockchains, and 
a discussion of the importance of privacy for 
social and public good going in the future. 
Why transparency? 
Transparency is a means for holding people, 
companies, organisations or governments 
accountable. Transparency is important for 
information and processes that are of collective 
concern in society: from political decision-
making and public spending, to supply-chains, 
product ingredients and code. Transparency 
on its own does not guarantee accountability. 
It is a strategy for achieving the normative 
aim of holding powerful people or systems 
to account (Ananny and Crawford 2018). For 
cases where there is a clear understanding of 
roles and relationships of power there is also 
an understanding of when transparency is 
appropriate. 
When ‘transparency’ merely becomes 
surveillance depends on questions of power. 
Transparency is when the powerful is 
made visible. When someone or something 
significantly determines and influences the 
lives of others they should be considered to 
be in a position of power. ‘Decentralisation’, 
whether real or imagined, can confuse this. With 
blockchain and Distributed ledger technologies, 
roles become somewhat reconfigured: private 
citizens are enabled to become ‘prosumers’, 
communities are enabled to provide financial 
services to one another and decisions are 
outsourced to algorithms and smart contracts. 
New actors emerge with different forms of 
responsibilities and spheres of influence – for 
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example core developers of blockchain protocols, 
miners and nodes. Such roles and relationships 
in DLTs / blockchains are still consolidating. 
When relationships across sectors and industries 
are reimagined as a horizontal networks, it is 
easy to lose track of who or what is in a position 
of power, and should be held accountable, and 
who is not and needs privacy protection. 
Why privacy? 
Privacy decisions should be considered an 
important aspect of active participation in 
democracies. Social, civic and even intimate 
life is increasingly taking place through and 
via digital platforms and networks. In recent 
years, major technology companies turned 
online life into datasets for commercial and 
political exploitation, significantly eroding 
democracy in the process. The GDPR was a 
regulatory response, aiming to strengthen 
privacy and return the control of personal data 
to individuals. Blockchain was a technological 
response, with the promise that data and 
applications would no longer be in control of 
major companies, but instead distributed across 
the network, curated and controlled through 
cryptographic keys. 
Privacy is important in order to safeguard 
people from persecution and to allow people 
and communities to experiment, make mistakes, 
learn and grow. But with the continued 
expansion of digital networked technologies 
there is more to it than that. Data, including 
personal data, increasingly informs not only 
policy, commercial and political profiling, but 
also Machine Learning algorithms and thereby 
the technologies of the future. This implies 
that privacy preferences are inadvertently also 
choices that influence policy and technological 
developments going forward. This is one of 
the current limitations of GDPR: privacy is 
Giving Streets states that it is a 
blockchain-based donations platform 
that promises ‘full public transparency 
on all donations via the Blockchain.’ 
The project suggests that there is a 
lack of transparency in charity and that 
increased transparency will translate 
into more trust and therefore more 
donations. It is intended to help buskers, 
charity workers and homeless people 
to collect donations as societies move 
towards cashlessness. The project 
website states that people can donate 
money by scanning a recipients QR 
code and see how their donation has 
been spent; while charity organisations 
can receive donations, trace their 
spending and demonstrate their 
impact to funders. The website does 
not give further details of what kind of 
information is made transparent on the 
blockchain and to whom. But the details 
matter: for example, the traceability of 
spending, if not done carefully, could 
compromise the privacy of a homeless 
person. While tracing the spending of a 
charity could benefit the visibility of the 
issues they are addressing and serve 
towards accountability. The difference 
lies in the question of what data is 
made visible to whom and what they 
are enabled to do as a result. The 
balance between the two can be struck 
by for example abstracting and only 
gathering aggregate data while making 
the rest unlinkable. DLT’s / blockchains 
for social and public good projects 
should aim towards highest standards 
of transparency on their technical 
architectures, as it is these that enable 
and enact the transparency and privacy 
features that they advertise. 
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strengthened as an individual right and yet the 
consequences of individual decisions on privacy 
are decidedly collective. In this context, privacy 
should not just be considered an individual right 
to be protected through encryption. Encryption 
should be considered an increasingly essential 
tool for active democratic participation in 
shaping the digital systems, infrastructures and 
policies of the future.
Transparency and privacy strategies 
for DLTs for Social and Public Good 
DLTs / blockchains brought about a new 
wave of interest and experimentation with 
cryptographic techniques that can be used to 
balance transparency with privacy. Bano et al 
(2017) have translated GDPR guidance into 
strategies for engineers towards this end. These 
can also serve as pointers for regulators about 
what is possible. The authors state that privacy 
engineers can: 
• Abstract, so that no personal information 
is processed, only grouped and aggregate 
information. In the case of Giving Streets, 
this implies that no individual spending is 
made visible, only aggregate information. 
• Separate, whereby different data cannot be 
correlated, such that for example an action 
is not associated with a name. 
• Hide, whereby personal data is made 
inaccessible or unobservable to the public, 
where for example access is determined by 
cryptographic keys. 
• Minimise, whereby only the absolutely 
necessary data for a given purpose is 
gathered and processed. 
Furthermore, they suggest strategies for 
enhancing the transparency of technical 
architectures: 
Coconut is a protocol developed for the 
Ethereum and Chainspace blockchains 
to enable what is called ‘selective 
disclosure credentials’ (Sonnino et al 
2018). The protocol was developed to 
enable people to prove specific things 
about themselves without having to 
reveal anything else. For example, one 
would be able to prove ones age without 
needing to show name, photo or any 
other information. Taking inspiration 
from the GDPR Art. 5 stipulation of 
‘data-minimisation’, this approach 
enables fine-grained balancing of 
transparency and privacy. Only the 
necessary information is revealed 
while everything else remains hidden. 
Coconut is an example of a number 
of different projects that are building 
on cryptographic advancements of 
what are called zero-knowledge proofs. 
These utilise mathematical probability 
in order to prove a statement without 
having to reveal the associated 
evidence. Municipalities and civic 
platforms in Holland are exploring 
the use of such techniques for secure 
identity authentication with Attribute 
Based Credentials. Advancements in 
cryptography and privacy engineering 
are opening up novel ways to balance 
transparency and privacy concerns. 
But these engineering solutions can 
be seductive and sold as silver bullet 
solutions. The balance between 
transparency and privacy remains a 
normative decision that depends on 
understandings of power relations and 
assessment of what is for the social and 
public good. Cryptographic techniques 
can be powerful tools to design fine-
grained means to achieve these.
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• Inform those using the systems what 
personal data is gathered and how it is 
being processed. 
• Control, so that people can control how their 
personal data is used. 
• Enforce, so that privacy is enforced by 
default, by design.
• Demonstrate that privacy is being enforced, 
by providing evidence.
Getting the balance right between transparency 
and privacy requires an understanding of 
power dynamics. Understandings of the roles 
and relationships of power can be complicated 
by DLTs / blockchains and other decentralised 
systems. New cryptographic techniques can help 
balance transparency and privacy in fine-grained 
and context specific ways. 
Privacy in the digital age was one of the 
main motivations that led to the invention of 
blockchain (Nakamoto 2008; Swartz 2018) 
and features frequently in discussions of DLTs 
/ blockchains. But privacy continues to be 
understood as an individual right to private life, 
realised as a personal choice. As research has 
shown, personal choice about privacy is rarely 
felt as meaningful given that the consequences 
and effects are abstract (Symons and Bass 
2017). 
Foregrounding the collective, societal effects 
of such choices can make for a much more 
empowering case for privacy decisions. In order 
for DLTs / blockchains for social and public good 
move forward in this day and age, privacy needs 
to be significantly updated: from an individual 
right, to a means for active participation in 
deciding on how, when and for what one’s 
personal data is used in the shaping collective 
technological futures. 
Transparency and privacy, through regulation 
and engineering, are important aspects 
of functioning democratic societies. But 
transparency and privacy cannot be treated as 
fixed values. Rather, they are a means to achieve 
normative aims of balancing power, enabling 
accountability and deepening democratic 
participation. Ideally, DLTs / blockchains 
will in the future be part of a movement to 
democratise technological development more 
broadly by opening up new possibilities for data 
governance through infrastructural mutualism.
Recommendations 
Transparency and traceability can be useful, but 
not always appropriate as a method for 
achieving normative aims and can generate 
social and institutional mistrust rather than 
trust. Because blockchains promise the certainty 
of cryptographic proofs, it is tempting to want to 
trace an increasing amount of things. Similarly 
to GDPR Art.5c ‘data minimization’, only that 
which is relevant, adequate, and absolutely 
necessary should be traced using blockchain. 
DLTs / blockchains for 
social and public good 
should take a ‘minimum 
viable proof’ approach 
to traceability and 
transparency.
Privacy should be promoted 
as a main principle 
and use-case in DLTs / 
blockchains for social and 
public good.
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Data, including personal data, informs policy, 
has economic value and determines access. 
Many of these processes, from credit rating 
to border controls are becoming increasingly 
automated through data processing and profiling 
algorithms. They are also feeding into Machine 
Learning and Artificial technologies of the 
future. DLTs / blockchains can enable new forms 
of data governance so that these processes 
can be democratised going into the future, and 
controlled by the people they affect.
5.5 Research informing policy: an 
analysis of an emerging blockchain-
enabled collaborative economy 
By Samer Hassan and David Rozas 
Samer Hassan is an activist and researcher, 
Faculty Associate at the Berkman Klein Center 
for Internet and Society (Harvard University) 
and Associate Professor at the Universidad 
Complutense de Madrid (Spain). Focused on 
decentralized collaboration, he was awarded an 
ERC grant for the “P2P Models” project, to build 
blockchain-based, democratic and economically 
sustainable organisations for the collaborative 
economy. 
David Rozas is a postdoctoral researcher at the 
Universidad Complutense de Madrid (Spain), 
currently involved in the P2P Models project. 
David’s previous research as a PhD student 
at the University of Surrey (UK) focussed on 
individual involvement and group dynamics of 
Commons-Based Peer Production communities, 
studying the Free/Libre Open Source Software 
community Drupal, in the context of the FP7 EU 
project P2Pvalue.
Blockchain and DLTs are commonly associated 
with cryptocurrencies, new markets around 
emergent currencies, and overall with the 
disruption of Finance. However, the untampered 
potential of blockchain and other DLTs lies in its 
capacity to enable the implementation of novel 
properties at an infrastructural level in a fully 
decentralized manner, impacting the governance 
of technological tools. We are currently 
witnessing the early stages of these emergent 
decentralized structures, and thus their future 
potential beyond the financial world is just 
starting to be explored. In the last years, there 
has been an emergent body of both projects 
and literature around the role of new forms of 
blockchain-based governance.
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Two confronting standpoints dominate the 
emergent debate on blockchains / DLTs and 
governance, which we may refer to as techno-
solutionist and market-driven approaches, vs 
approaches supporting existing centralized 
institutions. 
The first group often aims to solve social 
problems through the creation of new markets 
driven by their proposed cryptocurrencies. 
They show perspectives characterised by a 
high degree of techno-determinism. These 
perspectives envisage the emergence of new 
forms of blockchain-based governance on the 
basis of the potential of these technologies 
for decentralisation and trustlessness. These 
discourses typically inherently embed the idea 
of “market” and tend to ignore the complexity 
of social organisation. For example, they 
commonly assume that hierarchies between 
the participants in decision-making processes 
vanish thanks to the disintermediation enabled 
by blockchain technologies (e.g. Swan 2015; 
Hayes 2016; Heuermann 2015). Overall, they 
tend to provide reductionist accounts with 
regards to the distribution of power, failing to 
acknowledge issues such as the generation of 
oligarchies or power dynamics (Freeman 1972; 
Shaw and Hill 2014; De Filippi and Loveluck 
2016). There are abundant examples of techno-
solutionist projects aiming to tackle social 
problems through new markets, such as Steemit 
commodifying social media interactions, the 
KodakCoin cryptocurrency to license Kodak 
photographs, or Mercury Protocol rewards to 
tackle online harassment. 
The second, smaller group, opposes the first 
aiming to use blockchains / DLTs to strengthen 
centralized traditional institutions. Their 
critical stand against these techno-determinist 
perspectives has successfully identified and 
criticised the limitations of such approaches 
(e.g. Atzori 2015; Atzori and Ulieru 2017). 
Nevertheless, this critique is built upon the 
reinforcement of the role of central authorities, 
resembling traditional responses against 
unregulated markets. In other words, these 
views consider traditional central authorities 
as inherently necessary to enable democratic 
governance and, as a result, ignore the potential 
for communities to successfully self-organise. 
By drawing on this assumption, the potentialities 
of blockchains / DLTs are envisioned in non-
transformative ways: to support the control 
required by traditional centralised forms of 
governance. For example, providing more 
transparency to their central institutions 
(Nguyen 2016), more efficient mechanisms to 
avoid tax fraud (Ainsworth and Shact 2016), or 
several banking consortiums such as R3. 
Still, beyond this reductionist dichotomy, there 
is a third approach worth exploring: the one 
followed by Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom, on 
the governance of commons. Ostrom’s work 
demonstrated that communities managing 
common pool resources were more efficient 
than both Market and State managers, as long 
as they followed certain governance principles. 
Thus, this third approach relies on previous 
studies on the self-governance of common 
goods, enabling a perspective that does not rely 
on the logic of private markets, as implicitly 
assumed by the hegemonic blockchain / DLT 
perspectives, neither on the logic of centralised 
institutions, which the emergence of the 
blockchain originally reacted against. The 
current debate is evolving to welcome this third 
approach, as we can see in both recent research 
(Rozas et al 2018, Calcaterra 2018, Shackelford 
and Myers 2017, Howell et al 2019), journalistic 
articles (Wong 2019, Anderson 2019) and 
emerging blockchain / DLT projects embracing 
it, of which the most relevant is the Commons 
Stack project (Emmet 2019), with the support of 
Giveth (Decoodt 2019). 
This line of work explores essential questions 
such as: which are the transformative 
potentials of blockchain or other DLTs for more 
participatory forms of governance? Can we 
define relevant uses of DLTs beyond techno-
deterministic, market-driven scenarios and 
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traditional centralised control? And overall, how 
can DLTs facilitate large scale cooperation? 
These questions regarding blockchain-
enabled governance directly relate to one of 
the blockchain promises: the emergence of 
Decentralized Autonomous Organisations, or 
DAOs. A DAO is an organisation where the 
interaction of members (humans or machines) 
is mediated by a blockchain application, 
controlled only and exclusively by a set of 
immutable and incorruptible rules embedded in 
its source code. The notion of organisation here 
points to an entity comprising multiple people 
(or distributed applications) with a specific 
goal, not a legally registered organisation. A 
DAO can be regarded as a digital organisation 
mediated by a software agent, whose code is in 
the blockchain. As a decentralized organisation, 
a DAO can provide services (or resources) to 
third-parties, or even hire people to perform 
specific tasks. Hence, individuals can transact 
with a DAO in order to benefit from the service 
it provides, or to get paid for a contribution 
they made. As opposed to traditional online 
platforms, DAOs do not rely on any central 
server and cannot be arbitrarily shut down 
by any single party (unless specifically 
provided for in their code). Thus, DAOs may be 
considered fully autonomous, to the extent that 
they do not need their original creator. Besides, 
a DAO may be considered self-sufficient, to 
the extent that they can charge users for their 
own services (or assets) in order to pay for 
the services they need. A theoretical example 
could be a DAO-Couchsurfing (Couchsurfing is 
a hospitality network where members stay in 
each other’s house couches), which provides 
a public directory of places, and users can 
interact and even reward the hosts with 
reputational tokens. 
A lot has been written on how the Web 2.0 has 
facilitated new forms of social organisation 
and cooperation. At the same time, it has 
raised unparalleled control to a few large 
multinational corporations which act as 
owners of the enabling infrastructure. This has 
caused multiple issues around surveillance, 
privacy, accountability, exploitation, exclusion 
and monopolistic practices (Benkler 2016, 
Greenwald 2014, Anderson and Wolff 2010). 
DAOs provide a new way for building online 
software platforms, in which the technical 
infrastructure is shared, enabling higher 
levels of democratization, transparency and 
accountability. Thus, the promise of a Web 
3.0 enabled by blockchain governance could 
potentially enable the benefits of boosting 
cooperation from Web 2.0 without several of its 
main core caveats. 
Such promise has attracted multiple activists, 
non-profits and ‘well-intentioned’ actors to the 
field, and in particular to the creation of DAO-
like organisations supported by DLTs. It is true 
that, if such potentials were untapped, we can 
envision ecosystems of small organisations 
connected through automated systems, with 
DAOs automating some of the burdens of 
large-scale organisation and facilitating the 
emergence of new International Organisations, 
Federations and Confederations. In such 
scenario, it would be possible, for instance: 
to have public institutions using freedom-
respecting software providing services without 
compromising user’s privacy (e.g. through 
the mathematical method of zero-knowledge 
proofs); to have large-scale cooperation across 
non-profits validated by a network of trust in 
which each vouches for their known ‘friends’;  to 
have new crowdsourced metrics of the multiple 
forms of value created by communities and 
social actors; to customize services beyond the 
current uniformity imposed by monopolistic 
software platforms, lowering the barriers for 
competition and opening the door to new forms 
of innovation by multiple non-profit and for-
profit actors; appropriate automatic rewarding of 
work, including previously invisible reproductive 
work. And all these forms of cooperation would 
be facilitated without having an owner of the 
infrastructure with absolute control over the 
network and its resources. 
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However, such beautiful utopic scenarios, 
brought by both techno-deterministic and 
commoners in different degrees, confront a 
reality in which decentralized infrastructure, 
especially for DAOs, are not yet ready for large-
scale deployment. Ethereum, with its DAO 
concepts, was first proposed in 2013, and had 
its initial release in 2015. Since then, three 
large blockchain projects have promised to 
make DAOs a reality: Aragon, DAO Stack and 
Colony. They are undoubtedly moving forward, 
and e.g. Aragon has 1,300 prototype DAOs. 
Still, these projects development is slower 
than initially projected, and have suffered 
from multiple issues. In fact, the technical 
and social challenges have been greater than 
anticipated, including: scalability of Ethereum, 
that these projects rely upon; standardization 
and interoperability across blockchains and 
with existing systems; usability for non-geeks; 
large-scale fair governance issues which have 
challenged political scientists for centuries and 
free/open source communities for decades; legal 
issues such as GDPR-compliance; a profound 
lack of trained blockchain developer supply; 
environmental concerns with Proof of Work 
algorithms, etc. These challenges have slowed 
down development and expectations, and 
eventually caused that, 12 years after Bitcoin 
and 7 years after Ethereum, we still do not have 
widely successful DAO cases to look into.
Still, we cannot despise the whole field, since 
there is a wide diversity of worthwhile projects 
that can be considered DLTs for social and public 
good, i.e. aiming for social and public impact. 
The current report throws some light on the 
current state of this field, and enables us to see 
points of intervention for Europe to facilitate 
the work of the emergent field of DLTs for good 
that it is brewing within its grounds. It would 
be sensible to reinforce existing trends, as in: 
promoting free/open source projects and digital 
open commons in general; funding research to 
solve the infrastructural problems; supporting 
both for- and non-profit entrepreneurship (and 
not just the former); incentivizing diversity in 
technical teams; and aiding the consolidation of 
the emerging hubs already appearing in several 
European countries. 
Recommendations
The current Collaborative Economy is 
overwhelmed with monopolistic corporate 
US-based platforms causing a large number of 
issues (e.g. Facebook, Uber, Google, Airbnb). 
Europe is currently putting efforts in trying to 
have their own “European Unicorn”. However, 
barriers for competition are very high in the 
current playing field, so it may be more sensible 
to change the rules of the game. That is, support 
the emergence of decentralized interoperable 
open source infrastructure where new 
ecosystems can thrive, providing customized 
services which are unthinkable nowadays. There 
are multiple technical and social challenges with 
respect to developing decentralized tech, and 
today there is a window of opportunity for 
Europe to boost the field and strengthen their 
position. It is already happening, with e.g. 
“Bloxberg” providing blockchain research 
infrastructure after an initiative from the Max 
Planck Library. 
Investing in the research 
and construction of free/
open source decentralized 
technical infrastructure.
Strengthen EU hubs 
on decentralized tech, 
including not-just-for-profit, 
open and diverse projects.
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The mapping of the European ecosystem of DLTs 
for social and public good published with this 
report has provided insights on the existing 
trends and projects already ongoing. Public 
institutions now have the chance to strengthen 
this ecosystem, aiding in the consolidation of the 
emerging hubs already appearing in several 
European countries. This should be done not just 
focused on for-profit entrepreneurship, but also 
on non-profit entrepreneurship, as the data shows 
has a strong presence in the EU. In fact, this has 
happened in the free/open source software world 
for decades in the USA (e.g. Mozilla Foundation, 
Apache Foundation, Free Software Foundation). In 
the same line, strengthening the existing trends 
on openness and diversity will give a clear 
advantage to teams aligned with European 
values in the international arena.
The Collaborative Economy facilitated by the 
centralized Internet has enabled large US-centric 
monopolies which act as central data hubs for 
the world population private data. However, 
as the Sharing Cities Declaration states, when 
considering policy, not all platforms are the 
same. With the emerging decentralized web, new 
possibilities open up concerning governance and 
business models. As opposed to the US, in Europe 
people are more used to participatory businesses 
and co-ops, and a 17% of Europe’s population 
are members of a cooperative business. Today, 
there is an opportunity to support an emerging 
business and governance model, in line with 
decentralized tech: Platform Co-ops, i.e. platforms 
in which the users have a voice and a share of 
the profits, such as the German Fairmondo. There 
are already public initiatives to support, incubate 
and accelerate such projects, such as Barcelona 
City Council’s “La Comunificadora”.
5.6 Blockchain technology as a 
mechanism for global bottom-up 
coordination 
by Primavera De Filippi
Primavera De Filippi is a Researcher at the 
National Center of Scientific Research in Paris, 
and Faculty Associate at the Berkman-Klein 
Center for Internet and Society at Harvard. 
Former member of the Global Future Council on 
Blockchain Technologies at the World Economic 
Forum, she is the founder and coordinator of the 
Internet Governance Forum’s dynamic coalitions 
on Blockchain Technology (COALA). 
The need for trust in governance
The COVID-19 pandemic has shown the 
limitations of the current global governance 
system. Existing governance institutions, both 
on a national and international level, have been 
unable to address this global health challenge 
in an efficient and concerted manner. Lack of 
strong political leadership in the early days of 
the pandemic was in part due to a tendency 
to focus more on the short-term rather than 
on the long-term implications of such a crisis. 
Political interventions in the latter stages of the 
pandemic have been elaborated at the national 
level—often in a non-concerted manner—rather 
than seeking to collectively come up with large-
scale interventions to address the pandemic in 
unison. Interventions have been geared mostly 
on individual confinements and national lock-
downs, including international travel bans, 
without appropriately acknowledging the 
growing interdependence of modern societies, 
populated by transnational corporations and 
organisations, whose long-term sustainability 
depends on a considerable flow of capital, 
goods, services, and people across borders. 
Finally, many governments around the world 
(e.g. China, Singapore, Israel) introduced 
measures for authorities to track down the 
Promoting Platform Co-ops 
as emerging governance 
and business models.
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journeys of infected people as a means 
to reduce the spread of the virus. These 
measures—although successful to some 
extent in promoting better practices of social 
distancing—raise important privacy challenges, 
and are often regarded with skepticism as 
they may lead to the establishment of a new 
surveillance regime that may persist even after 
the pandemic. Hence, the current responses 
to the pandemic are likely to undermine the 
trust that people put in governments and public 
institutions, regarded as either ineffective or too 
oppressive in their actions. This is particularly 
problematic in a period where self-discipline and 
social commitment —which both require trust—
have become crucial elements to overcome this 
global crisis. 
Increasing trust through confidence
The impact of blockchain technology on 
institutional and corporate governance has 
already been explored by a variety of scholars 
(De Filippi and Wright 2018, Werbach 2018, 
Reyes 2019) seeking to better understand 
how blockchain technology could contribute to 
increasing transparency and accountability in 
a variety of sectors. Major banks (e.g., the R3 
consortium) have already been experimenting 
with blockchains and DLTs for the settlement 
of inter-banks transactions, in ways that are 
more secure and efficient (Eyal 2017). In 2015, 
Nasdaq created the first blockchain-based 
system for the trading of private companies 
shares (Rizzo 2015), and securities brokers are 
currently exploring the technology’s potential to 
expedite the trading of securities by reconciling 
settlement and clearing into one single step 
(Trautman 2016). In the public sector, while 
Estonia was the first to recognize the potential 
of blockchain and other DLTs for securing 
the operations of governmental agencies, 
in the past few years, several governments 
have begun to explore the potential of these 
technologies to improve the transparency, 
integrity, and even the efficiency of public 
administrations (Ojo and Adebajo 2017, Maupin 
2017).
Finally, at the international level, some use 
cases have already been identified for the 
use of blockchain technology as a means 
to increase transparency and traceability in 
the supply chain (Francisco and Swanson 
2018). Several initiatives are emerging, using 
blockchain technology to improve real-time 
tracking and logistics40 or to guarantee the 
traceability and the provenance of specific 
goods or services41. The same technology could 
be deployed as a global and decentralized 
database where countries could log and trace 
the spread of the pandemic, and potentially 
even to keep track of the various tests (and, 
eventually, vaccines) delivered to people, 
allowing them to prove they have been tested 
without excessively impinging upon their 
privacy.
Overall, by contributing to greater 
transparency and accountability, blockchain 
technology can ensure a higher level of 
predictability in the operations of public or 
private institutions. In fact, to the extent 
that these institutions are constrained by a 
series of technological guarantees—which 
they cannot deviate from — it is impossible 
for them to act in an opportunistic manner.  
Moreover, because they do not have the 
power to unilaterally modify or influence the 
operations of a blockchain-based system, 
there is less of a need for third-party’s 
scrutiny and oversight. The adoption of 
blockchain technology is enough to guarantee 
that these institutions will not be able to 
act in ways that go counter to people’s own 
interests or expectations. 
Accordingly, by enhancing the confidence and 
reliability in public and private institutions, 
blockchain technology reduces the level of risk 
40  As for example OriginTrail http://origintrail.io
41  As for example Provenance http://provenance.org
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or vulnerability that is generally associated 
with trust.42 As such, the technology could 
indirectly contribute to increasing the level of 
trust that people may be willing to confer in 
these institutions, because of the higher degree 
of predictability associated with their actions. 
Indeed, thanks to blockchain technology, people 
would no longer need to trust these institutions 
in toto, but only to the extent necessary for 
them to carry on these specific operations 
that cannot be codified into the formal and 
deterministic language of a blockchain-based 
system. 
Addressing interdependence
The greater transparency and higher 
predictability provided by blockchain technology 
could contribute not only to increase the 
confidence (and trust) in public or private 
institutions, but also to support more 
cooperation among institutions that do not trust 
each other, without the need to establish an 
overarching entity or organisation in charge of 
coordinating the activities of multiple parties. 
This could have important implications for 
global governance. However, as of now, while 
the benefits of blockchain technology have been 
studied from a sectoral perspective (in terms 
of e.g., financial applications, supply chains 
management, impact assessment, philanthropy, 
etc.), too little attention has been given to 
analysing whether the principles of distributed 
consensus and bottom-up coordination 
42  Drawing from Luhmann’s distinction between “trust” 
and “confidence” (Luhman 2000), we refer here 
to “confidence” as a set of expectations about the 
operations of a person or system, based on personal 
experiences or inductive knowledge about the way 
the world works. We refer instead to “trust” as the 
act of delegating power to a third party as a result 
of insufficient knowledge or excessive complexity for 
carrying on the task at the individual level. Hence, as 
opposed to confidence—which is based on rational 
expectations and predictability—trust necessarily 
involves some degree of risk or vulnerability, as it 
requires taking a leap of faith as regard the trustee’s 
good intentions to act in the trustor’s best interest.
elaborated within the blockchain space could 
be transposed in the global arena to support 
the resolution of global challenges in a more 
concerted and coordinated manner. 
We live in an interconnected world, and yet 
we lack a proper mechanism of international 
or even transnational coordination (Biermann 
et al 2009). While global interdependencies 
provide many opportunities for cultural and 
economic growth, they also introduce multiple 
points of failure that might propagate errors 
across multiple social and economic systems 
(Balsa-Barreiro et al 2020). Accordingly, global 
challenges cannot be addressed individually, 
from the perspective of a single entity or 
nation state. They require a more holistic 
approach involving all relevant parties, both 
public and private actors (Hewson and Sinclair 
1999), with an in-depth analysis of their 
mutual interdependencies, so that they can be 
addressed collectively and on a global scale.
One solution would be to create a centralized 
global governance system to better manage 
these interdependencies, with the establishment 
of a dominant superpower that can actually 
exercise coercion to enforce its decision on a 
global level. Yet, such a solution would introduce 
a single point of failure and control, which 
may go counter the established principles of 
global governance and international law. On the 
opposite side of the spectrum, an alternative 
solution would be to “deglobalize”, cutting 
down connections and closing up borders, 
while progressively strengthening resilience 
at the local level. Such a solution would entail 
some level of decentralisation, albeit a form of 
decentralisation driven solely and exclusively by 
a lack of trust. 
The most appropriate solution probably lies in 
between these two extremes. The challenge 
is to figure out how we can create a more 
resilient and trustworthy governance system 
that actually embraces (rather than rejects) 
interdependence; one that supports and 
encourages cooperation amongst multiple 
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interrelated parts, so that global challenges 
can be addressed collectively, through a 
decentralized yet coordinated approach.
The blockchain solution
As Ostrom (2000) would point out, decentralized 
yet coordinated action is hard without 
monitoring or enforcement. Blockchain and 
other DLTs provide a decentralized solution to 
precisely both of these challenges: monitoring 
can be achieved in a decentralized manner via 
a distributed ledger used to record information 
in a transparent and tamper-resistant manner; 
whereas enforcement can be achieved through 
a system of smart contracts for the trusted 
execution of specific agreements, automatically 
executed by the underlying technology (De 
Filippi and Hassan 2016).
In light of that, the benefits of blockchain 
and other DLTs for global governance are 
essentially twofold. On the one hand, the use 
of blockchain technology by public and private 
institutions could lead to a higher degree of 
confidence in their operations, increasing the 
trust level conferred to these institutions while 
simultaneously reducing the need for global 
scrutiny and oversight. On the other hand, the 
adoption of a shared database and execution 
platform based on a decentralized blockchain 
infrastructure could facilitate new forms of 
cooperation amongst these different institutions, 
providing for a trusted and coordinated 
mechanism of bottom-up collaboration that 
does not rely on any centralized superpower or 
other trusted authority.
While there is currently a lack of empirical 
data on the actual benefits of blockchain 
technology in the field of corporate and 
institutional governance (due to the relatively 
limited adoption of blockchain technology in 
existing institutional settings), insight from 
international law and global governance 
scholars could help us investigate the extent 
to which existing blockchain-based solutions 
for institutional governance—such as public 
blockchains, consortium blockchains, or even 
permissioned blockchains—could be adapted 
to support the coordinated actions of a variety 
of public and private actors (e.g. market 
players, governmental agencies, civil society 
organisations, etc.) participating in a global and 
polycentric system of governance (Polanyi 1951, 
Ostrom 1999).
Recommendations
The adoption of blockchain technology could 
help re-establish public confidence and trust in 
existing governance institutions by providing a 
series of technological guarantees that they 
cannot deviate from. By enhancing the 
transparency, accountability and predictability of 
these institutions, blockchain technology makes 
it easier for people to trust them to act in their 
own interest. 
Policy-makers could promote innovation in the 
blockchain space by inviting the private sector 
to come up with new usages of blockchain 
Short term: Encourage 
public and private 
institutions to adopt 
blockchain / DLTs as 
a means to provide 
technological guarantees.
Medium term: Promote 
innovation in the blockchain 
space via the use of 
blockchain / DLTs for 
regulatory compliance.
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technology as a regulatory technology (regtech) 
through a series of technological guarantees 
designed to achieve specific regulatory 
objectives. Provided that these solutions are 
recognised by regulators as being “functionally 
equivalent” to existing legal formalities, 
regulators would let anyone who adopts them 
benefit from a lower regulatory burden. 
If global challenges are to be addressed in 
a coordinated manner, it is crucial to have 
a common infrastructure which constitutes 
the backbone of selected public services. 
The European Union is already working on 
the implementation of such a solution with 
the European Blockchain Partnership. Ideally, 
similar initiatives would emerge from different 
regions of the world, all sharing a common 
infrastructure that is controlled and governed 
in a distributed manner by all relevant 
stakeholders.
Long term: Foster the 
implementation and 
progressive adoption 
of shared blockchain 
/ DLT infrastructures 
for public services that 
extend beyond national 
boundaries.
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